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The relationship between depression and attributions and expectancies 
concerning current life problems and syn^toms was examined in a series of 
studies in clinical populations, aimed principally at examining aspects 
of the attributional reformulation of the learned helplessness theory of 
depression. In an Initial study comparing depressed and emxious 
patients, some evidence was found of an association between depression 
and internal, global and uncontrollable attributions concerning current 
life problems. A subsequent study examined the relationship between 
internality cmd the components of depression obtained from a factor 
analysis of the Beck Depression Inventory. Evidence was found of a 
specific association between personal (vs universal) internal 
attributions and a component of the BDI, Interpreted as reflecting low 
self esteem. A longitudinal study did not, however, provide evidence of 
a causal relationship between low self esteem w d  attributions. Finally 
depression severity was found, in a separate study, to be associated with 
pessimism about future change in symptoms, while low self esteem was 
found to be atssociated with internal attributions concerning the cause of 
the main presenting symptom. Patients who presented with diffuse, 
emotional symptoms, compcu'ed with those who presented with more specific, 
neurotic symptoms, were more depressed and attributed the cause of their 
symptoms more to internal psychological (compared with medical) causes. 
It was concluded that though some evidence had been obtained of an 
association between attributions, expectancies and the components of 
depression, this could be accounted for by the hypothesis that 
attributions and expectancies are a cognitive symptom of depression 
rather than that they cause depression. It is contended that 
methodological problems do, however, make evidence of a causal 
relationship difficult to obtain.
CHAPTER I
THE ATTRIBOTIOWAL HgPDWWLATlOW OF THE LgAWm) HBU»LBSSIIKSS THEORY OF 
DEPRE88I0W
Introduction
There has over the past fifteen years* been considerable interest and 
research into the psychiatric disorder depression, and particularly 
cognitive theories of depression. Theories and treatments of depression 
have in the past been developed from a wide variety of standpoints 
including the biological (eg Coppen 1967, Whybrow and Mendels, 1969), 
psychoanalytic (eg Freud, 1917), social (eg Brown and Harris, 1978) and 
behavioural (eg Ferster, 1973). However during the past decade, 
cognitive theories and therapies of depression have become Increasingly 
prominent and influential, particularly as developed by Beck and his 
colleagues (eg Beck, 1967; 1976). Cognitive approaches to depression cu^ e 
based on the assumption that depression is fundamentally a cognitive 
disorder, that is that the depressives cognitive process and structures 
have a major causal role in the development amd maintencuice of 
depression. This constrasts with other approaches, pau*ticularly 
biological models, which assume that depressive cognitions are simply one 
feature of the disorder.
Cognitive theories of depression have themselves varied greatly in both 
content and theoretical background. They have focussed on cognitions at 
different levels of permanency and accessibility ranging from transient 
conscious thoughts to basic cognitive structures (see Narzillier, 1980) 
and have been derived from different theoretical paradigms. For example 
Rowe's (1978) work is based on a personal construct theory framework 
while Beck's work developed from a psychodynamic background but was 
influenced most by his clinical observations. Relatively few cognitive 
theories^have been based on experimental psychology, a major exception to 
this generalisation being SeligHwn's (eg 1975) learned helplessness 
theory of depression. The learned helplessness theory was originally 
developed to explain findings obtained from research into the learning of 
conditioned responses in animals. The concept was subsequsntly applied 
to human subjects in laboratory experiments and finally to the phenomenon
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of clinical depression. However it quickly became apparent that the 
original learned helplessness theory could not account for both findings 
in the experimental human learned helplessness literature (eg Klein, 
Fencil-Morse and Seligman, 1976) nor conceptual and theoretical problems 
arising from extrapolating the learned helplessness phenomenon in 
students to clinical depression.
The original learned helplessness theory of depression (Seligmcurt, 1975) 
had proposed that the perception of non-contingency between actions and 
outcomes was a sufficient but not necessary condition for the occurrence 
of depression in humans. The revised theory made a number of significant 
changes and developments including differentiating among the components 
of depression (affective, motivational, self-esteem and cognitive) and 
proposing that attributions play a crucial role in mediating between life 
events cuid depression.
THK ATTRIBUTIOIIAL HKWaBKILATIOII
The revised reformulation differs from the original learned helplessness 
theory in several important ways.
1. The kinds of outcome which can lead to depression are defined in a 
more restricted way. In the original theory non-contingent positive 
and negative outcomes could produce depression. The revised theory, 
taking account of "common sense" and clinical experience, proposes 
that only when highly desired outcomes are believed Improbable or 
highly aversive outcomes believed probable, can depression result. As 
in the original theory, it is not the expectation alone which can 
lead to depression, but the expectation together with the expectation 
that no behaviour within their repertoire will change this 
likelihood.
The revised theory proposes that after the person has failed in their 
attempts to modify the aversive expectation, leading to a perception 
of nrâ-contlngency, attributions for the cause of this failure are 
iiade. These attributions determine whether an expectation of future 
non-contingency is made and also determine aspects of the resulting 
depression. If the attribution is to a stable cause, an expectation 
of non-contingency will usually bs made. In addition the depressive 
ct^anges will be sors persistent if more stable attributions are made. 
The intemallty dimension will determine whether self-esteem deficits are
!
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found while globality will determine how generalised and severe are 
the depressive changes.
This sequence of events is reproduced in figure 1.
3. Finally« the revised theory proposes that the intensity of depression 
will depend on the certainty of the expectation of non-contingency, 
and in the case of the effective and self-esteem defects, the 
importance of the outcome. <
A number of important features of the theory should be noted as they
appear to have often been ignored by subsequent authors:
1. The proximal cause of the affective and motivational components of 
depression is the future expectation of non-contingency not a current 
or past perception of non-contingency. While future expectations are 
probably related to past and present perceptions, they are certainly 
not the same and indeed may be unrelated. For exeunple, a person may 
be made unemployed because their firm has closed d o m  (a stable 
external cause) but expect future employment to depend on effort 
(internal unstable).
2. The future expectations must concern either improbable highly 
desirable outcomes or probable highly undesirable outcomes. It is 
not very clear what kind of outcomes are meant by these statements. 
Abramson et al (1978), are not very specific about this but give, as 
an example, a man whose child is dying with leukaemia. Here the 
highly undesirable outcome is the child's death. Abramson, Garber 
and Seligman (1980), note this problem and suggest that Klinger's 
(1975), notion of current concerns may be relevant. This conception 
is Important as it indicates that the outcome need not be an event at 
all but can be, for example, a "non event", such as the expectancy 
that the person will not be able to have any children, or a failure 
to acijust to an event, such as the expectation that the person will 
never get over a loss.
3.  ^ The attributions made concern the cause of helplessness, that is the
person's failure to modify the future expectation, not the cause of 
ttie problem itself or cause of the future expectation. This 




4. The use of the concept "intemality" Is clearly specified by Abramson 
et al (1978) to refer to a personal-universal dimension. This usage 
is distinct from that adopted by Heider (1958) which regards internal 
causes as arising from within the person and external causes as 
arising from the environment. It also appears to differ from the 
analysis of Weiner in his many studies of achievement-related 
situations from an attributlonal standpoint (eg Weiner, 1974). 
Although task difficulty and ability appear, to differ along an 
intemality dimension similar to that proposed by Abramson et al 
(1978), luck and effort differ in a way similar to that proposed by 
Heider.
The reformulated theory leads to a number of predictions about depression
in humans:
1. When a highly aversive outcome is expected with a high probability, 
and the person expects that there is nothing that they can do to 
change this expectation (le behaviour and outcome are considered 
non-contingent), this is a sufficient but not necessary condition for 
the occurence of the motivational, affective, and cognitive symptoms 
of depression.
I
2. If internal attributions are made for the cause 
non-contingency, this will lead to lowered self-esteem.
of this
3. If stable attributions are made for the cause of this
non-contingency, this will lead to the symptoms of depression being 
more persistent and chronic.
4. If global attributions are made for the cause of this
non-contingency, this will be associated with more generalised and
more intense symptoms of depression.
/
These predictions concern the aetiology and persistence of s o m  
depressions and the relationships between life events and problems 
 ^ and depression.
Although the aetlological theory is the core of the reformulated 
theory, proposals are also sade regarding vulnerability
/ -  5  -
(depression-proneness) and recovery from depression.
5. There exists a depression-prone attrlbutional style which consists of 
a tendency to make internal, stable and global attributions for the 
cause of failures, particularly failures to control aversive 
outcomes and external, unstable and specific attributions for 
success. This attrlbutlonal style interacts with the actual life 
problems facing the individual in the determination of what 
attributions are actually made concerning a particular failure.
6. Finally, recovery from depression will depend on a number of factors. 
Change in the future expectation is critical and may be brought about 
by changes in the aversiveness or desirability of the outcome or 
changes in the probability of the outcome. This in turn can be 
caused by environmental changes or attributional changes.
It should be borne in mind that predictions five and six are less central 
to the theory. Indeed the vulnerability hypothesis can be regarded as a 
separate hypothesis concerning what determines the attributions people 
medce when faced with life events or problems. The aetiological theory 
would not neccessarily be falsified should the vulnerability hypothesis 
fail to be substantiated since the aetiological theory does not directly 
concern Itself with what determines attributions made, only with the 
consequences of particular kinds of attributions.
Peterson and Seligman (1984) in their review of investigations relevant 
to the reformulated helplessness theory of depression concluded that 
"results to date support the model". This conclusion arose from a review 
of a variety of studies in both clinical and non clinical population, 
most of which have addressed the vulnerability hypothesis only. Peterson, 
Raps and Villanova (1985) in a subsequent atteiqpt to differentiate 
supporting from non supporting studies concluded that a large sample 
size, a ^arge number of events concerning which attributions were made 
and using hypothetical events were associated with positive findings. 
However this was only true for stable and global attributions and since 
the three attributional dimensions were highly intercorrelated across 
studies, their independent effects could not be determined. Their 
conclusions were therefore considerably more qualified than Peterson and 
Seliglnarf*i. Finally Brewin (1985) concluded from his review of the theory 
and evidence that there is little evidence to support the vulnerability
/
and aetiological hypothesis although there is some evidence to support 
other aspects of the model such as that concerning recovery. There is 
clearly considerahle. divergence of opinion regarding the extent to which 
currently available evidence does support the reformulated learned 
helplessness theory.
The following review will examine the theoretical problems with the 
reformulated theory, the practical problems arising from attempts to 
examine the theory, the actual findings obtained and the relevance of the 
findings to the reformulated theory.
It will be concluded that the reformulated theory has not been adequately 
tested, most authors having failed to clearly understand its main 
propositions. The evidence which has accumulated will be presented and 
demonstrated to be limited in its relevance. Inadequate in aspects of its 
methodology and only weakly supportive in its findings. It will be 
argued that despite these conclusions the theory itself remains of 
considerable interest meriting further investigation.
THEORETICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE REFORMULATED LEARNED HELPLESSNESS THEORY
A nximber of theoretical criticisms and questions have been raised 
concerning the reformulated theory (eg Wortmcn and Olntzer, 1978, Hammen, 
1981, Coyne, 1982). Most of these criticisms have concerned the 
attributlonal component of the theory which will be considered first.
The reformulated leau'ned helplessness theory differs from the original 
theory principally in the role ascribed to attributlonal processes. A 
number of theoretical problems concerning this attrlbutional component 
will be examined including the theoretical status of attributions; 
aspects of the attrlbutional analysis; other possibly relevant 
attributlonal dimensions; the subject matter of the attributions and the 
concept of attributlonal style.
/
THE THEORETICAL STATUS OF ATTRIBUTIONS
Abramson et al (1978) in their original statement of the theory were far 
'from clear about the status of attributions in their analysis. 
Attribution theory is derived from a phenomenological framework, 
attributions being regarded as aspects of a person's naive psychology.
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(Holder, 1958). There has been considerable controversy concerning the 
theoretical status of attributions in particular and cognitions in 
general (eg Nlsbett and Wilson, 1977). Critlcissshave been made of the 
assumption that people have direct access to their mental cognitive 
process. Nonetheless in their original analysis, it appeared that 
Abramson et al were using attributions either in a phenomenological 
framework or as intervening vcu'iables. However Abramson, Garber and 
Seligman (1980) and Peterson and Seligman (1984) in subsequent papers 
explicitly state that they regard attributions as hypothetical 
constructs. This is therefore a quite different usage from that of most, 
if not all attribution theorists (eg Weiner, 1974, Heider, 1958,) and 
does have considerable bearing on a number of criticisms which have been 
made of attribution theory. For example Wortman and Dlntzer (1978) noted 
in their critical review that there has been some debate about whether 
people do actually make attributions spontaneously and whether these 
attributions relate to subsequent behaviour. Such criticisms do however 
lose much of their force if attributions are regarded as hypothetical 
constructs moderating between two sets of variables. Verbal behaviour, 
in such a framework, is merely one set of output operations of 
attributions. The absence of spontcuieously given attributions is not 
crucial to Peterson euidSdllgman's attributions! analysis. However if the 
attribution concept is used as a hypothetical construct, it would be 
helpful to specify more clearly and in more detail the input and output 
operations relating to attributions.
ASPECTS OF THE ATTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The attributlonal analysis proposed by Abramson et al has also been 
criticised for some of the assumptions it makes about how people make 
attributions. For example Wortman and Dintzer (1978) proposed that 
people mcqr initially make more than one possible attribution concerning 
the cause of an outcome and that these alternatives might then be tested 
out subsequently. The Implicit assumption that only one causal 
attribution may be held by a person at any one time may not, they 
suggest, be valid. However by using a methodology that forces subjects 
to give a single exclusive cause, a distortion of peoples "natural" 
attributional process may be created.
Wortman and Dlntzer also point out that attributions may be made at 
diffbi'snt levels in a kind of helrarchy with quite diffsz^nt conclusions
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being drawn at different levels. For example a relationship failure may 
be attributed to lack of certain personal qualities in the person making 
the attribution (internal cause) but the lack of personal qualities may 
themselves be attributed to their upbringing or childhood experiences 
(external cause). Self esteem loss may then depend on which level of 
attribution is focussed on or given priority by the person. This may be 
a more significant criticism, particularly as most studies have focussed 
on the Immediately emtecedant attributed cause which may relate less 
closely to depression and loss of self esteem.
The Concept of Attributional Style
The concept of attributional style is atssumed by the vulnerability 
hypothesis, with little evidence being presented to show that it is a 
significant contributory factor to the making of any specific attribution 
(Abramson et al, 1978). It may be that attributions are determined 
predominantly by situational factors, person by situation interactions or 
person factors other than attributional style (eg mood state). The 
reformulated theory also proposes that the depressive attributional style 
consists of the tendency to make these different attributions, internal, 
stable and global, to a greater extent them people who are not 
predisposed to depression. Many of the issues raised by these
assumptions are empirical but it is noted here that the assumption that 
much behaviour is related to relatively stable personal characteristics 
(traits) has been questioned (eg Nischel, 1977).
These points are not of themselves crucial or even important to the 
aetlological theory or most other aspects of the reformulated 
helplessness theory. They are, however, pertinent to the most studied 
but arguably peripheral aspect of the theory, the vulnerability 
hypothesis.
The Focus of the Attributions
/
One Mpect of the theory which appeaurs to have given rise to considerable 
confusion and lank of clanity is the object or focus of the attributions 
ie about what the attributions are made.
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Recall that the reformulated helpleaaneaa theory propoaea that when a 
peraon is faced with an undesirable outcome (or non occurrence of an 
expected desirable outcome) they will attempt to change or control it. If 
their attempts are unsuccessful they will eventually conclude that the 
outcome and their behaviour are non-contingent. They will then make 
attributions concerning the cause of this non-contingency or failure to 
control. The focus or subject of the attributions is therefore the 
person's failure to control or modify cm outcome, ie the 
behaviour-outcome non-contingency. It follows from this that the focus 
of attributions is not the cause of the outcome itself or cmy aspect of 
the outcome.
It is important that, in any test of the theory, the appropriate 
attributions! focus is selected. This has not been done in some studies, 
such as those of Hammen and her collègues discussed in more detail below, 
(eg Gong-Guy and Hammen, 1980; Cochran and Hammen, 1985) in which 
attributions concerning the cause of life events were examined.
It may however be that other attributions! foci are important in the 
development of depression, including the event itself, the consequences 
of an event and the emotional effect of an event on a person. Indeed it 
has more recently been proposed that causal beliefs and expectancies 
concerning the symptoms of depression themselves may be important in the 
maintenance if not the aetiology of depression (eg Teasdale, 1985, 
discussed further in Chapter 7 below). Finally causal beliefs about the 
future may be as important as beliefs about the past, particuletrly in 
view of the critical role of future expectancies (of uncontrollability) 
in the reformulated theory.
The Concept of Outcome
The final part of this section on theoretical issues concerns the nature 
of the concept of "outcome". Abramson, Garber and Seligman (1980) 
briefly consider this point and note the lack of clarity in the concept 
particularly in the sense of "highly aversive outcomes". They suggest 
that Klinger's (1975) notion of "current concerns" may be relevant and 
that depressive affect only arises from the non-occurrence and expected 
non-occurrence of outcomes which are "in our mind", "in the realm of 
possibility" or "of present concern". This emphasises that outcomes are 
not '^ Just outside "objective" events but in many cases may be a
/
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discrepancy between an expected state of affairs and an actual state of 
affairs. Thus while two people may be in identical objective situations, 
one may be satisfied with the situation, and therefore not face the 
non-occurrence of a desirable outcome, while the other may not. Examples 
of this may include being childless, not being able to play sports due to 
an injury, or not having a close friend. This has considerable bearing, 
once again, on the subject matter of euiy attributions made since most 
studies have concentrated on negative events (eg failure or rejection) 
whether hypothetical or occurring in real life.
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN TESTING THE REFORMULATED THEORY
The examination of the reformulated theory has raised a number of 
practical problems which can be divided into the populations studied, the 
conceptualisation and measurement of depression and the measurement of 
attributions and other relevemt cognitions. These will be considered in 
turn.
POPULATIONS STUDIED
The majority of studies have been conducted with American University 
students as subjects. There have been relatively few studies with 
clinically depressed patients and a similcu' number of studies with 
specific general population groups eg expectant mothers, unemployed men 
and teachers.
One limitation of much of the literature relevant to the reformulated 
helplessness theory is the use of "analogues" of clinical depression, 
namely mildly depressed students. Typically in such studies, groups of 
depressed students are identified by the administration of the Beck 
Depression Inventory with a cut off of around 10. This is considerably 
below the cut of 14 recommended by Beck to differentiate mildly depressed 
from non-depressed patients (Beck 1967). Such an approach might however 
be Justified by arguing that depression is a continuous state ranging 
from mild transient states of depression, which nearly everyone 
experiences, to severe clinical depressions. Given such an assumption 
a ^  cut off is essentially arbitrary. But if the cut off is arbitrary 
correlational statistics are preferable and involve less loss of 
Information.N
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There is however one additional problem In the uae of student analogues. 
This is that in students depression level, as measured by the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI), has been found to be very unstable. For 
example Hammen (1980) found a change in average BOX score of 8 points 
over a two to three week period, such that over half the depressed 
students at initial assessment were non-depressed at later assessment 
(using a cut off of 10). Zimmerman (1986) using only a one week 
test-retest interval found a test-retest reliability coefficient of only 
0.64 and also that more than half of the students scoring in the 
depressed range (with the same cut off)i at first testing, fell into the 
non-depressed range a week later (the BDI forms used concerned "the past 
week"). These findings indicate that depression in students, identified 
by a BDI cut off of 10, is very transient or fluctuating. This raises 
the question of whether such mild depressions in students are comparable 
with clinical depressions in patients. It also emphasises the
importance, in studies utilising mildly depressed students, of measuring 
depression level and attributions at the same time.
CONCEPTUALISATION AND MEASUREMENT OF DEPRESSION
Although the reformulated helplessness theory is not entirely cleeur about 
the kind of depressions it might apply to, it is clearly important to 
clarify this point if meaningful research on the theory is to be 
conducted and suitable measuring instruments selected. Three Issues will 
be briefly considered: the conceptualisation of depression in relation to 
the reformulated theory, the distinction between anxiety and depression 
and the measurement of depression.
a) Conceptualisation
The reformulated theory makes certain assumptions about depression 
which lead to tentative conclusions regarding the kinds of depression 
it might apply to. The moat important assumption is that the 
depressions it is concerned with are reactions to some aspects of the 
persdn's circumstances, ie it is a theory of reactive depressions.
Unfortunately this assumption does not greatly assist the 
identification of a subgroup of depressions which are likely to 
consist mainly of helpless depressions. This is largely a result of 
the confused situation regarding the diagnosis of affective
-  12  -
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disorders. A number of overlapping distinctions are made none of 
which clearly identify a relevant subgroup. The endogenous-reactive 
distinction would at first sight appear to be the most promising 
since this relates most directly to the role of life events in 
aetiology. However the distinction is, confusingly, at least partly 
made on the basis of symptomatology (endogenous type depressions 
being linked with severe somatic or sometimes psychotic synq>toms). 
There is no reliable means of determining the aetiology of a 
depression, endogenous disorders bèing identified on the basis of 
symptom pattern and the absence of an obvious precipitant, in the 
Judgement of the Interviewer. Other methods of determining the 
endogenicity of depression such as the dexamethaaone suppression test 
have not yet proved reliable and valid (eg Braddock, 1986). Other 
distinctions such as psychotic-neurotic, primary-secondcu'y and 
major-minor are much less clearly relevant to the helplessness 
theory.
b) The Distinction Between Anxiety and Depression
The distinction between cmxiety atnd depression is a controversial 
area, but one of some importance to the reformulated helplessness 
theory. The theory is one of depression, and anxiety is one of the 
most important other emotional state and psychiatric disorder for 
consideration in examining the specificity of the theory to 
depression. This is particularly so as there is some controversy 
regarding how specific the measures of depression are, and to what 
extent they also measure other neurotic pathology, particularly 
anxiety (see below).
It is essential to clarify what is meant by depression and anxiety, 
as the terms are used in two quite different ways. First depression 
and anxiety can refer to diagnostic categories as in the diagnosis of 
major depression or snxiety state. There is some disagreement 
regarding how reliably depressed and anxious patients can be 
differentiated (eg Roth and MountJoy, 1982). Secondly depression and 
anxiety can refer to psychiatric clinical states, which may be viewed 
as either continous or not with normal states. Hare the issue is to 
what extant anxiety and depression can be differentiated as distinct
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States composed of at least some clearly different components. Most 
evidence suggests that theÿ can Indeed be differentiated (eg Qarber, 
Miller and Abramson, 1980) but that there is some overlap in 
phenomenology and that they tend to be moderately correlated. It is 
therefore important, in any attempt to test the reformulated 
helplessness theory, to ensure thst any association between 
attributions and depression is specific to depression as distinct 
from anxiety. This is particulcu*ly so given both the substantial 
correlations found between measures of depression and anxiety, and 
the frequent co-existence of symptcjins of anxiety and depression in 
clinical populations (discussed further in Chapter 4 below).
c) The Measurement of Depression
The measurement of depression has utilised two major methods, 
psychiatric diagnostic categories, and scales in which depression is 
conceptualised as a continuously varying state.
The most widely used measure of depression in the reformulated 
attribution theory literature is the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). 
This is a 21 item self administered rating scale covering a wide 
range of depressive symptomatology including affective (depressed 
mood, loss of interest, irritability, hopelessness), cognitive 
(difficulty making decisions, sense of failure, self-accusation, self 
blame), motivational (social withdrawal, impaired work efficiency) 
and somatic (early wakening, weight loss, loss of appetite, loss of 
libido) symptoms. The BDI has been found to be a reliable and valid 
instrument in psychiatric populations (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock 
and Erbaugh, 1961). It has been found to be internally consistent 
and moderately stable over time.
A number of criticisms of the BDI must be taken into account. First 
the BDI total score is simply the unweighted total of the patient's 
self-rating of each symptom. It is therefore quite possible to 
obtain a score indicating, for example, moderate levels of 
depression, but with depressed mood, hopelessness and loss of 
interest rated ms absent. Secondly, the instructions in the original 
form require the subject to rate how they are feeling "now" which is 
meaningless in the case of some items such as weight loss or sleep 
disturbance, and may in other cases reflect very transient 
fluctuations in SK>od. The particular temporal form of the BDZ used
may therefore be significant (eg whether the original "now" form la 
used or a time period eg one week la included in the Initial 
instructions). Thirdly the items making up each Individual symptom 
scale do not always appear to form a undlmensional criterion of 
severity, frequency or other quantitative attribute. For example 
item 4, dissatisfaction, includes a frequency statement ("I feel 
bored most of the time"), a comparative Intensity statement ("I don't 
enjoy things the way I used to") and an unqualified Intensity 
statement ("I am dissatisfied with everything") within the same 
scale. Similar criticisms can be made of item 5, guilt, item 10 
crying and item 11 Irritability.
Nonetheless the BOX remains one of the most widely used auid best 
validated self-administered questionnaire which, despite the points 
noted above, is a generally adequate measure of the severity of 
depression in clinical populations. There has however recently been 
some controversy regarding its use to detect "non-clinlcal" 
depression in students. The major argument has concerned whether the 
BOX is a specific measure of depression in student populations or a 
measure of more general psychopathology.
Golin and Hartz (1979) examining the factor structure of the BOX, and 
Gotlib (1984) Investigating correlations between the BOX and 
questionnaires measuring other forms of psychopathology both 
questioned the specificity of the BOX as a measure of depression in 
students. However subsequent studies by Hill, Kemp-Wheeler and Jones 
(1986) and Hill, Kemp-Wheeler and Jones (1987) have provided 
substantial support for the proposition that the BOX is indeed a 
specific measure of depression in a non-clinically depressed student 
population.
Studies of clinical populations have typically used some level of 
diagnostic criterion either instead of, or in addition to, a 
quantitative questionnaire measure of depression. These have 
Included the Present State Examination (Wing, Cooper and Sartorius 
1974), International Classification of Diseases (XCD-9) (WHO, 1978), 
the Research Diagnostic Criterion (Spltzer, Endicott and Robins 1978) 
and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric 
Association (DSN XXX) (American Psychiatric Association, 1980). ThisN
list itself indicates and reflects the diversity of psychiatric 
diagnostic criteria currently avallablW which renders the comparison
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of studies more difficult.^ This is further increased by the lack of 
consensus regarding subgroups of depression referred to above. Thus 
differences in the findings of studies of clinical populations may 
reflect differences in diagnostic criterion used but equally, as 
noted above, it is difficult to identify any of the currently used 
subcategories of depression with the helpless depression described by 
Abraunson et al (1978).
MEASUREMENT OF ATTRIBUTIONS AND OTHER RBLATED COGNITIONS
Studies have measured these variables under two main headings; the 
measurement of attrlbutlonal style cmd the measurement of specific 
attributions and cognitions. The great majority of studies have utilised 
the former kind of measure in examinations of the vulnerability 
hypothesis. Measures in both kinds of studies have included four main 
methods; questionnaires with hypothetical situations, questionnaires with 
real life situations, questionnaires with experimental tasks and ratings 
of spontaneously generated attributions.
a) Questionnaires with Hypothetical Situations
This forms the most widely used approach, the main instrument used 
being the Attrlbutlonal Style Questionnaire (ASQ) devised by 
Sellgman, Abramson, Semmel and van Baeyer (1979). This, as its name 
implies, is designed to measure a disposition to make particular 
kinds of attributions along three dimensions, intemality, globality 
and stability. In view of its widespread use, and that much of the 
evidence supporting the reformulated helplessness theory relies on 
it, the ASQ will be considered in detail.
The ASQ consists of 12 hypothetical situations, half positive and 
half negative. They are also divided between achievement-related and 
affiliation-related situations.
Examples include:
"You meet a friend who compliments you on your appearance"
(af f i H a t  ive-pos Iti ve)
"You do a project which is highly praised" (achievement-positive)
"You meet a friend who acts hostilely towards you"
(afflliative-nagatlve)
"You cannot get all the work done that others expect of you" 
(achievement-negative) /
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For each situation the subject is asked to vividly imagine the 
situation, decide what they would believe would be the major cause of 
the situation if it happened to them, and answer three questions 
concerning the intemality, stability and globality of the cause they 
have given. Each attributlonal dimension is rated on a seven point 
scale anchored by statements at each end. Scores are generated for 
each attributlonal dimension for negative and positive situations 
sep8U!*ately. Composite scores can be derived for positive, negative 
and all situations. The rell^illty and validity of this 
questionnaire have not however been shown to be adequate.
Considering reliability first, studies have been conducted of both 
the Internal consistency and test-retest reliability of the ASQ. 
Internal consistency as measured by Cronbach's alpha, (Cronbach, 
1952) hats been found to range from 0.12 to 0.78 for the individual 
scale with most values lying between 0.40 and 0.70 (Peterson, Semmel, 
van Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky and Sellgman, 1982; Golln, Sweeney and 
Shaeffer, 1981; Zauta, Gunther and Charter, 1985; Manly, McMahon, 
Bradley and Davidson, 1982; Person and Rao, 1985). The intemality 
scale with negative outcomes, in particular, consistently yielded low 
values for the sub-scales casting doubts on the extent to which the 
scale measures a consistent disposition to make certain kinds of 
attributions. In view of this Peterson et al (1982) themselves 
suggest that only composite scores should be used (internal 
consistency coefficients of composites ranging from 0.71 to 0.85).
Test-retest correlations have also been found to be modest for a 
measure purporting to be of a stable trait. The individual subscale 
reliability ranged from 0.47 to 0.69 while for composites the values 
are slightly higher, range 0.61 to 0.70 (Peterson et al, 1982; Qolln 
et al, 1981; Zautra et al, 1985).
The face validity and criterion validity of the ASQ have been found 
to be' wanting. The face validity of the ASQ depends on the extent to 
which its content fits the kind of attributional style described by 
Seligman et al (1978). It will be recalled that this is the tendency 
to attribute failures, particularly failures after repeated attempts 
to control an outcome, to internal, global and stable causaa. The 
slituations deacribed in the questionnaire do not, however deacribe
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failures in some instances. For example in some items there is not
clear indication of any failure (eg "a friend comes to you with a 
problem and you do not try to help them"). Even where a failure is 
cited, this is usually a single specific Instance (eg "You give an 
important talk in front of a group and the audience reacts 
negatively").
The wording of the questions relating to the internal ity dimensions 
is also questionable cuid may account for the poor internal 
consistency of this item with negative outcomes'. It states "Is the
cause of .......... due to something about you or something about
other people or circumstances". This is quite ambiguous with regard 
to the conception of Internal!ty proposed in the reformulated theory 
in which comparison with one's peers plays a central part.
The ability of the ASQ to predict attributions made to problems in 
real life or in experimental situations has been found to be 
inconsistent raising doubts about its ecological validity. Indeed 
very few studies have addressed this issue which is crucial if the 
ASQ is truly to be regarded as a measure of a predisposition to make 
particular kinds of attributions. Cutrona (1983) in a study of 
expectant American women found only weak relations between 
attributions made concerning the causes of childcare stress, blues 
symptoms and daily stress with the ASQ. The only significant 
correlations (at the 5X confidence level) foimd were between the ASQ 
and dally stress attributions (r>0.29). Miller, Klee and Norman
(1982), using a short form of the ASQ, found only limited evidence 
that the ASQ predicts attributions concerning real life events or 
experimental failure in a clinical population. The only 
statistically significant positive correlations were for 
non-depressed subjects and those were between attribution composite 
scores of the ASQ and experimental tasks. Zautra, Gunther and 
Charter (1985) found statistically significant positive correlations 
between ASQ composite scores and attributional components derived 
from daily logs (subjects rated daily the causes of the most 
unpleasant and pleasant events they experienced each day for 14 days) 
in a student population. They did not however report on individual 
attributional dimensions. Finally Peterson, Betts and Sellgman 
(1985) found significant correlations between spontaneously given 
causal attributions concerning recent significant Ilfs events and the
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ASQ, for intemality and' composite scores but not stability or 
globality.
A final point about the scale of the ASQ is that Abramson et al, 
(1978) assume that the attributlonal dimensions are Independent. 
However a number of authors have found significant inter-correlations 
between the Individual dimensions. For negative outcomes the four 
relevant studies reported correlations of 0.0 to 0.18 for stability 
and intemality (two statistically sfgnlficcmt),.0.19 to 0.43 (median 
0.27) for intemality and globality (all statistically significant) 
and 0.23 to 0.55 (median 0.42) for stability and globality (all 
statistically significant) (Peterson et al, 1982, Golin et al, 1981, 
Zautra et al, 1985, Manley, McMahon, Bradley auid Davidson, 1982 and 
Pearson and Rao, 1985). This casts further doubt on the ability of 
the ASQ to exeunine the predictions of the reformulated theory which 
include specific predictions concerning each dimension.
In conclusion there are a number of doubts about the reliability and 
particuleu:*ly validity of the ASQ as a measure of an attributlonal 
style.
b) Questionnaires with Real Life Situations
A number of studies have used questionnaires to assess attributions 
but with real life events rather than hypothetical situations as the 
subject of the attributions (eg Hammen, Krantz and Cochrcui, 1981; 
Hammen and Cochran, 1981; Cochran and Hanunen, 1985).
The use of real life situations hiw both advantages and disadvantages 
compared with hypothetical situations. A major advantage is that the 
attributions concern more personally meaningful outcomes and are 
therefore more likely to be relevant to the subject than hypothetical 
situations. Inevitably the latter may include some situations of 
little'relevance or concern to the subject, particularly non-student 
subjects. A major disadvantage could be the greater variance in 
situations introduced by eliciting and using different life 
situations for each parson, which could mask individual differences. 
This could also reduce the reliability of any measure of 
attributlonal stylo based on real life events. There is little 
empirical evidence available relevant to this point although Firth
and Brewin (1982) in a very amall acale atudy (of 8 depreaaed 
patienta) found teat-reteat correlatlona over a alx week period of 
0.23 , 0.74 cuid 0.87 for internal, atable and global attributiona 
reapectively. These attributiona were made concerning the three moat 
important recent life events and the main symptoms. In addition the 
events selected were typically recent life events, including a 
heterogenous mixture of failures (eg falling an exam), ambiguous 
events (eg losing a Job) and non failures (eg Illness in a relative). 
Hammen and Nayol (1982) have in factj described the variety of life 
event types elicited and demonstrated that attributions do Indeed 
differ according to event type.
A further criticism is that attributions are elicited concerning the 
cause of the life event itself not the subject's failure to deal with 
the life event or its consequences. Thus the relevance of such life 
event studies to the reformulated theory must be seriously 
questioned.
Studies with real life events 8u?e, in conclusion, promising in their 
relevance to the subject and therefore in their potential to reflect 
attributions made in real life. Their relevance to the reformulated 
helplessness theory, in the form they have been carried out in, is 
unsatisfactory.
c) Questionnaires with Experimental Tasks
A few studies have examined attributions made following success or 
failure on experimental tasks involving some kind of problem solving. 
Success or failure is either manipulated experimentally or allowed to 
occur naturally. Such an cq>proach attempts to measure attributlonal 
style by assessing attributions made in one situation. An advantage 
compared with both hypothetical situations and real life events is 
that the subject makes the attributions directly after having faced a 
real,'albeit minor, success or failure. The attributions made may 
therefore be a more realistic reflection of attributlonal style, 
especially compared with hypothetical situations. Further the 
success or failure is at least objectively similar for all subjects,
%
particularly where the outcome is manipulated, although there may be 
differences in its perceived importance and meaning. A major 
disadvantage however is that attributional style is inferred from a
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single, rather minor situation, which is likely to give a rather 
unreliable measure of limited validity.
d) Ratings of Spontaneously Generated Attributions
Ratings of spontaneously generated attributions, particularly 
concerning recent life events, have been utilised in a few studies 
(eg Gong-Guy and Hammen, 1980, Peterson, Betts and Sellgman, 1985). 
Such a methodology has been used principally to provide evidence 
regarding the validity of questionnaire elicited attributions. 
Spontaneously generated attributions possess the advantage over all 
other methods that they are more likely to reflect the everyday 
spontaneous attributional processes of the subjects and au*e less open 
to the objection that people do not spontcuieously generate 
attributions in many circumstances in everydeiy life. Their value 
does however depend upon the extent to which the subject matter of 
the attributions is appropriate. However Gong-Guy and Hammen, and 
Peterson et al both examined attributions concerning recent 
slgnificwt life events (not failures to control) while Peterson, 
Laborsky and Sellgman (1983) examined attributions concerning any 
undesirable event. None of these studies has been of attributions 
concerning the cause of the uncontrollability or non contingency of 
life events or concerns, thus none have provided an adequate test of 
the reformulated theory of learned helplessness and depression.
In summary, a number of practical issues raised by studies relevant to 
the reformulated helplessness theory have been considered. These issues 
have Included the use of mildly depressed student "analogues" of clinical 
depression; problems in the identification of relevant helplessness 
subgroups of depression; the measurement of depression as a continuous 
clinical state and the measurement of attributions, particularly 
attributional style. Particular criticisms have been made of the over 
reliance on studies of mildly depressed students and the validity and 
reliabllty of the principal measures of attributional style, especially 
the ASQ. '
THE FINDINGS OF STUDIES RELEVANT TO THK RBFORMULATED LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 
THEORY
Having-, considered some of the theoretical and practical issues raised by 
the studies to be reviewed below, the evidence relevant to each aspect of
/
the theory will now be examined. It will be argued that moat of the 
available evidence la addreaaed to the vulnerability hypotheala, if 
addreaaed to any clear hypotheaia at all, and that the evidence available 
providea only weak aupport for this hypothesis. It will also be 
contended that the vulnerability hypothesis is a rather minor extension 
of the reformulated theory and not a central prediction as stated by 
Peterson and Seligman (1984). Finally it will be concluded that all 
aspects of the theory remain to be adequately tested.
The evidence will be considered according to the methodology. The main 
categories of studies are cross-sectional studies, prospective studies, 
longitudinal studies and small scale naturalistic studies.
1) Cross-sectional studies (including cross-sectional
repeated measures studies)
results of
These are the most frequently reported and have involved the 
measurement of depression and attributions on one occasion. Groups 
of non-depressed subjects have been compared with depressed subjects 
on the attributional measure or correlations between measures of 
depression and attributions have been obtained. These studies have 
usually addressed the vulnerability hypothesis. It will be apparent 
that such a methodology can only establish whether there is an 
association between the state or level of depression and 
attributions. Only to the extent that state depression tmd 
depresslon-proneness are correlated can such an association be 
relevant even to the vulnerability hypothesis. The use of 
cross-sectional studies to examine the vulnerability hypothesis is 
therefore questionable cuid their value for testing the aetiological 
hypothesis is, of course, very limited.
There are a number of other problems with the use of single occasion 
studies to examine the vulnerability hypothesis. Such a methodology 
does not enable the direction of causality in any association between 
depression and attributions to be determined. Positive findings may 
therefore equally well be explained by proposing that the ASQ simply 
measures aui aspect of the cognitive distortions characteristic of the 
depressed state (described by Beck 1967, 1976). Many studies of a 
variety of relevant cognitions have consistently found that 
"depressive cognitions" are state dependant and are not evident in 
recovered depress!vss or those who subsequently bscosie depressed. For
/
example Reda, Carpinlello,'Secchiaroli and Blanco (1985) found that 
although the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale differentiated depressed 
and control subjects initially, it failed to differentiate the two 
groups when readministered after the depressed group had recovered. 
Miller and Norman (1986) found a similar result for the Cognition 
Bias Questionnaire. Wilkinson and Blackburn (1981) found no 
difference between recovered dépressives and normal subjects on two 
measures of cognitive distortion, the Cognitive Response Test and the 
Cognitive Style Test. Both groups differed significantly from a 
currently depressed group. A simileu? result was reported by Fennell 
and Campbell (1984) using the Cognitions Questionnaire, «mother 
meemure of cognitive distortion. The only studies finding evidence 
that such measures are elevated in recovered depress Ives have used 
short test-retest intervals raising the possibility that the 
recovered depressive group was not fully recovered (eg Eaves and 
Rush, 1982) or showed other evidence of Incomplete remission (eg 
Dobson and Shaw 1986). Secondly as noted by Willieuns and Rothwell 
(1985), the vulnerability hypothesis only predicts group differences 
if subjects have recently faced uncontrollable life events (or 
current concerns). In the absence of such life events, no 
relationship between attrlbutlonal style amd depression should be 
found. Thirdly most studies have presented their results as 
correlations or relative differences between groups, yet the theory 
makes specific predictions about the attributions depressive-prone 
individuals will make. Such individuals are hypothesised to meüce 
internal, stable and global attributions in absolute, not relative, 
terms. Further, the aetiologlcal theory also make specific 
predictions about the relationship between pcu'ticulau? attributions 
and aspects of depression. Once «igain, group differences c«mnot 
adequately test such hypothesis. Finally a number of studies have 
reported only composite attributional scores made up of the sum of 
internal, stable imd global attributions. Both the psychological 
meaning of composites and their statistical Justification læe 
questionnable.
A composite score is difficult to interpret, or make psychological 
sense of, as it consists of any combination of scores on the three 
attributional dimensions. Further the attributional dimensions are 
assumed to be Independent rendering the construction of coaq>osltes 
even more questionable (although, as noted above, statistically 
significant small to moderate intercorrblations have in practice been
/
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The cross sectional studies have been carried out with three main 
groups of subjects: students, psychiatric patients and specific 
population groups; and four main kinds of measure: the ASQ, real life 
events and experimental tasks. These will be considered in turn.
a) Studies Using the ASQ
*
These studies are the most replicated of the three kinds and 
therefore could provide the most solid body of evidence from
cross-sectional studies. The findings are presented in tables 11 
(students). 111 (psychiatric patients) and liii (specific groups). 
Considering the evidence in students first, this is presented as 
correlations between depression and ASQ because most reports cure in 
this form and any cut off point to identify mildly depressed students 
would be arbitrary. Inspection of Table II reveals that
statistically significant correlations between most attrlbutional 
dimensions and BDI total score have been found but that the values of 
the correlations are small, with few even accounting for lOX of total 
variance. This is despite the fact that the attrlbutional dimensions 
are moderately intercorrelated which might have served to spuriously 
inflate some correlations.
found). '
The evidence in patients presented in table 111 is in the form of 
group comparisons, except for Pearson and Rao (1985) who only report 
correlations. Here the selection criteria for both depressed and 
control groups are variable making direct comparisons difficult. 
Raps, Peterson, Reinhard, Abramson and Seligman (1982) obtained the 
strongest evidence of group differences with six out of twelve 
coiq>arisons significant for the individual dimensions. Their control 
groups, non—depressed medical in-patients and non-depressed
schisophrenic in-patients, were however possibly atypical groups 
themselves. Hamilton and Abramson (1983) also obtained group 
differences but only gave results for composite difference scores. 
These are particularly difficult to interpret as they consist of the 
, positive composite minus negative composite, making the precise 
nature of group differences even harder to determine. Eaves and Rush 
(1^84) fouhd significant differences between depressed, mainly 
out-patient, subjects and normal controls on all negative







b) Studies with Real Life Events
The results of these studies are presented in tables liv (non 
clinical populations) and Iv (psychiatric populations). They are 
much more varied in measures and methods of analysis th^u^ in the case 
of the hypothetical events.
Limited evidence of an association between attributions 2md 
depression has been found. Hammen 2uid colleagues have carried out 
three studies of the relationship between attributions concerning the 
cause of recent stressful life events in students (Hammen, Krantz emd 
Cochr2ui 1981, Hammen and Cochran 1981, Cochran and Hammen 1985). 
Hammen et al (1981) and Htumnen and Cochran (1981) compared mildly 
depressed with non depressed students using the BDI to divide their 
subjects. Significemt group differences were found for globality but 
not for stability or internality when attributions over five most 
stressful recent life events were compared. Cochraui and Hammen 
(1985) used similar methods, although included only extremely 
upsetting events, but used a more sophisticated method of analysis, a 
causal modelling statistical procedure. This allows the independent 
and direct association of each attributional variable with depression 
to be determined. Once again only globality was found to be 
independently associated with depression. One other study, Harvey 
(1981) has examined attributions concerning significant life events. 
Group differences between mildly depressed and non depressed students 
were found for internality only for both positive and negative 
events. Cutrona (1983) and Zautra, Guenther and Charter (1985) 
examined attributions concerning day to day life stresses Euid 
experiences. Cutrona (1983) in a study of expectant mothers found no 
relationship between the attributional composite derived from 
attributions concerning dally stresses and childcare stress, and 
depression level. A statistically significant relationship was 
however found for attributions concerning blues symptoms. Zautra et 
al (1985) did however find significant correlations, for all 
attributional dimensions, between attributions concerning the cause 
of the most unpleasant dally experience and depression level.
Finally Peterson, Betts emd Sellgman (1985) rated elicited causal 
attributions concerning the two worst events involving themselves 




dimensions and the composite correlated with BDI score.
There was therefore some evidence of an association between 
attributions made concerning real life events and depression, 
although once again the magnitude of associations was often small 
(most correlations less than 0.3) and the results inconsistent. 
Globality was most often found to be significemtly related to 
depression in those non clinical populations, paralleling findings 
with the ASQ.
Four studies utilising real life events with clinically depressed 
populations have been reported in the literature (table Iv). The 
studies varied greatly in methods used and subjects studied. The 
results were slmilau' but rather more positive than those obtained 
with student subjects with the most consistent positive findings 
being for globality. Two studies ex2unined attributions concerning 
the most stressful recent life event reported by their subjects. 
Miller, Klee and Norman (1982) found a difference between depressed 
and non depressed psychiatric in-patients but reported only composite 
scores. Gong-Guy and Hammen (1980) found significant differences in 
internality, auid almost in globality, between depressed and non 
depressed psychiatric out-patients despite using a very low BDI total 
score cut off of 9 to classify patients as depressed. Three other 
studies examined attributions concerning two (Cochr2ui and Heunmen 
1985), five (Gong-Guy and Hammen 1980) and three major recent life 
events (Firth and Brewin 1982, plus also the main presenting 
symptom). Somewhat surprisingly the number of significant 
associations found was inversely related to the number of life events 
over the three studies. Cochran and Hammen (1985) found both 
internality and globality related to depression while Firth and 
Brewin (1982) found significant differences for globality only and 
Gong-Guy and Hammen (1980) found no significant differences. However 
as these studies vary considerably in subject selection criteria and 
methods of analysis, this pattern of results may not be related to 
number of life events.
Overall studies with real rather thatn hypothetical life events as the 
subject of attributions have found less evidence of an association 
between depression and attributions in students, but similar or 
slightly stronger evidence in clinical populations. This may be at
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least in part because students are a relatively homogenous group to 
which the hypothetical situations of the ASQ have been tailored (eg 
"You give an important talk in front of a group and the audience 
reacts negatively"; "You go out on a date 2uid it goes badly"). Such 
items may be of little relevance to a patient population of widely 
varying age, occupation and marital status. In a clinical population 
the relevance of real life events may more than compensate for the 
increased variance introduced by using real life events. However it 
must be repeated in this context that the focus of attributions in 
the theory is the subject's helplessness rather than the life event 
itself.
Studies Involving Experimental Tasks
A small number of studies have been carried out in which attributions 
have been obtained following success or failure on an experimental task. 
Such studies have measured attributional style by obtaining subjects' 
explanations following success or failure on a single, minor, but real 
and immediate task.
Four studies have been carried out on student subjects. Sharp and Tennen
(1983), Rizley (1978) and Kulper (1978) (table Ivi). These studies have 
however varied considerably in how and what attributions were measured, 
and the tasks used. They were not designed to test the vulnerability 
hypothesis of the reformulated theory but do provide some relevant 
evidence. Overall each study found that depressed subjects tended to make 
more internal attributions for failure than non-depressed subjects. There 
was some evidence of the reverse following success but here the findings 
were less consistent. It is interesting to note that the findings for 
internality following failure were found more consistently in these 
studies than studies using the ASQ despite only one situation being 
sampled and the relatively small sample sizes used.
The three studies which have been reported with clinical populations are 
summarised in the table (Ivll). The results are generally negative with 
Gotllb and Olsen (1983) and Miller, Klee and Norman (1982) finding no 
group differences in attributions. Watson and Dyck (1984) did find some 
evidence of group differences in attributional composite but only under 
specific conditions namely 20 or 50% success, when attributions were 




spontaneously generated) and the dimensions rated by the subject (not 
independent raters).
In summary, studies involving experimental tasks have been few in number. 
Those with student populations have provided rather consistent evidence 
for depression being associated with more Internal attributions following 
failure but less consistent results regarding attributions following 
success. Those with clinical populations have been generally negative, 
perhaps reflecting the difference in relevance of experimental tasks to 
student and patient populations.
To conclude this review of cross-sectional studies, they provide some, 
but relatively weak, evidence of an association between depression and 
attributions. Most if not all of this evidence has concerned 
attributions! style and is therefore relevant to the vulnerability 
hypothesis only. A few studies have ex^unlned attributions concerning the 
single most stressful recent life event(s) which could be relevant to the 
aetiological hypothesis, with similar results to the studies of 
attributions! style (eg Gong-Guy and Hammen 1980; Miller, Klee and Norman 
1982). However, as pointed out earlier, this failure is not particularly 
surprising given the problems identified in the measurement of 
attributions and the fact that all the studies have measured state 
depression not depression-proneness.
Prospective Studies
Prospective studies allow a more powerful examination of the 
vulnerability hypothesis than cross-sectional studies. They do however 
present considerable practical problems in finding a suitable group of 
subjects prior to the occurrence of a life event and the onset of
depression. Attrlbutlonal style is generally measured in a group where a 
major life event is known to be very likely, prior to its occurrence. 
While this is not too difficult once a satisfactory subject group is
identified (eg pregnant mothers), it is considerably less easy to ensure
that measurement is not affected by either the expectation of the life 
event or, more significantly, the development of depression. Williams 
(1985) has suggested that cognitive symptoms may develop before the 
emotional and other symptoms of depression so that an apparent
relationship between attrlbutlonal style and vulnerability to depression 
may in fact reflect as association between attributlonal style amd the
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early symptoms of depression. Nevertheless, by measuring attributional 
style at a different point in time to the measurement of depression, the 
vulnerability hypothesis may be more stringently examined, particularly 
in contrast to the hypothesis that attributional style is actually a 
cognitive symptom of depression.
Four studies have been reported involving the measurement of 
attributional style prior to a signlflcemt life event. In three of 
these, Cutrona (1983), Manly, McMahon, Bradley and Davidson (1982), and 
O'Hara, Rehm 2uid Campbell (1982), the life event was childbirth, while in 
Metalsky, Abramson, Sellgman, Semmel sind Peterson (1982) the event was a 
low mark in an examination tEd<en by college students. All three studies 
meaisured attributional style by the ASQ.
Cutrona (1983) found that the ASQ negative attributional composite, 
administered eight weeks pre-natally did predict the level of depression, 
as measured with the BDI, at both two 2md eight weeks post-natally 
(correlations obtained were 0.35 and 0.33 respectively). Only women who 
were non depressed pre-natally, as defined by a BDI score of less than 
nine, were included in the analysis. Depression level pre-natally in 
this group of women did not predict depression level post-natally. This 
result therefore appears to provide strong support for the vulnerability 
hypothesis. There is however one puzzling aspect of this finding. The 
ASQ did not predict attributions made to real life stress including 
childcare stress, blues symptoms and a daily report of upsetting events. 
While this might be explained by difficulties in the measurement of these 
attributions, it does somewhat weaken the support provided by this study 
to the vulnerability hypothesis given that the ASQ is supposed to measure 
a relatively stable attributional style applied to real life events.
Memly et al (1982) carried out a somewhat similar study. The ASQ and BDI 
were administered six to seven weeks pre-natally but in this study 
measures of post-natal depression were administered on the third day 
post-natally. No relationship was found between pre-natal ASQ and 
post-natal depression. The difference in results may be due to the 
timing of post-natal depression measurement. Day three post-natally is 
the peak time for the occurrence of post-natal "blues", a phenomenen 
which is probably related to the major hormonal changes occurring at this 
time. In contrast two and eight weeks post-natally are times when 
depression is more likely to be related to problems in adjusting to the
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stress of a new baby. It should however be noted that Cutrona found that 
attributions concerning blues symptoms were associated with concurrent 
depression while attributions concerning child care stress and dally 
upsetting events were not.
O'Hara, Rehm and Campbell (1982), in the largest scale study of the three 
concerned with child birth, administered the ASQ and BDI as part of a 
battery of measures during the second trimester of the mother's 
pregnancy. Depression level was reassessed using the BDI at 2m  average 
of 11.7 weeks after birth. In a hierarchial multiple regression analysis 
it was found that ASQ composite (with four items deleted) was a 
significant predictor of post-partum depression level (r=-0.30). This 
result is therefore similar to that obtained by Cutrona (1983) and 
strengthens the explanation offered of Manly et al's negative finding, 
although the amount of variemce in depression accounted for by 
attributional style was dissapointingly low 2md comparable to that found 
in cross-sectional studies of sub-clinical depression.
Finally Metalsky et al (1982) administered the ASQ to college students, 
prior to taking mid-term exams and eleven days prior to the receipt of 
the exeun results. Ch2mge in depression level following the receipt of 
their results was measured with the Multiple Affect Adjection Check List. 
As predicted, change in depression level was correlated with the 
internality and globality scales for negative outcomes in students 
receiving low grades but not those receiving high grades (correlations 
0.34 and 0.32 respectively). However the reverse pattern was obtained 
for stability. Unfortunately, Metalsky et al did not obtain students' 
own attributions for their success or failure, so it was not possible to 
examine whether, as predicted by the theory, ASQ is related to depression 
via its association with such attributions.
The four prospective studies reviewed have provided some support for the 
vulnerability hypothesis. Three studies, Cutrona (1983), O'Hara et al 
(1982) and Metalsky et al (1982) were mainly positive in their findings 
that attributional style did predict subsequent depression level 
following a major life event. However, how this relationship is mediated 
is considerably less clear. In particular there is little evidence that 
it is mediated by the ability of the measure of attributional style to 
predict actual attributions made concerning real life events.
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Longitudinal Studies
Longitudinal studies involve the measurement of both attributions and 
depression on more than one occasion. Such studies allow a number of 
questions to be answered which neither cross-sectional or prospective 
studies can address. First they can provide some evidence relevant to 
whether depressive attributional style, as measured by the ASQ eind other 
methods, is a relatively stable trait rather than a state-dependent 
aspect of cognitive processing. This is particularly so where there is 
considerable variability in depression level between assessment 
occasions. Secondly the causal direction of any relationship between 
attributions and depression may be, to some extent, examined. One 
statistical model which h M  been used to examine this is cross-p2mel 
correlation analysis (Kenny 1975).
Five relev2uit longitudinal studies have been reported. Golln, Sweeney 
and Shaeffer (1981) and Zautra, Guenther and Chau'ter (1985) carried out 
similar studies involving the administration of the ASQ £md measures of 
depression, to students, on two occasions separated by one month and two 
weeks respectively. Golln et al analysed their study using a 
cross-lagged panel correlation amalysis. They found significant 
predicted differences between cross-lagged correlations between 
depression level and stability, globality and composite attributional 
scores with bad outcomes. From this they concluded that their results 
support the reformulated theory and more significantly provide evidence 
that attributions cause depression, not vice versa. However if ASQ is to 
be regarded as a measure of a relatively stable trait, which all other 
authors including its originators propose, this conclusion is not 
warranted. Consider what Golln et al found: namely that correlations 
between ASQ measured at time two euid depression level measured at time 
one are smaller than correlations between ASQ measured at time one and 
depression level as measured at time two (cross-lagged correlations). 
The vulnerability hypothesis would however predict no difference in the 
magnitude of correlations unless there were either differences in the 
mean and variance of depression on the two occasions or a significant 
life event intervened between time one and time two, at a higher level 
than before time one. There is no indication in their paper that either 
of these is true.
Zautra et al (1985) did not report cross-lagged correlations. They found
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moderate levels of stability for the ASQ over the two week interval 
(test-retest correlations range 0.48 to 0.62 for individual dimensions 
and composites). Thus although the study was longitudinal in its method 
of data collection it was cross-sectional in its method of analysis and 
so will not be considered further.
Three studies have reported studies of the ASQ in clinical populations. 
Heunilton and Abramson (1983) assessed depression u^ld attributlonal style 
in depressed and non depressed psychiatric in-patients, Initially within 
seventy-two hours of admission and again within seventy-two hours of 
discharge, the mean interval being seventeen days. Results are only 
presented for composite difference scores and clearly support the 
proposition that the ASQ measures a state dependent variable. The 
depressed group differed from both psychiatric and normal controls in the 
expected direction at initial assessment but when this was repeated 
shortly before discharge, no group differences were found. This study 
strongly suggests that the ASQ does not measure a stable attributional 
style but »-ather aspect of state depression. Pearson and Rao (1985) 
also obtained measures of depression 2uid attributional style (ASQ) 
shortly after admission, at discharge and also seven months after 
discharge. Interestingly, although they presented their results as 
correlations rather than meaui differences, the pattern of results was 
similar to Hamilton and Abramson (1983). Significant correlations 
between ASQ dimensions, Internallty and globallty with negative outcomes, 
were obtained at admission but not at discharge. This could however be 
at least in part due to the fall in depression level between admission 
and discharge although the standard deviations of BDI total score were 
similar on the two occasions (11.21 and 9.25 respectively) which makes 
such an explanation unlikely. Pearson and Rao also presented mean scores 
for depression and attributions at admission and discharge. Both BDI 
total scores and all attributional dimensions with negative outcomes 
decreased significantly between admission and discharge. While, in the 
absence of a control group, this evidence is not as strong as Hamilton 
and Abramson's, it is clearly compatible with it and also suggests that 
the ASQ measures a relatively state dependent variable. Eaves and Rush
(1984) found precisely the opposite pattern of results to Hamilton emd 
Abramson in their study of depressed psychiatric out-patients. While 
they also found signlflceuit differences between depressed and control 
subjects initially, these differences persisted when the depressed 
subjects had been recovered for at least two weeks. Results were
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presented for each attributions! dimension with negative outcomes as well 
as negative composite. It is difficult to account for the difference 
between these two studies. Both used the same criterion to define their 
patient groups euid although Hamilton and Abramson used a patient control 
group it does not seem likely that this could account for the different 
pattern of results. The only other major difference was in the way the 
results were reported, Hamilton and Abramson reporting only composite 
difference scores. However Pearson and Rao, with a mixed psychiatric 
subject group, did report signlflceuit changes between admission and 
discharge on the negative outcome attributional dimensions.
Finally Firth eind Brewin (1982) measured depression level and 
attributional style on two occasions separated by six weeks in a small 
scale study of eight depressed patients. They derived their measure of 
attributional style from attributions made concerning the three most 
upsetting recent life events their subjects had experienced, and their 
main symptom. Like Golin et al, they analysed their results using a 
cross-lagged panel correlation analysis. They found a similar pattern of 
results as Golin et al for the stability dimension but not internality or 
globality. The same criticism of their conclusion, that stability is 
causally related to depression, must be made. However Firth and Brewin's 
study is rather different in that the subjects were all depressed at time 
one and less depressed at time two. Their study can therefore be 
interpreted as providing some support for the proposal of the 
reformulated theory that the stability of attributions relates to the 
prolongation of depression.
In conclusion the longitudinal studies reviewed do not provide consistent 
evidence that attributional style, particularly as measured by the ASQ, 
is related to depression-pronesness. The balance of evidence is at least 
as compatible with the state dependent hypothesis.
Small Scale JIaturalistic Studies
Small scale naturalistic studies can provide some evidence relevant to 
the reformulated learned helplessness theory, particularly to such issues 
as whether causal attributions are spontaneously made in everyday life 
and if so do they reflect a style or are they determined mainly by other 
factors such as the particular situation?
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The only relevant study reported to date is that of Peterson, Luborsky 
and Sellgman (1983). This study concerned a single patient whose mood 
varied greatly within psychotherapy sessions which were all tape 
recorded. This allowed an examination of how spontaneous attributions 
given by the patient changed prior to and following a mood shift. Shifts 
towards decreased depression were preceeded by lower attrlbutlonal 
composite scores compared with shifts towards higher depression or no 
change. This evidence csm be adduced in support of the aetlological 
hypothesis although it is only weakly related to this hypothesis which 
concerns attributions regarding highly aversive or important outcomes.
The Specificity of Findings
A final point must be made about the specificity of positive findings to 
depression compared with other emotional states and clinical disorders 
such as anxiety. The specificity of findings to any p^ u:’ticula^ subgroup 
of depression should also be considered. Finally it is importeunt to 
consider whether results are specific to attributional dimension compared 
with the cognitions proposed by other cognitive theories of depression.
Taking the specificity of findings to depression first, four studies have 
attempted to examine this, particularly in relation to einxiety. Control 
groups have typically been non-depressed students or patients, or a mixed 
group of non-depressed psychiatric patients. Three studies have examined 
the association between etnxiety as well as depression £tnd the ASQ. Dowd, 
Claiborn and Milne (1985), in a multiple regression analysis found that 
global attributions for bad outcomes significantly predicted trait 
anxiety while stable attributions for bad outcomes significantly 
predicted depression level. No other significant relationships were 
found. Nezu, Nezu and Nezu (1986) found that the ASQ composites 
correlated significantly and substantially with BDI total score but also 
with measures of anxiety (Spielberger's STAI). However since the 
measures of depression and anxiety Intercorrelated substantially (all 
intercorrelations 0.60) it is difficult to interpret their finding. Hill 
and Kemp-Wheeler (1986) examined the relationship between the BDI and the 
EPQ (providing a measure of neuroticism) and a measure of attrlbutlonal 
style (applied to failure to prevent life events for which responsibility 
was perceived). They found that Internallty and stability were related 
to neuroticsm but not depression in a step-wise regression analysis. It 
is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from these three studies in
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student populations but it emphasises the need to examine the specificity 
of any associations between depression and attributions.
The specificity of the relationship between depression and attributions! 
style to any subgroup of depressions, particularly reactive or non 
endrogenous depressions has also been examined in two studies. Both 
Zimmerman, Coryell and Corenthal (1984) and Eaves and Rush (1984) found 
no difference on any ASQ measure between endogenous and non endogenous 
depression defined on the basis of symptomatology and the dexeunethasone 
suppression test. There is therefore no evidence linking attributional 
style to a reactive kind of depression. This is possibly surprising in 
view of the theory's clear orientation towards reactive depressions 
although it might at least in part be explained by the problems in making 
reliable diagnosis or judgment concerning aetiology.
The specificity of positive findings to the attributional dimensions of 
internality, globality and stability is important in view of the number 
of other cognitive theories of depression which propose that other 
cognitions may play a causal role in the aetiology and maintenance of 
depressions (eg Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1962, 1987). As discussed earlier 
(pages 23-34), these theories have lead to the development of a number of 
measures of cognitive distortion which include both causal attributions 
and other cognitive processes. Most studies of such measures have found 
that depressed subjects show evidence of cognitive distortions while 
depressed but not after they have recovered (see page 24 above). 
Cognitions studed have included self blame, ascriptions of responsibility 
for negative events and expectations that unpleasant events will extend 
into the future (eg the Cognitions Questionnaire, Fennell and Campbell, 
1984), derived from Beck's cognition theory of depressions (Beck, 1976). 
It is therefore Important to demostrate that the attributional dimensions 
proposed by Abramson et al (1978) are the most important ones in 
mediating between life problems and aspects of depression, rather than 
being simply three of a set of dimensions concerning, for example, the 




SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The review of the reformulated learned helplessness theory of depression, 
presented in Chapter I, has revealed a number of limitations in the 
evidence, which has to date accumulated, relevant to the aetiological 
hypothesis. Although much of the evidence only weakly, if at all, 
supports the theory, it may be premature to consider the theory itself to 
be false at this stage.
The limitations of the evidence reviewed above may be summarised as 
follows:
1 Subject Population:
The majority of studies have been of "subclinical" depression, in 
particular of mildly depressed students. The relevance of such 
studies to a theory of clinical depression is inevitably limited.
2 The Measurement of Attributional Style:
The measures of attributional style used in most studies have a number 
of weaknesses. Most have consisted of hypothetical situations of 
little relevance to the aetiological hypothesis of the reformulated 
theory. Where real life problems have been utilised, attributions have 
been obtained concerning the cause of single life events not of the 
uncontrollability of current concerns as specified in the theory. This 
last point is probably the single most important criticism to be made 
of the research on learned helplessness euid depression.
3 Control Groups Utilised:
Even where clinically depressed populations have been studied, control 
for psychiatric disorders other than depression has usually been 
absent or limited. In particular no study has controlled for clinical 
anxiety which frequently co-exists with euid covaries with depression. 
The specificity of the theory to depression has therefore not been 
adequately tested.
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4 The Lack of Clarity Regarding What Hypothesis Is Being Tested:
A considerable number of studies do not make it clear whether they are 
attempting to examine the vulnerability hypothesis, the aetlological 
hypothesis or some other hypothesis. Frequently studies have utilised 
measures of attributions! style (eg ASQ) but compared currently 
depressed and non-depressed groups, a procedure of limited relevance 
to the vulnerability hypothesis, as it fails to differentially test 
the state dependent hypothesis.
5 The Paucity of Studies Attempting to Examine other Aspects of the 
Reformulated Theory other than the Vulnerability Hypothesis:
Despite Peterson and Seligman's (1984) claim that the vulnerability 
hypothesis is a central aspect of the theory, the original theory as 
proposed by Abramson et al (1978) clearly regards this aspect of the 
theory as of secondary importance. There has however been a paucity 
of studies attempting to examine other aspects of the theory, 
particularly the aetiological hypothesis.
6 The Specific Relevance of the Attributions! Dimensions of Internality, 
Stability and Globality to Depression;
Many workers have proposed that a variety of cognitions, both 
attributional auid non-attributional, have a central role in the 
aetiology and maintenance of depression (eg Beck 1976). There have 
been few attempts to demonstrate that the attributional dimensions 
proposed by the theory are the most important ones and that they are 
not simply another aspect of the cognitive distortions frequently 
reported in depression.
There is therefore a need for more adequate studies relevant to the 
theory, in particular studies of clinically depressed subjects utilising 
real life, relevant current concerns, adequate control groups 
particularly for clinical anxiety, and comparing the attributional 




THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEPRESSION. AND ATTRIBUTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS 
CONCERNING CURRENT CONCERNS
The aim of the first study described below was to examine whether causal 
explanations emd expectations regarding real life significant current 
concerns are related to clinical depression. The study involved the 
administration, to a group of patients with neurotic psychiatric 
disorders, of a series of interviews: one covering current concerns or 
life problems facing the subject; one concerning causal explanations and 
future expectations regarding these current concerns and finally an 
interview covering psychiatric symptomatology.
The information obtained was used to answer the following sets of 
questions:
1) Questions arising from the Reformulated Learned Helplessness Theory:
i) Do depressed patients attribute the causes of their major 
current concerns to internal, stable and global causes?
li) Do depressed patients give more internal, stable and global 
attributions than patients with anxiety disorders?
ill) Are patients who give Internal, stable and global attributions 
more likely to be depressed than the whole population of 
patients studied?
Each of these questions concerns an aspect of the reformulated theory and 
is relevant to the aetiological hypothesis. It cannot of course provide 
evidence differentiating the aetiological from a state-dependent 
hypothesis. The study was carried out as an initial step towards the 
examination of the hypotheses rather than to differentiate between them.
2) Questions arising from both the reformulated theory itself and the 
work of Wortman and Dintzer (1978), Gong-Guy and Hammen (1980) and 
Firth and Brewin (1982) regarding the Importance of controllability:
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i) Do depressed patients attribute the causes of their major
current concerns to uncontrollable causes?
ii) Do depressed patients give more uncontrollable causes than
patients with anxiety disorders?
ill) Are patients who give uncontrollable causes more likely to be 
depressed than the whole population of patients studied?
3) Questions arising from the work of Beck (1976) suid others proposing 
that a negative attitude to self, etnd self blame, are central 
features of depression:
i) Do depressed patients attribute the causes of their major
current concerns to causes which they hold themselves 
responsible for?
ii) Do depressed patients give more causes, for which they hold 
themselves responsible theui einxious patients?
iii) Are patients who give "personally responsible" causes more
likely to be depressed than the patient population as a whole?
4) Questions arising from work (including the reformulated helplessness 
theory. Beck, 1976 etc) suggesting that future expectations, 
particularly pessimistic expectations, are a central feature of 
depression.
i ) Do depressed patients expect the cause of future change in
their current concerns to depend on any of the following: 
internal, global, stable, uncontrollable and personally 
responsible causes?
li) Do depressed compared with anxious patients give more of any of 
the following: internal, global, stable (low expectations), 
uncontrollable and personally responsible causes for the cause 
of future change than anxious patients?
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The questions given above concern the relationship between the state of 
clinical depression and causal explanations and expectations concerning 
major current concerns. As the study is cross-sectional in design it 
cannot establish whether any cauSal relationship exists between 
depression and causal beliefs. It is however an important first step to 
determine whether an association exists which is specific to the state of 
depression.
This study will differ in a number of ways from those already reported, 
and reviewed above, relating to the reformulated learned helplessness 
theory and other cognitive theories of depression. First the study will 
be of a clinically depressed sample of psychiatric patients with a 
control group of non-psychotic psychiatric patients who have some kind of 
anxiety disorder. In other studies of clinical samples controls have 
usually been either non psychiatric patients, "normal" volunteers or 
schizophrenics. No study has specifically controlled for clinical 
anxiety. Secondly the study will involve obtaining causal expleunatlons 
regarding important real life current concerns. Such causal explanations 
are of direct relevance to the aetlological hypothesis. Other studies 
which have utilised real life problems rather than hypothetical events 
have studied only life events which sure of questionable relevance to the 
reformulated theory. Thirdly, several other possibly relevant 
attributional dimensions, including controllability and attributions of 
personal responsibility, are examined alongside internality, globality 
and stability allowing the reformulated theory to be compared with 
several other cognitive theories of depression. Future causal 
expectations will also be obtained allowing a comparison of the role of 
causal explanations with that of causal expectations. Other studies have 
focussed on causal explanations only, and in many cases included only 
Internality, globality and stability as dimensions.
Subjects
Forty-five psychiatric patients served as subjects in this study. They 
were a mixture of in-patients, out-patients and day-patients being 
treated by psychiatrists and clinical psychologists in North 
Staffordshire, with an age range of 18 to 65. All had been referred with 
a non-psychotic psychiatric problem, predominantly depression, anxiety 
symptoms and phobic anxiety. Patients were excluded if they had a 
current or previous diagnosis of schizophrenia, manic-depressive
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psychosis, anti-social personality disorder, alcoholism, drug abuse or an 
org2uiic syndrome. Those considered by the responsible psychiatrist or 
psychologist to be of low intelligence were also excluded. Most patients 
were receiving chemotherapy and a considerable number were also receiving 
behavioural psychotherapy.
Materials and Procedure
Each subject was interviewed individually either in an office at a health 
service facility or alone within their own homes. The interview 
consisted of three components: a current concerns interview; a causal 
beliefs interview and part of the Present State Examination (Wing, Cooper 
and Sartorius 1974). The complete interview took approximately two hours 
and was completed at one sitting with a short break half way through 
(after the current concerns interview) if necessary.
The Current Concerns Interview
The Current Concerns Interview is a structured interview specifically 
constructed for this study. The interview was developed from that 
utilised by Brown and Harris (1978) in their study of life events and 
depression in women. It covers all aspects of the subject's current life 
and elicits from the subject areas of current concern. (See Appendices A 
and B)
Most other studies involving real life problems have focused on life 
events using some kind of life events survey to elicit these (eg Gong-Guy 
and Hammen 1980).
As has already been discussed life events are not the most relevant or 
appropriate aspect of real life problems to study in the context of the 
reformulated helplessness theory. Abramson et al (1978) have themselves 
proposed that the concept of current concerns (Klinger 1975) might be 
more helpful. They have in addition pointed out that the causes of 
depression can Include the loss of desirable outcomes as well as 
undesirable outcomes. The interview was therefore designed with these 
points in mind, that is to elicit current concerns which could Include 
the consequences of undesirable events and the non-occurrence or loss of 
desirable events or outcomes.
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The reliability of the interview could not be established by conventional 
inter-rater reliability measures as only one interviewer was involved in 
the study. However a number of features and stages were built into the 
interview to maximise the likelihood that the interview would be 
reliable. These include:
1) The use of interviewee copy of the schedule (appendix B) which the 
subject read as the interviewer went through the full schedule;
2) A detailed section clarifying each concern with the subject including 
criteria for arriving at the precise wording of each current concern 
to be used in the subsequent causal beliefs interview and a procedure 
for checking the accuracy of the wording with the subject.
As can be seen from an inspection of the schedule, the current concerns 
interview has three distinct phases:
1) An eliciting phase during which each main area of the patient's life 
was addressed Euid possible concerns Identified;
2) A clarification phase during which each possible concern was 
discussed. Each concern was then written on a 5" x 3" index card in 
the form:
Present: eg I am not working
Desired: eg I am working in a full-time job
Each card was then placed in front of the subject to check their 
satisfaction with the wording and to establish that only separate 
distinct concerns were included.
3) A reuiking phase completed the interview during which the subject 
r^mked the concerns in order of importance.
The interview therefore normally finished with at least six current 
concerns, in rank order of Importance, each written on an index card in 
the format described above.
Causal Beliefs Interview (appendix C)
The Causal Beliefs Interview is a detailed structured interview designed 
to elicit causal explanations concerning each of the six highest ranking 
current concerns identified by the Current Concerns Interview. For each 
current concern the subject was asked about their beliefs about the main
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cause of the concern, together with further questions concerning a number 
of attributional dimensions of relevance to the reformulated theory emd 
other dimensions of relevance to other related theories. The dimensions 
Included were:
1) Internality - this was asked in two forms, one similar to that used
by Seligman et al (1979) in the ASQ This item did however divide
external causes into three subcategories: other people, other 
circumstances (impersonal world) and physical aspects of the person 
(impersonal self). The main score, however, indicated the extent to 
which the person gave internal attributions and was scored as a 
simple dichotonous item 0=external, l=lnternal. The second, labelled 
universality specifically included a reference to comparison with
other people eund was therefore directly relevant to the concept of 
internality as used by Abramson et al (1978).
2) Stability - this dimension was also included in two forms, one
concerning the probability of change and the other the time scale of 
change. Each item was rated on a six point scale, each point being 
defined by a word or phrase.
3) Globality - this dimension referred to the extent to which the cause 
affects other areas of the person's life and was rated by the subject 
on a five point scale, each point being defined by a word or phrase. 
These three dimensions were directly derived from the reformulated 
theory.
4) The Behavioural-Characterological distinction - this concerned the 
internally attributed causes only and referred to the distinction 
between dispositional aspects of the person (such as lack of ability, 
shyness) and the person's behaviour, what he or she did.
5) Controllability - this referred to the extent to which the cause was 
believed to be under the person's control, that is contingent on 
their behaviour. The present controllability of the cause was rated 
on a five point scale, each point being defined by a word or phrase.
6) Responsibility - this dimension was included in two forms, the extent 
to which the person believed they are responsible for the cause and 
the extent to which they believed other people were responsible for
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For each current concern the subject was first asked to describe in their 
own words what they believes was the main cause of the current concern. 
Each causal belief scale was then taken in turn and the response of the 
subject recorded. The subject was then asked about what they believed 
future improvement in the concern depended upon and what they expected 
would cause it. Their answer was again recorded and a parallel set of 
questions concerning this cause asked. The questions were identical to 
those concerning the cause of the concern except for internal ity where no 
question involving peer comparisons was included.
The reliability of the causal beliefs interview was measured by an 
analysis of the internal consistency of each individual dimension using 
Cronbach's alpha statistic. For each question an average score was
obtained across the six current concerns. It was expected that if the 
interviews were reliable eind measured a consistent aspect of person's 
causal beliefs (that person variance was a substantial proportion of 
total variance), values of approximately 0.70 should be obtained. Higher 
values would indicate greater consistency but, as Boyle (1985) has 
pointed out, could also point to redundancy between the six concerns.
Present State Exaunination
The Present State Exeunination (PSE) is a structured interview designed to 
cover the main symptoms of psychiatric illness (Wing, Cooper and 
Sartorius 1974). There is a total of 140 items rated from the interview, 
detailed criteria being provided for the rating of each item. It has 
been extensively researched and widely used as a descriptive and 
diagnostic tool. From the 140 symptoms, 38 syndromes have been derived, 
each of which consist of groups of similar symptoms. For exEunple, 
syndrome 6, simple depression, is derived from five symptoms: inefficient 
thinking, depressed mood, hopelessness, suicidal pl2uis or acts and 
depression on examination. These 38 syndromes are reduced to a smaller 
number of diagnostic categories called catego classes, for example simple 
depression and anxiety neurosis.
For the purpose of this study, items were selected from the PSE to cover 
the full range of neurotic, non-psychotlc, symptomatology. Items 
concerning delusions, hallucinations and thought disorder were excluded
causes. Each was ranked on a five point scale.
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as were items which do not relate to the catego classes, such as those 
concerning "insight". This reduced the number of items to 48, and these 
are given in appendix D.
The reliability of the interview has been established as high in trained 
interviewers (Wing et al, 1974). The interviewer in this current study 
was not specifically trained on the PSE but was an experienced clinical 
psychologist who had worked full-time for four years entirely with 
patients of the kind taking part in the research. Detailed scoring 
criteria are given in Wing et al (1974) for each item and were strictly 
adhered to. It is therefore likely that the interview was carried out 
reliably but this could not not be directly tested. Six catego classes 
were utilised in this study: simple depression, neurotic depression, 
retarded depression, phobic anxiety neurosis, anxiety neurosis and other 
neurosis. It should be noted that these are not diagnoses as such but 
simply describe by a single category, the main current symptomatology of 
the subject.
The Present State Examination was used in two ways in this study. First 
the catego class was used to divide the patients into currently depressed 
and currently non-depressed groups. One feature of the PSE should be 
noted here.
Where anxiety and depression are both rated as present at the syndrome 
level, the syndrome rated at the higher level of severity determines the 
catego class. However if both are rated at the same level, depression 
takes precedence in determining the catego class given. Thus subjects 
with a catego class of depression cem have anxiety symptoms of severity 
comparable with those with a catego class of anxiety. Subjects with a 
catego class of anxiety cannot have symptoms of depression rated at a 
comparable level but can have such symptoms at a less severe level.
The PSE was also used to derive a number of symptoms scores: total 
symptoms reported, number of symptoms of depression and number of 
symptoms of anxiety. Symptoms of depression included in this total were 
based on those described by Beck (1967, 1976) and in DSM III (1980): 
depressed mood, hopelessness, suicidal plans or acts, loss of Interest, 
irritability, loss of weight, early wcücening, subjective anergia cund 
retardation, guilt, self depreciation, lack of self confidence, 
subjectively inefficient thinking (difficulty making decisions), poor
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concentration, neglect due to brooding, social withdrawal and loss of 
libido. Symptoms of anxiety included were: tension pains, muscular 
tension, subjective feeling of nervous tension, free floating autonomic 
anxiety, anxious foreboding, panic attacks, situational autonomic
anxiety, autonomic anxiety on meeting people, specific phobias and 
avoidance of anxiety provoking situations.
Overview of Data Analysis
The main body of the data analysis will consist of an examination of each 
of the main hypotheses (1-4), taking each of the three questions in turn 
concerning the causal explanations and expectations given by the 
depressed patients; a comparison between the depressed and non-depressed 
patients and finally an examination of the relationship between causal 
beliefs and depression.
i) Subject Grouping: The main subject grouping was by main catego
category. This procedure gave a group of depressed patients and a 
group of non depressed, anxious patients. This is discussed 
further under subject characteristics below.
ii) Measure of Causal Explanations auid Expectations: For each
dimension two methods of describing the results were used. First 
the average score over the six highest ranking current concerns was 
obtained for each subject. The properties of this averaged score 
and their inter-relationships are discussed further under "Causal 
Beliefs Interview" below. This score was used in two ways. First 
the mean of scores on each dimension of each subject was calculated 
for each group. This meeui score is therefore similar in derivation 
to the scores utilised in other studies, for example utilising the 
ASQ. Secondly the score of each subject was categorised for each 
dimension (eg as either internal or external) and the distribution 
of frequencies of each category for each group of subjects was 
obtained. This second method while involving the loss of some 
information gives a clearer picture of the distribution of causal 
explanations and expectation categories. For exeunple it clarifies 
the number of subjects giving internal or external attributions. 
Details of the rationale and scoring criteria for the two methods 
of describing attributions and expectations are given in appendix 
E.
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iii) Methods of Analysis
a) Questions concerning the causal expectations and explanations
given by depressed patients: The actual attributions (eg
internal, stable, global) given by the depressed patients were 
examined using the frequencies derived from method 2 described 
above. Tests of statistical significance were carried out 
using binomial statistics comparing obtained frequencies with 
the null hypothesis that patients do not have a bias to give 
any particular kind of attribution.
b) Questions concerning the relationship between causal 
explanations u^ld expectations, and depression will be examined 
by computing the conditional probability of a subject being 
depressed if they for example, gave internal attributions and 
comparing this with the overall probability of being 
depressed. The significance of the difference between these 
two probabilities was examined by the application of the 
binomial distribution mean and variance to the overall 
probability of being depressed (Guilford, 1965 page 123). For 
the difference to be found to be significant at the 5% level 
the conditional probability had to differ by a z score of at 
least 1.96 from the population probability.
Finally it will be recalled the four main questions were as follows:
1) Are internal, global and stable attributions concerning the cause of 
current life concerns associated with depression?
2) Are low levels of the controllability of the cause of current 
concerns associated with depression?
3) Are high levels of personal responsibility attributed to the cause of 
current concerns associated with depression?
4) Are future expectations that internal, global, stable 
(unexpected),uncontrollable or personally responsible causes will be 




Table 3i gives the characteristics of the subjects divided on the basis 
of their main catego class. As can be seen both depressed and 
non-depressed groups have an average age of around 40 years. The median 
duration of psychiatric disorder was non significantly longer in the 
depressed group, (Mann-Whitney U test: U=199, z=0.63, p 0.1). Most 
subjects in both groups were married and attended as out-patients. There 
was however an unexpected and statistically significant sex difference 
( *=9.42, p 0.01), the depressed group being predominEuitly female and the 
non-depressed group male. This does not follow the normal expected sex 
distribution of depression and anxiety disorders, both of which are 
generally found to be commoner in women (eg DSM III 1980). The main 
catego class for each subject is given in table 3ii. The non depressed 
group consisted predominently of subjects whose main catego class was of 
phobic anxiety. Although three separate depression classes were obtained 
by the depressed subjects, the classes were not analysed separately due 
to the small numbers involved and because the classes did not seem likely 
to relate to the helplessness theory. The total number of depressive, 
anxiety and all symptoms for each group is given in table 3ii. As 
expected the depressed group differed highly significantly from the non 
depressed group in number of depressive symptoms (t=11.93, p 0.01) but 
also in total symptoms (t=8.93, p 0.01). The depressed group therefore 
appeared to present with more diffuse symptomatology than the non 
depressed group. Finally there was no significant difference in the 
number of 2mxiety symptoms (t=1.56, p 0.1).
CURRENT CONCERNS ELICITED
In all but one subject at least six concerns were elicited. In this one 
exceptional case (a depressed subject) only three concerns were elicited 






Rellabllltes and Relationships Among Attrlbutlonal Dimensions
For each attributional dimension, an averaged score over the six highest
ranking current concerns was obtained.
a) Internal Consistency: The internal consistency for each dimension 
was calculated using Cronbach's alpha statistic (Cronbach, 1953). The 
values are given in brackets in tables 3iii and 3iv. With the 
exception of present controllability they lay in the range 0.62 to 
0.79 with a median of 0.69 for the dimensions relating to the cause 
of the concern, and 0.68 to 0.84 with a median of 0.72 for those 
relating to the cause of future change. These are generally moderate 
values, comparing favourably with the values obtained for the ASQ (a 
measure of attributional style) and suggest that the subjects had 
consistent individual differences in their attributions. The low 
value of 0.39 for present causes controllability could indicate 
either that the reliability of this particular scale is poor or that 
most of the variance of ratings of controllability is accountable for 
by situation variance or the interaction between situations emd 
persons.
b) Inter-relationships between the attributional dimensions: The
inter-correlation between the attributional dimensions, given by 
Pearson's Product-Moment Correlation, are presented in tables 3iii 
and 3iv.
i) Attributions for Present Cause: A number of relatively small 
but statistically significant correlations were obtained. 
Internality was correlated with both universality and personal 
responsibility, both not unexpectedly. The two stability 
means were highly intercorrelated suggesting that they measure 
similar beliefs. Overall most correlations were less than 0.4 
indicating that with the exception of the stability measures, 
the dimensions share only a relatively small proportion of 
common variance.
ii) Attributions for the Cause of Future Change; The number and 




for the cause of the concerns. The two Internality dimensions 
were highly intercorrelated and may not have been clearly 
differentiated by subjects. Personal responsibility was again 
correlated with internality. However, rather surprisingly the 
two expectation dimensions were uncorrelated indicating that 
subjects' beliefs about the likelihood of chEmge occurring are 
independent of their beliefs about the time scale of any 
cheunge. The considerable number of statistically significant 
intercorrelations does raise some doubt regarding the
independence of the dimensions relating to future change.
iii) Correlations Between the Dimensions Relating to Present Cause 
and Expected Cause of Future Change: These are presented in 
table 3v for similar past and future dimensions only. Most 
were statistically significemtly correlated with globality and 
internality both quite highly correlated. Subjects who 
believed their concerns were caused by internal causes also 
tended to believe future chauige depended on an internal cause 
(ie a change in or action by themselves). Similarly those who 
believed their concerns were caused by global factors also 
expected future ch2unge to depend on such factors. There was 
therefore some evidence to support the assumption that causal 
beliefs about the past and about future change are related. 
Smaller but statistically significant correlations were also 
obtained for personal responsibility and stability (both 
forms) but not for controllability or others responsibility.
CAUSAL BELIEFS AND DEPRESSION
Sex Differences; In view of the marked sex difference between the two 
groups an initial analysis was carried out to examine whether sex was a 
slgnlflcemt factor associated with subjects' attributions. ANOVAS were 
ceu?rled out on the method one data, for each attributlonal dimension, 
with sex and groups (depressed and non-depressed) as independent factors. 
None of the sex main effects or interactions were significant at the 5X 
level of statistical slgniflcemce (and only one at the 10% level). It 
was therefore concluded that sex was not a significant Influence on 




QUESTION 1: ATTRIBUTIONS RELATED TO THE REFORMULATED HELPLESSNESS THEORY
Considering first the questions derived from the reformulated learned 
helplessness theory, above (page 47), these will now be considered in 
turn.
The reformulated theory is concerned with the internality, globality and 
stability dimensions. Table 3vi gives the results for these dimensions 
using each of the two methods described above.
i ) Do Depressed Patients Attribute the Causes of Their Current 
Concerns to Internal, Stable or Global Causes?
The depressed subjects' ratings of each dimension indicate that the 
main cause of their current concerns was a stable cause but with no 
consistent tendency to be either global or internal (table 3vi). 
Thus depressed subjects did not expect the cause to change much in 
the future but there was considerable variability in the 
internality, and globality of the cause.
ii) Do Depressed Patients Differ from Anxious Patients in Their Causal 
Attributions?
The results were generally consistent across the two methods of 
analysis. For both globality and internality there were non 
significant trends (p < 0.1 but > 0.05) towards the depressed group 
giving higher levels of internality and globality than the non 
depressed group. There were no group differences for universality 
or stability (both likelihood and time scale forms).
iii) Are Patients Who Give Internal, Stable and Global Attributions More 
Likely to be Depressed Compared with the Total Patient Population? 
The results of this analysis are presented in table 3vii. 
Statistically significant relationships were found between 
Internality and globality, and depression. Non significant trends 
were also found for universality but no trend at all was found for 
stability. There was therefore evidence that subjects who 
attributed their current concerns to Internal and global causes 
were significantly more likely to be depressed than the total 
subject pool but no such trend was found for stability.
Overall these results provide some support for the hypothesis derived
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Table S v l; The Relationship between the Internallty, Oloballty and Stability 
of Caueal Explanations, and Depreeelon (I)










Intemality (0-1) 0.54 (0.30) 0.38 (0.28) t - 1.73
Universality (0-1) 0.54 (0.33) 0.44 (0.29) t > 1.0
Globali^ (1-5) 2.72 (0.81) 3.30 (1.13) t » 1.97
Stability (likelihood) (0-5) 2.03 (0.92) 1.86 (1.04) t « 0.57
Stability (tine scale) (0-5) 1.74 (0.63) 1.57 (0.08) t - 0.45
Subjects Cate£orlsed by Averaged Score (method 2)
Attributions! Dimensions
Proportion of subjects 

















Internality 0.467 0.273 (N14) z-0.316 z-1.22
Intemality (Universality) 0.467 0.333 (N12) zbO .316 zkO •79
Globality 0.500 0.200 z«0 z-1.90
Stability (likelihood) 0.759 (N29) 0.867 z-2.79** zbO.84







from the aetiological hypothesis of the reformulated helplessness theory 
at the beginning of the chapter. Both depressed and non depressed 
subjects gave stable causes suggesting that the theory's proposals with 
respect to stability are not specific to depression. There was some 
evidence that depressed subjects gave more global, and to a lesser extent 
more internal, causes them non-depressed subjects but not that they gave 
generally global or internal attributions. Finally subjects who gave 
internal or global attributions, predominantly, were more likely to be 
categorised as depressed.
QUESTION 2: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTROLLABILITY AND DEPRESSION
The results for the controllability of the cause of current concerns are 
given in table 3viii.
i) The depressed subjects in all cases gave low ratings indicating that 
they perceived themselves as having little or no control over these 
causes.
ii) There was a statistically significant difference between the mean 
controllability ratings of the depressed 2md anxious patient groups 
Indicating that the depressed group perceived themselves as having 
less control over the causes of their current concerns than did the 
anxious subjects. This result was obtained despite 80% of the 
anxious group also giving an average controllability rating 
indicating low perceived control.
iii) No statistically significant relationship between controllability 
and depression was found. Thus there was no difference between the 
probability of being depressed if low controllability ratings had 
been given compared with the overall probability of being 
categorised as depressed in this patient sample. The failure to 
find any relationship may however have been due to floor effects 
since as noted above, both groups gave mainly low controllability 
ratings.
In summary both depressed and anxious patients perceived themselves as 
having little control over the causes of their current concerns. The 
depressed patients did however give lower controllability ratings than 
the anxious patients in line with predictions.
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; The Helatlonahip Between the Controllability o f Cauaal EnpIanatlcriB. end Pep:>eeBlcn 
ftqy MBene (waUTod 1)













Rraporticn of ai>JectB giving 
men vnoontrollabillty rating 
1.0 - 2.5 1.0 0.8 ai.47*** z-2.5»
Begreslan Anedysis of Relatioieiiip Between Uhocntrollabllity end Depreeslcn
ftx*eblUty of being Overall probability Sigilflcance of
depreeeed if men of being depressed difference*
woontrOlleble rating
1.0 - 2.5
(Jhoontrollability 0.71 0.667 z»i0.62
• p<0.05
- assessed ly application of the binomial distribution and variance to overall probability 
of being depressed (Guilford, 1965, p 123)
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QUESTION 3; THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY AND 
DEPRESSION
The results obtained for both the extent to which subjects held 
themselves and other people responsible for the cause of their current 
concerns, are given in table Six.
i) Contrary to expectations derived from Beck's work depressed subjects 
did not give high personal responsibility ratings. The group mean 
score lies between points three 2md four on the rating scale, 
equivalent to a rating of between "moderately" and "a little". The 
ratings for "others responsibility" were similar, the mean being 
almost identical to that for personal responsibility (2.31 being 
equivalent to 3.69 on the scale used for personal responsibility). 
There was therefore no evidence either of high attributions of 
personal responsibility or of higher attributions of personal 
responsibility compared with responsibility attributed to others.
ii) There were no significant differences between depressed and anxious
groups on either scale. The only trend was in the opposite
direction to that expected with a rather higher proportion of 
anxious subjects giving high personal responsibility ratings. This 
trend was not however reflected in the group means.
iii) There was also no tendency for subjects who gave high personal 
responsibility ratings to be depressed.
The results for the responsibility scales were negative and contrary to 
expectations in every respect with no relationship found between 
attributions of responsibility and depression.
QUESTION 4: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPECTATION OF FUTURE CHANGE AND 
DEPRESSION
The results for the expected cause of future change are given in tables 
3x, 3xi and 3x1i.
1) Table 3x revealed that depressed subjects did not have generally 
low expectations of causes of future change occurring. On the 
contrary moderate or high expectations were generally given.
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Subjects did however tend to expect future change to depend on 
uncontrollable causes but not causes for which they believed 
themselves highly personally responsible (both tests falling short 
of statistical significance at the 5% level). There were no trends 
for expected causes of change in present concerns to be either 
predominantly internal or global.
ii) Table 3xi shows that significant group differences were found for 
two dimensions, the expected likelihood of occurrence of the cause 
of ch^ulge and personal responsibility of the expected cause of 
change. Depressed subjects gave lower expectations that the cause 
of change would occur and held themselves less responsible for the 
cause of change. No signlfic^u^t differences were found for 
internality, globality, controllability, the time scale of the 
cause of expected change and "other responsibility".
iii) Table 3xii shows only one significant relationship between 
attributions! categories and depression was found. Subjects who 
had low expectations of the cause of change occurring were more 
likely to be depressed.
In summary the findings for future expectations were less positive than 
for the causes of the current concern. Depressed subjects did have lower 
expectations of the cause of change than the euixious subjects but did not 
have generally low expectations. Subjects who had low expectations were 
more likely to be depressed. Depressed subjects also held themselves 
less responsible for future change than the anxious subjects and did not 
give high personal responsibility ratings. Results for internality, 
globality and controllability were generally negative with no significant 
group differences.
THE REPLICABILITY OF RESULTS WHEN DIFFERENT METHODS OF CLASSIFYING 
SUBJECTS ARE USED
The results reported above classified subjects into depressed and 
non-depressed using the main catego class. This may not however be the 
most appropriate way of dividing subjects into depressed and anxious 
groups, particularly as the latter could contain subjects with some 
depressive symptoms.
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As a first step towards examining this classification, the distribution 
of depressive symptoms in subjects in both groups were examined. Table 
3xiii shows that in practice there was little overlap between the groups 
weakening the force of the criticism made above of the anxious group. It 
can be seen however that there is a wide range in number of symptoms of 
depression with a bimodal shape to the distribution, one peak being at 
the lower end and another in the middle. The results with method I group 
means were re-analysed using four different and to some extent arbitrary 
classification criteria:
1) Catego Class (as above)
2) A median symptom split:
depressed subjects having 7 or more symptoms 
non-depressed subjects having 6 or less symptoms
3) A median split, excluding subjects with 3-5 symptoms:
depressed subject having 6 or more symptoms 
non-depressed subject having 2 or less symptoms
4) A more severely depressed group split:
depressed subject having 8 or more symptoms 
non-depressed subject having 2 or less symptoms
In addition correlations between number of symptoms of depression, 
anxiety and all symptoms, and the attributlonal dimensions were computed.
Results are given in table 3xiv for the cause of current concerns. 
Hotellings' T^  was applied to assess the overall significance of group 
differences over all attributions! dimensions. Individual statistically 
significant differences are also given. The results generally suggest 
that groups formed on the basis of number of depressive symptoms do in 
fact give greater overall differences in the attrlbutional dimensions as 
indicated by the Hotellings' T* . In all analyses controllability 
significantly differs between the groups and in two analyses group 
differences in globallty were also found. Finally, moderately large 
statistically significant, positive correlations (Pearson's 
product-moment correlation) between uncontrollability and number of 
depressive symptoms and between globallty and number of depressive 
symptoms were found. However a similar magnitude correlation was also 
found between number of anxiety symptoms and globallty. In order to 




attributional dimensions, a partial correlation analysis was carried out. 
When the correlations between anxiety and both globality smd
controllability were partialled out, the correlations between depression 
and globality (0.33) and between depression and controllability (0.44) 
remained significant. However the correlations between anxiety and 
globality (0.288) fell short of statistical significance when the 
correlation between depression and globality was partialled out (the 
correlation between anxiety and controllability remained non
significant).
The same analyses were carried out for the causes of future change. Table 
3xv shows a similar pattern of results but with less clear evidence of 
the superiority of the subject groupings formed by splits based on number 
of depressive symptoms. Indeed in one case, the median split, the 
Hotellings' T* failed to approach statistical significance. There was 
also less consistency in the statistically significant group differences 
and correlations found. No dimension was consistently related to group 
membership although personal responsibility was in four of the five 
methods, high personal responsibility being associated with depression. 
Expectation of the cause occurring in the future (likelihood form) gave 
statistically significant differences in two analyses as did 
controllability with depressed subjects having lower expectations of the 
cause occurring in the future and lower expected control. Controllability 
and personal responsibility correlated significantly with number of 
depressive but not anxiety symptoms.
Overall the general consistency of results using different criterion for 
allocating subjects to depressed and non-depressed groups suggests that 
the findings are likely to be robust for past controllability and future 
personal responsibility. It also suggests that the results of the 
analysis based on catego class are unlikely to be greatly different from 
analyses based on other criteria. There was some suggestion however that 
dividing subjects on the basis of number of symptoms reported may have 
given cleeu'er results than using catego class, particularly for the 
dimensions relating to the cause of the current concern.
ANALYSIS OF CAUSES GIVEN USING A CATEGORICAL SYSTEM FOR EACH CAUSE
Inspection of the causal explanations given by subjects using their ovm 
words suggested that they could be adequately described by the four
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categories yielded by question (1) internality, but with causes 
attributed to the personal self divided into behavioural and 
characterologlcal causes. Each cause given was therefore categorised 
into one of five categories, based on subject's responses to questions 
one and three of the Causal Beliefs Interview: characterolglcal, 
behavioural, physical self. Impersonal circumstances and other people. 
Examples of each cause are given in table 3xvl.
Group meEins for each of these categories, expressed as a proportion of 
all causes given, are presented in table 3xvll. For the cause of the 
current concern, the depressed group gave characterological causes 
approximately half the time with few behavioural and physical self causes 
and approximately a one fifth each circumstances and other people. The 
non depressed subjects gave approximately one third characterologlcal 
causes and circumstetnces and around one fifth other people. There was a 
strong but statistically non significant trend for depressed subjects to 
give more cheu'acterological causes and fewer circumstances as causes. For 
the cause of future change the results were less distinct. Depressed 
subjects gave both characterological and behavioural causes about one 
quarter of the time with both circumstances and other people being 
utilised equally but less frequently. Non depressed subjects gave 
behavioural causes most often but circumstances, other people zmd 
characterological causes were also Involved. No group differences 
approached statistical slgnficance.
DISCUSSION
The present study has provided further evidence relevant to the 
reformulated learned helplessness theory Eind to a number of related 2md 
alternative theories of depression. The evidence has been obtained in a 
clinically depressed patient population examining their causal 
explematlons and expectations regarding their moat Important current 
concerns. Taking each set of questions posed at the beginning of this 




1) The Reformulated Learned Helplessness Theory
The evidence obtained gave some, but not very strong, support to 
hypotheses derived from the aetiological hypothesis of the 
reformulated learned helplessness theory. Depressed subjects gave 
stable but not predominantly Internal or global attributions. 
Depressed subjects tended to give more global and to a lesser extent 
internal causes than the Eunxious subjects although these trends were 
not statistically significant in the main analysis using catego class 
to form depressed Euid anxious groups. There were no differences 
between groups for stability. These results indicate how very 
important it is to use adequate control groups in tests of leEU'ned 
helplessness theory. In the absence of the anxiety group one might 
have concluded the results supported the learned helplessness theory 
much more strongly and that they were specific to depression. Finally 
subjects who gave predominantly internal or global attributions were 
significantly more likely to be depressed than the whole patient 
population. This latter more positive finding might be related to 
the heterogen!ty of the depressed patients. It should be recalled 
that the reformulated helplessness theory is a theory of one type of 
depression, helpless depressions, not of all kinds of depression and 
therefore it might be expected that the latter method of analysis 
would yield more positive results than a simple group comparison. The 
positive results can be interpreted as either reflecting a kind of 
cognitive distortion by the depressed patients, perhaps due to a 
depression-prone or a state dependent attrlbutlonal style, or that 
the depressed patients are facing, or are troubled more by, certain 
kinds of life problems, namely those with Internal, global and stable 
causes. Either possibility is however consistent with the 
reformulated learned helplessness theory.
2) Attributions of Controllability
Depressed subjects gave predominantly uncontrollable causes and gave 
more uncontrollable causes than the anxious subjects. No association 
was found between uncontrollable causes and depression although floor 
effects could have obscured any association that does exist. The 
evidence supported quite consistently the hypothesis that depressed
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subjects perceive themselves as having little control over the causes 
of their current concerns and that this is specific to depression, at 
least in degree, when compared with anxiety. This result provides 
support for the importance given to uncontrollability in the learned 
helplessness theory.
3) Attributions of Personal Responsibility
No support was found for a relationship between depression and 
attributions of personal responsibility. Depressed subjects did not 
give causes for which they held themselves mainly responsible nor 
were there any group differences between the depressed and anxious 
subjects. Depressed subjects did not therefore appear to blame
themselves for the causes of their current concerns to any very 
significant extent. This finding is surprising given that guilt and 
self blame are such frequent features of depriesslon, and the central 
role in depression given to a negative self concept or low self 
esteem by authors such as Beck. It may be that these negative 
findings are due to a social desirability set, defensiveness or
desire for approval and that in consequence subjects' verbal responses 
meiy not have accurately reflected their cognitive processes.
4) Expectations of the Cause of Future Change
The findings for expectations of the cause of future change were 
generally negative. Depressed subjects did not give predominantly
Internal or global causes, or causes which were unlikely to occur
although there was a trend towards them giving uncontrollable causes 
and causes for which they did not hold themselves responsible. The 
negative findings for the likelihood of occurrence were rather 
surprising given the frequently reported association between 
depression and pessimism about the future. Depressed subjects were 
however more pessimistic than the anxious group.
The other positive finding, that depressed subjects held themselves 
less responsible for future change, was the reverse of that expected 
and reinforces the negative findings for responsibility attributed to 
peist causes.
In summary this study Involved the comparison of groups of depressed and
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anxious with anxious and non-depressed (largely) patients on measures of 
causal explanations and expectations regarding major real life current 
concerns or problems. Results gave some support to the reformulated 
helplessness theory in that subjects who gave Internal or global 
attributions for the cause of their current concerns were significantly 
more likely to be depressed than the patient population as a whole. 
Depressed subjects as a group also tended to give more global and 
internal (but not in the sense of the personal-universal distinction) 
attributions. As regards stability depressed subjects gave predominantly 
stable attributions but so did emxlous non-depressed subjects.
Indirect support for the reformulated theory was also given by the 
results for controllability. While the theory does not discuss 
controllability as an attributions! dimension, the perceived 
controllability of current concerns is a critical element of the theory. 
As would be predicted by the theory depressed subjects rated the causes 
of their current concerns as uncontrollable, and did this to a 
significantly greater extent than the anxious group.
The results for future expectations of the cause of future change 
accorded less well with the reformulated theory. Depressed subjects did 
not give low expectancies for the likely cause of future chEtnge as might 
have been predicted from the reformulated theory although they did give 
lower expectancies than the anxious group. They did tend to rate the 
cause of future change as uncontrollable, but did not differ 
significantly from the anxious group in this respect.
While this study provided some support for the reformulated helplesness 
theory of depression, little support was found for other theories 
particularly Beck's cognitive theory. Thus depressed subjects did not 
appear to be highly self blaming in that they did not tend to hold 
themselves responsible for the cause of their problems. They did not 
appear to be particularly pessimistic about the future and did not hold 
themselves mostly responsible for future change.
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CHAPTER 4
THE MEASUREMENT OF DEPRESSION AND ANXIETY
In Chapter 3 the relationship between depression and causal beliefs was 
examined using a system for categorising subjects on the basis of their 
main reported syit^toms: the Catego category derived from the PSE. This 
methodology does however have a number of disadvantages when utilised to 
test the reformulated learned helplessness theory. First the theory 
differentiates among the components of depression and makes different 
predictions about these components. In particular internality is linked 
most closely with the self esteem loss in depression while globality is 
related to the generality of motivational deficits and stability to the 
chronicity of these deficits. The use of a mutually exclusive category 
method to define subject groups does not allow these different 
components to be differentiated. Secondly, as will be discussed further 
below, depression and anxiety frequently co-exist in clinical 
populations. A result of this, as found in Chapter 3, is that it is 
difficult to find "pure" depressed 2und "pure" anxious groups of patients.
Indeed in that study there were no differences between the two groups in 
total number of anxiety symptoms, although they did differ clearly in 
depressive symptomatology. Although this permitted adequate control of 
anxiety symptoms, it did not permit the assessment of the independent 
relationships between depression and causal beliefs and between anxiety 
and causal beliefs. Thirdly a categorical system takes no account of 
symptom severity once it is above a threshold level. This may not be a 
problem if the theory assumes that depression is a discontinuous state or 
that once above a central threshold the relationship between causal 
beliefs etnd depression is a constant one. This does however seem rather 
unlikely in view of the number of positive findings in students of an 
association between attributions and depression using "sub-clinical" cut 
offs to define depressed groups. Further in the study described in 
Chapter 3 the results obtained by correlating number of depression 
symptoms with causal beliefs, or by dividing subjects using more extreme 
symptom splits (le excluding subjects with moderate number of depressive 
results) were at least as statistically significant and consistent as 
those obtained using catego category, and in a number of instances more 
so.
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These considerations lead to the conclusion that the continuous measures 
of depression and anxiety, and of the sub-components of these states, may 
enable a more adequate test of the reformulated learned helplessness 
theory to be carried out than by using a categorical system. However the 
measurement of depression and anxiety as independent states do raise a 
number of issues, some of which were discussed in Chapter I. These 
include both general and specific points:
i) Ceui depression Emd anxiety be measured independently of one 
another?
ii) Do measures of depression and anxiety attempt to assess states or 
traits, Euid to what extent do they make clear their objective?
iii) How CEUi the clinical state of anxiety be meeisured?
iv) How can the clinical state of depression be measured Euid to what 
extent do measures of depression take into account Emd yield 
independent measure of the components of depression?
These issues Erne of considerable importfimce to studies of the 
reformulated leEurned helplessness theory, and other theories of 
depression. If the specificity of such theories to depression is to be 
tested, adequate measures of depression and anxiety are essential. As 
the reformulated theory mEdces predictions about both state depression Emd 
vulnerability to depression, it is importEmt to have measures of state, 
and to a lesser extent trait, depression and Emxiety. Cognitive theories 
of depression in general, Emd the reformulated theory in particulEu? 
propose that cognitions play a causal role in the aetiology Emd/or 
maintenEmce of depression. It is important to know to what extent 
measures of depression actually measure and reflect the self esteem loss 
and other cognitive coiq>onents of depression.
THE MEASUREMENT OF DEPRESSION AND ANXIETY AS INDEPENDENT STATES
The independent measurement of depression smd anxiety raises a number of 
difficulties including the overlap of symptomatology; the slmultEmeous 
occurrence of depression and Emxiety symptoms in clinical populations and 
the distinction between depression and Emxiety as mood states Emd 
depression Emd Emxiety as clinical syndromes.
A mood state may be dlfferentlatied from a clinical syndrome in that the 
former is essentially an affective concept while the latter is am
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essentially medical construct in which a number of symptoms are linked 
together because of their tendency to co-exist and because of presumed 
basic underlying cause or causes. A syndrome consists however only of 
symptoms (and signs) unlike a psychiatric diagnosis which takes into 
account personality variables, aetiologlcal factors and previous 
psychiatric history.
Although the symptomatology of depression and anxiety are to a 
considerable extent clearly differentiable there is an area of overlap. 
Indeed the affects of depression and anxiety themselves have been held to 
be characteristic of both anxiety Eind depression (eg Garber, Miller and 
Abramson, 1980). The H^unillton Rating Scales for Depression and Anxiety 
(Hamilton 1959, 1967) reflect this, each including items concerning both 
anxious and depressed mood. Other symptoms such as initial insomnia, 
irritability and difficulty in concentration can also occur in both 
depression 8md anxiety.
Roth and his colleagues in Newcastle conducted a series of studies 
concerning the differentiation of clinical depression and clinical 
anxiety (Roth, Gurney, Garside and Kerr, 1972; Gurney, Roth, Garaide, 
Kerr and Schapiro, 1972; Mountjoy and Roth, 1980). Using multivariate 
methods of euialysis they were able to show that a population of anxious, 
depressed emd mixed anxiety-depression patients were unimodally 
distributed along a factor reflecting the depression-anxiety continuum 
(as indicated by the pattern of factor loadings). This indicated that 
such patients do not readily and naturally fall into two distinct groups 
although the symptoms themselves did distribute themselves at opposite 
ends of a continuum reflecting the distinction between anxiety and 
depression. In a later study (Mountjoy and Roth, 1980) they were able to 
demonstrate, using discriminent function emalysis, that it is possible to 
differentiate patients diagnosed as having either an enxlety disorder or 
depression. However the overlap of symptomatology was once again 
apparent with items such as poor concentration positively discriminating 
the anxious - phobic subjects, despite poor concentration being usually 
considered a symptom of depression (eg Present State Examination, 1975; 
DSM III, 1980). By contrast persistent tension was found to positively 
discriminate subjects diagnosed as depressed.
"Anxiety" cuid "depression" can refer both to mood states cmd clinical 
syndromes. Measures of depression and anxiety may be designed to measure
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either of these two kinds of variables which are phenomenologically quite 
distinct. For example Spielberger's State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Spielberger, 1970) is basically a measure of mood state and includes no 
reference to somatic sensations. The Leeds Self Assessment of Anxiety 
(and Depression) Scale (Snaith, Bridge and Hamilton, 1976) includes 
somatic symptoms as well as emotional state and was designed to measure 
the clinical syndrome of anxiety. This distinction is of some 
importance, p2urticularly as depressed and anxious mood have not been 
found to be good discriminators of the clinical syndromes of depression 
and 2mxiety. For example Snaith, Baugh, Clayden, Husain and Sipple 
(1982) found a correlation of 0.64 between ratings of depressed mood £»nd 
ratings of overall severity of clinical anxiety.
It may therefore be concluded that while 2uixiety and depression, as 
clinical syndromes, can be differentiated there is a considerable overlap 
in symptomatology, and frequent occurrence of symptoms of both depression 
and anxiety in clinical populations.
THE MEASUREMENT OF DEPRESSION AND ANXIETY AS STATES OR TRAITS
Conceptually state 2ind trait depression and anxiety are quite distinct 
but they are nonetheless not always clearly differentiated. State 
anxiety and depression refer to the current or recent functioning of the 
subject and are measured by reference to current symptomatology. Trait 
anxiety and depression refer to the tendency to become depressed or 
anxious readily or frequently and are measured by reference to how the 
subject generally or normally functions. States are usually measured by 
reference to a time period of a month or leas, traits by reference to a 
long or indefinite time period. Some measures of depression and anxiety 
may be criticised for lack of clarity in this regard. Thus while some 
measures eg Spielberger's State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 
1968) and the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al, 1961) clearly 
specify the time period involved, others such as Cattell's IPAT Anxiety 
Scale (Cattell and Scheier, 1963) do not.
The importance of this distinction can be illustrated with reference to 
the factor analytic studies of Golln and Hartz (1979) and Weckowlcz, Muir 
and Croply (1967). Golin and Hartz attempted to examine the similarity 
of factors obtained from BDIs administered to mildly depressed students 
(cut off of 9) with those obtained by Weckowicz at al. They found little
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similarity and concluded that mild depressions differ qualitatively from 
severe clinic depressions. This contrasts with the finding of a similar 
study in mildly depressed students by Hill, Kemp-Wheeler and Jones 
(1986). In this study the factors obtained in students were reasonably 
similar to those reported in Weckowlcz et al and a sample of depressed 
patients. The major difference between the two studies was that Golln 
and Hartz used a trait form of the BDI whilst Hill et al and Weckowicz et 
al used the state form.
The Measurement of Clinical Anxiety
The measurement of the clinical state of anxiety, as distinct from 
anxious mood, requires subjects to report on symptoms experienced over a 
period of time, usually from a few days to a few weeks. This is 
paurticularly important in the measurement of the clinical syndromes 
because the symptoms, particulau?ly panic attacks 2md somatic symptoms, 
are often intermittent. However this raises an additional problem, 
namely that symptoms can vary in a number of ways in addition to 
intensity. In particular they may vary in frequency and duration. These 
three parameters are not always clearly differentiated on existing 
scales. For example the Leeds Self Assessment Scales (Snaith et al, 
1976) have four response categories for each item: definitely (3), 
sometimes (2), not much (1) and not at all (o). It can be seen that both 
frequency and intensity parameters are confused within a single scale 2md 
that an additional parameter, certainty ('definitely') is also included. 
These three parameters may not however always covary euid thus could be 
confusing if included in a single scale,. A similar problem may be 
discerned in the Clinical Anxiety Scale, a rating scale derived from the 
Hamilton Rating Scale by the same group of authors (Snaith et al, 1982). 
Other scales do not specify which parameter(s) they are referring to. For 
example Foulds and Bedford's DSSI/SAD scale (Bedford euid Foulds, 1978), 
does not specify emy parameter but simply asks the subject how upsetting 
the symptom has been. This rating of upset may relate to any or none of 
these pareuneters.
The Measurement of Clinical Depression
A particular problem arising from the measurement of clinical depression 
is that the syndrome consists of a number of components which may be 
differentiable empirically and theoretically. In particular affective.
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cognitive and somatic components 8tre frequently identified and are 
referred to by Abramson et al (1978) in their original paper. Measures 
of depression may however vary considerably in the extent to which they 
sample symptoms from each component. For example the Hamilton Rating 
Scale of Depression (Hamilton, 1967) is biased towards somatic items 
while the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al, 1961) Includes a 
considerable number of cognitive items.
The factor analytic study of the BDI in a patient population, carried out 
by Weckowicz et al (1967) revealed that a number of identifiable 
components could be demonstrated. The first component was loaded highly 
by mainly cognitive, low self esteem items: guilt, sense of punishment, 
self-accusation, sense of failure, self-punitive wishes u^1d self-hate. 
The second factor, labelled a retardation factor, was loaded highly by 
work inhibition, fatiguabillty, lack of satisfaction and depressed mood. 
The third factor, labelled "somatic disturbance" w m  loaded most highly 
by sleep disturbance, loss of appetite, weight loss and loss of libido. 
It is interesting to note that a general "severity" factor did not emerge 
and that the first factor found was a "cognitive one". It may therefore 
be important to be aware of the symptoms sampled by any measure of 
depression and that any association between that measure and another (eg 
of attributions) may be due principally to one component of depression.
AIM OF STUDY
The aim of the study reported in this chapter was to examine a number of 
the issues raised above. A sample of depressed and anxious patients 
completed questionnaire measures of anxiety and depressive symptoms. 
These were then subjected to a range of factor analytic methods to 
determine their factor structure sund interrelationship. This euialysls 
enabled a number of questions to be amswered:
1) Can depression and anxiety be measured as differentiable clinical 
states and to what extent do they covary in the patient population?
2) Do the measures of depression and anxiety measure predominantly 
single unitary syndromes, or are sub components differentiable?
3) Are the frequency, duration and intensity parameters differentiable 
in the measurement of anxiety m d  to what extent do they covary?
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Subjects
120 adult psychiatric day patients and out-patients were included in this 
study. Patients were aged 18 to 65 and presented with a neurotic 
psychiatric disorder. Patients were excluded if they had a
monosymptomatic disorder (eg specific phobia or obsession); a psychotic 
disorder, alcoholism, drug abuse, psychopathic or sociopathic personality 
disorder or a mental handicap. In addition only patients whose symptoms 
were clearly distinct from their "normal" state were Included. The most 
common presenting problems were of depression, inability to cope, p^mic 
attacks amd a variety of anxiety symptoms.
METHODS AND PROCEDURE
Subjects completed four questionnaires which were all individually 
administered at the same session. They took approximately twenty to 
thirty minutes to complete. The questionnaires completed were:
a) The Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al, 1961) - a 21 item, 
multiple choice questionnaire covering most of the major symptoms of 
depression. A two week period over which each symptom is rated was 
used. (Appendix F)
b) The Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire (Frequency) (ASQF): a 13 item 
questionnaire including the main symptoms of clinical anxiety plus 
three additional items relating to depression. The items were 
adopted from other questionnaires including Delusions, 
Symptoms-States Inventory (Bedford and Foulds 1978), and Leeds Scales 
(Snaith et al 1976). Symptoms included were:
1) Physical Anxiety Symptoms - palpitations or sensation
butterflies in the stomach
- dizzy attacks and unsteadiness
- feeling tense or wound up
- headache, neck and back pains
of
ii) Affective Symptoms - feeling very frightened or panicky
- feeling scared or frightened
- feeling insecure or lacking self 
confidence
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ill) Cognitive Symptoms - worry about future
iv) Behavioural Symptoms - restlessness and Inability to sit 
still
For each symptom the subject was asked how frequently this had 
occurred during the past fortnight: dally, most days, several days 
or not at all. The questionnaire is included in appendix G.
c) The Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire (Intensity (ASQI): This was 
identical to the ASQF but instead of rating the frequency of the 
symptom occurrence, the greatest intensity during the past fortnight 
-very, quite, a bit - was rated. (Appendix H).
d) The Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire (Duration) (ASQD): This was also 
identical to the ASQF but the subjects rated the longest duration of 




These are given in Table 4i. Subjects were approximately equally 
divided between males and females, mean age of 37, mainly married and 
also approximately equally divided between those in full time and 
those not in employment. Most were attending as out-patients at 
clinical psychologist's clinics. Almost three quarters were at least 
mildly depressed, using a BDI cut off of 13 and almost one half were 
moderately to severely depressed, using a BDI cut off of 20 
(suggested by Beck as criteria for ascribing severity of depression).
ii) Factor Structure of the Questionnaires
The individual items of the four questionnaires were each separately 
subjected to factor walysis. Matrices of product moment 
correlations between all pairs of items were computed separately for 
each questionnaire (BDI, ASQF, ASQI and ASQD). The matrices were 
factored using the Principle Factor method with communallty 
estimated by iteration. Kaiser's criterion for ceasing factor
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extraction was used and the resultant factor matrix subjected to a 
variety of orthagonal and oblique rotations including Varimax and 
Obllmax.
a) The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
The factor pattern proved robust under a variety of rotations 
including oblique (oblim^uc) solutions with a delta range 0.0 to 0.5. 
The orthogonal (varimax) solution will be discussed in more detail as 
it was slmileu' to the oblique solutions but is easier to interpret 
and use in subsequent analyses (because the factors are 
uncorrelated).
Five factors were extracted with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0. The 
pattern of symptom loadings on each of the factors is given in Table 4ii. 
The first factor accounted for by far the greatest part of the variance, 
30.1%, while subsequent factors accounted for between 7.7 and 5% of the 
variance each.
Factor 1: The first factor's highest loadings were on work retardation, 
fatigability, dissatisfaction, pessimism, crying,
hypochondriacal pre-occupation and sadness with lower loadings 
on irritability, loss of interest in people, body image change 
and suicidal ideas. This factor is similar to the second 
factor found by Weckowicz et al (1967) which had its highest 
loadings on work retardation, fatigability, dissatisfaction 
and sadness. This factor was interpreted by Weckowicz et al 
as reflecting "loss of vital energy" and will be labelled here 
"loss of energy ¿uid interest". It is of interest that this 
factor includes in its highest loadings three of the four 
defining aspects of depression as stated in the DSM III 
criteria for major depression disorder: depressed mood, loss 
of interest, loss of energy and irritability. It may 
therefore reflect the core symptoms of depression. Finally it 
should be noted that in Weckowicz et al's study, the factor 
was second in order of percentage of total variance accounted 




Factor 2: The second factor's highest loadings were on self accusation, 
self doubt, guilt, indeciveness and sense of failure. There
were lower loadings on body image ch^ulge, suicidal ideas, 
dissatisfaction, expectation of punishment, sadness and loss 
of interest in people. This factor is similar to the first 
factor found by Weckowicz et al (1967) which had its highest 
loadings on guilt, expectation of punishment, self accusation, 
sense of failure, self doubt, and suicidal ideas. This factor 
was Interpreted by Weckowicz et al as a factor of guilty 
depression but this factor was interpreted here as 
characterised by a "negative attitude to self" with high 
loadings on self accusation, self doubt, guilt and sense of 
failure.
Factor 3: The third factor's highest loadings were on loss of appetite, 
suicidal ideas and weight loss with lower loadings on 
pessimism, somatic preoccupation, guilt, sadness. Insomnia, 
sense of failure, guilt and self doubt. This factor is more 
difficult to interpret as the items do not hang together in a 
very clear way. The highest loadings suggest that it reflects 
a more severe depression but the absence of substantial 
loadings on insomnia and loss of libido make it difficult to 
view this as a somatic factor. This factor is therefore
interpreted as reflecting severe depressive symptoms although 
it is acknowledged that this is not very clear. It bears some 
similarities to the third factor of Weckowicz et al (1967) 
which had its highest loadings by loss of appetite, weight 
loss and sleep disturbance. However this factor had
considerably more significant loadings than that of Weckowicz 
et al, which more clearly resembled a somatic disturbance 
factor.
Factor 4: The highest loadings on this factor were irritability, 
sadness, social withdrawal, sense of failure, insomnia and 
loss of libido with small loadings on dissatisfaction, 
indeciveness, anorexia and crying. This factor appears to 
represent a kind of Irritable miserableness although the 
substantial loadings on sleep disturbance and loss of libido 
suggest that it is a more severe psychopathologlcal factor 
than this might suggest.
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Factor 5: There was a very high loading on this factor by expectation of 
punishment emd a lower substantial one by crying. No 
interpretation or further comments are made of this factor.
In summary the results of the factor analysis were in several respects 
similar to that of Weckowicz et al (1967) and are largely in accord with 
previous findings concerning the BDI. The first factor in this study is 
a predominantly affective and motivational factor and may be compared 
with the second factor of Weckowicz although the latter factor is simpler 
in its pattern of loadings. The second factor in this study is a
predominantly cognitive factor and resembles the first factor of 
Weckowicz. The third factor is less clear. It resembles the third, 
"somatic", factor of Weckowicz in its high loadings on anorexia atnd 
weight loss but has a considerably smaller loading on insomnia than in 
the former study.
b) Factor Structure of the ASQI
The individual items of the ASQI were subjected to an identical 
analysis to the BDI. The factor pattern 2igaln proved robust linder a 
variety of rotations. The orthogonal (Varimax) solution will be 
discussed in more detail. Three factors were extracted with an
eigenvalue greater than 1.0. Their pattern of symptom loadings is 
given in table 4iii. The factors accounted for 38.2% , 11.3% and 
7.7% of the variance respectively.
Factor 1: The highest loadings on the first factor were panic feelings, 
frightened feelings and palpitations and butterflies in the 
stomach with smaller loadings of feeling tense, dizzy attacks, 
lack of self confidence, restlessness and feeling Insecure. 
This factor therefore includes all the anxiety symptoms except 
worry about the future and may be interpreted as reflecting 
generalised symptoms of anxiety.
Factor 2: The second factor's highest loadings were on worry about the 
future, feeling insecure, dwelling on the past, sadness and 
lack of self confidence with smaller loadings on worse AM and 
feeling frightened. This factor therefore is characterised by 
predominantly cognitive symptoms of both depression and 
anxiety but with substantial loadings on both depressive and 
anxious affect. It is therefore Interpreted as reflecting
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cognitive and affective symptoms of anxiety and depression.
Factor 3: The highest loadings on this factor were feeling tense, 
sadness, lack of self confidence and feeling insecure with 
smaller loadings on restlessness, feeling frightened and 
palpitations. This factor is more difficult to characterise 
and will not be interpreted further at this stage.
In summary the results of this factor analysis produced a single 
generalised anxiety factor which, with the exception of worry, was loaded 
substantially by all the anxiety symptoms. It appeared to be a specific 
anxiety factor as none of the depressive symptoms loaded on it 
substantially. The second factor was unexpected, consisting of both 
cognitive and affective aspects of depression and anxiety. Both worry 
about the future and dwelling on the past had high loadings on this 
factor.
c) ASOF
The results of the factor analysis of the ASQF were in some respects 
similar to that of the ASQI. Three factors were extracted with an 
eigenvalue greater than 1.0, accounting for 35.8%, 11.6% and 7.9% of 
the variance respectively. The pattern of loadings produced by the 
orthogonal factor solution are presented in table 4iv. The solution 
was robust under a variety of rotations as with the BDI and ASQI.
Factor 1: This factor was very similar to factor two of the ASQI with 
highest loadings on dwelling in the past, feeling insecure and 
worry about the future and substantial loadings on sadness, 
worse AM, feeling frightened and lack of self confidence. It 
is also interpreted as reflecting cognitive and affective 
symptoms of anxiety emd depression.
Factor 2: The second factor was similar to factor 1 of the ASQI but 
differed in not having slgnificemt loadings on dizzy attacks 
and in having a significant loading on sadness. Thus while it 
predominantly reflects generalised symptoms of anxiety it is 
less clearly defined than in the case of the ASQI.
Factor 3: This factor was also similar to factor 1 of the ASQI but had 
no significant loading on palpitations and restlessness, and
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had a significant loading on worry about the future.
Factors 2 emd 3 of the ASQF therefore are both similar to factor 1 of the 
ASQI and each has as its highest loading, a physical symptom of anxiety 
with no significant loading on depressive items. These factors do not 
therefore represent different components of auîxiety.
e) ASQD
The results of the factor analysis of the .ASQD were similar to that 
of the ASQI, particularly for factors 1 and 2. Three factors were 
extracted with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0. The factors accounted 
for 38.9%, 11.9% and 8.0% of the vari^mce respectively and were
robust under a range of rotations. The orthoganal solution factor 
loadings are presented in table 4v.
Factor 1: This factor closely resembles factor 1 of the ASQI, having 
significant loadings on all anxiety symptoms apart from worry 
about the future and no significant loadings on the three 
dperesslon-related symptoms. The highest loadings were also 
the same: panic feelings, palpitations or butterflies and 
frightened feelings.
Factor 2: The second factor also closely resembles the second factor of 
the ASQI and first factor of ASQF with highest loadings on 
future worry, feeling insecure and dwelling on the past. There 
were relatively minor differences in some of the smaller 
loadings but the factor again is interpreted as reflecting 
mainly cognitive symptoms of anxiety and depression.
Factor 3: The third factor was loaded substantially on feeling insecure, 
sadness, worse AM, lack of self confidence and feeling tense 
with smaller but slgniflc8u:it loadings on feeling frightened, 
dwelling on the past, palpitations or butterflies in stomach, 
and panic feelings. Indeed only three items, future worry, 
dizzy attacks and headache, neck and back pains, did not have 




iii) Inter-relationship of the Symptom Factors
The factor scores of each subject on each factor were calculated 
from the factor loadings and a correlation matrix between all 
factor scores (with the exception of the fifth factor of the BDI) 
computed. The results of this analysis are presented In tables 4vl 
and 4vll. This provided additional supportive evidence concerning 
the Interpretation of each of the original factors extracted.
BDI Factors:
Factor 2 Interpreted as reflecting the cognitive component of 
depression, 'negative attitude to self , correlated significantly 
and most strongly and consistently with each of the ASQI, ASQD and 
ASQF factors Interpreted as cognitive and affective symptoms of 
anxiety and depression. It did not correlate significantly with 
any of the factors Interpreted as being generalised anxiety symptom 
factors. This finding strengthens the Interpretation of the 
cognitive factors.
ASQ Factors:
All the ASQ factors Interpreted as being cognitive and affective 
symptom factors Intercorrelated substantially and slgnlflcsuitly 
with Intercorrelatlons of 0.53, 0.77 and 0.82. The factors
Interpreted as generalised anxiety symptom factors were also highly 
and significantly Intercorrelated with Intercorrelatlons of 0.76, 
0.63 , 0.64 , 0.52 and 0,46. The highest correlations In both cases 
were between ASQI and ASQD factors with ASQF factors being rather 
less highly correlated with the former.
The findings support the proposition that the two ASQI and ASQD 
factors are probably measures of general anxiety symptoms and 
cognitive symptoms of anxiety and depression respectively.
Iv) Correlation between BDI Total Score and Factor Scores
As pau?t of the analysis described above the product-moment 
correlation between Individual subject factor scores and the BDI 




4vii. Inspection of this table reveals that the general anxiety 
symptom factors only weakly or non significantly correlated with 
the BDl total score (range 0.130 to 0.230). This suggests first 
that the BDl, In this population at least, Is not Just a measure of 
generalised neurotic psychopathology. Secondly It suggests that 
the anxiety symptom factors are relatively specifically related to 
anxiety. They correlate only weakly with both BDl total score and 
BDl factors (all but one correlation being below 0.3). The pattern 
of factor loadings strengthens this Interpretation since only Items 
concerning symptoms of anxiety (derived from existing validated 
anxiety scales) had significant loadings on the anxiety factors 
(especially ASQI and ASQD factor 1).
v) Relationship Between Symptom Factors and Subject Characteristics
The relationship between the symptom factors described above 2ind 
the age, sex, marital status and employment status of subjects was 
examined. Pearson correlation coefficients between age and the 
symptom factors were all statistically non-slgnlfleant. No sex
differences were found (as Indicated by t-tests computed between 
male and female subjects for each symptom factor). Finally a 
series of ANOVAs were carried out on each set of factor scores 
with marital status 2uid employment status as Independent factors. 
These revealed no significant relationship between the factor 
scores smd either of these v^u'lables.
Discussion
It Is now possible to return to the questions posed In the Introduction
to this study and consider them In the light of the results given above.
1) Can depression and Anxiety be Measured as Differentiable Clinical 
States?
The results of the factor analysis of questionnaires concerning 
symptoms of anxiety and depression, ASQI, ASQD, ASQF and BDl, 
together with the examination of the correlations between factor 
scores derived from this analysis suggest that anxiety and depression 
can be measured as relatively differentiable states. In particular 
the ASQI and ASQD yielded very similar factors both of which were 
significantly loaded by symptoms of anxiety only, the highest
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loadings being bn core anxiety symptoms:- "panic feelings", "feeling 
frightened" and "palpitations or butterflies in stomach". These 
factors both had low correlations (0.160, 0.230) with BDI total 
score, a validated measure of depression though it must be admitted 
that one of the BDI factors (the most Important statistically) also 
had a low and nonsignificant correlation with Total BDI score. 
Although the validity of the ASQI and ASQD factors have not been 
established by reference to clinical ratings of symptoms, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that they are at least related to the severity 
of iuixiety symptoms.
2) Do Measures of Depression and Anxiety Measure Predominantly Single 
Unitary Syndromes, or are Subcomponents Differentiable?
The factor analysis of the BDI suggests that there are differentiable 
subcomponents of depression. Two factors emerged which fairly 
closely resembled those obtained by Weckowlcz et al (1967) reflecting 
respectively predominantly affective and motivational symptoms (loss 
of energy, loss of interest, depressed mood) and cognitive symptoms 
(sense of failure, self bleune, guilt). A third factor, which less 
closely resembled the third factor of Weckowlcz et al, suggested more 
tentatively that a somatic disturbance component may be 
differentiable. The result of this study therefore replicates most 
of the main findings of Weckowicz et al. They are also largely in 
accord with other factor euialytic studies of the BDI, reviewed by 
Steer, Beck u^ld Carson (1986). They argue that the BDI represents 
three major factors - negative attltudes/sulclde, physiological and 
performance difficulty. They also note, however, that the major 
dimension to emerge is a cognitive self-evaluative one. In this 
study it was the most readily interpretable factor although the 
second in order of proportion of total variance accounted for. Again, 
it must however be cautioned that the interpretation of the factors 
derived in this and other studies are based soley on the pattern of 
factor loadings and have not been validated against an Independent 
criterion.
The factor analyses of the anxiety symptom questionnaires did not 
provide any consistent evidence that subcomponents of anxiety are 
differentiable in this population. All symptoms of anxiety, with the 
exception of "worry about future problems", loaded significantly on
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the first factors of the ASQI emd ASQD. This may be partly because 
of the relatively few symptoms of each component included in the 
questionnaire. However there was no evidence that, for example, the 
somatic symptoms of euixiety tended to associate together, separately 
from the emotional and cognitive symptoms.
In conclusion, there was evidence from factor analysis of the BDI, 
across a range of methods Including orthogonal and oblique rotations, 
that the BDI total score reflects a number of subcomponents of 
depression. These could provisionally be characterised as reflecting 
affective ¿uid motivational symptoms (particularly loss of energy and 
Interest), cognitive symptoms and somatic symptoms, which emerged as a 
single main factor in two of the three questionnaires.
A cognitive and affective factor also emerged consistently from all 
three anxiety questionnaires and correlated most strongly with the 
negative attitude to self factor of the BDI. Finally a mixed 
depression/anxiety factor emerged in two of the three questionnaires, 
correlating more strongly with the BDI factor than the generalised 
anxiety symptom factor.
3) Are the Frequency, Duration and Intensity Parameters Differentiable 
in the Measurement of Anxiety and to What Extent do they Covary?
The pattern of correlations between the symptom factors of the ASQI, 
ASQD and ASQF suggest that these paramenters are related but perhaps 
differentiable. The highest correlations were between the ASQI and 
ASQD, with correlations of 0.764, 0.819 and 0.525 between the three 
factors of the respective questionnaires. The ASQF yielded a 
different, less clear factor structure with a less clear pattern of 
correlations with other factors. Further, subjects expressed greater 
difficulty when completing the ASQF than the other two 
questionnaires. It may be therefore that the ASQF is a less reliable 
questionnaire although it is also possible that it does measure a 
different aspect of symptomatology.
In summary it seems likely that the ASQD and ASQI yield reasonably valid 
measures of anxiety but it is less clear to what extent they can be 
differentiated. It may therefore be that asking questions concerning 
either the intensity or duration of symptoms yields similar information 
concerning the severity of symptoms. It is considerably more doubtful
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that this is the case with the frequency of symptoms.
Conclusion
To conclude, the results of this study indicate that the clinical states 
of anxiety and depression can be measured reasonably independently as 
continuous variables and that the measxire of depression reflects a number 
of subcomponents of depression. A subcomponent reflecting predominantly 




THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNALITY AND SELF ESTEEM; A CROSS SECTIONAL 
STUDY
In Chapter 3 the relationship between causal explanations and 
expectancies on the one hand, and psychiatric symptomatology on the 
other, were examined. Evidence was found that depressed patients 
attribute the causes of their current concerns to stable and 
uncontrollable causes and that, in the case of uncontrollable causes, 
they do this to a greater extent than non-depressed, anxious patients. 
Findings for internallty and globality were less clear. Results were 
largely obtained by comparing two groups of patients divided on the basis 
of their main PSE catego class. It was however noted that similar 
results were obtained using other methods of dividing the patient 
population.
In Chapter 4 the measurement of depression and anxiety in clinical 
populations was examined. It was concluded that it was to some extent 
possible to differentiate and measure clinical depressions and anxiety as 
continuously varying states despite the frequently reported finding that 
such measures both covary and co-exist in patient populations.
This chapter describes a further study of the relationship between 
symptomatology 2uid causal explanations and expectations in clinical 
populations. The focus of the study was the internallty dimension(s). It 
involved the administration of measures of symptoms, and of a number of 
Internallty dimensions, to a population of non-psychotlc psychiatric 
patients. The principal aim of the study was to examine whether there is 
a specific association between the Internallty dimensions emd the self 
esteem lowering found in depression, as hypothesised in the reformulated 
learned helplessness theory (Abramson et al, 1978).
INTERNALITY AND DEPRESSION
The relationship between internallty euid depression raises a number of 
issues:
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1 How Is internality defined and measured, and to what does the 
internallty refer?
2 What may be the relationship between depression and the various 
meanings of internality?
3 Is there a "depressive paradox" (Abramson and Sackeim, 1978) arising 
from depressives' belief in both their helplessness and internally 
directed blame?
1 The Meetnings of Internality
The concept of internality has been used in a number of different 
ways. These differ in the meaning given to internality itself, the 
temporal focus (particularly past versus present and future) and the 
object of the internal attribution.
Heider (1958), one of the founders of attribution theory, proposed 
following a phenomenological study of every day or common-sense 
"psychology", that the explanations people give for the causes of 
outcomes of actions can be divided into internal and external causes. 
Internal causes, in his model, are those lying within the person while 
external causes lie within the environment. Rotter (1966) proposed 
the concept of locus of control which involved the distinction between 
outcomes perceived as causally related to a person's own behaviour and 
characteristics (internal) and those perceived as causally related to 
external forces such as circumstances or luck. Rotter's concept was 
essentially concerned with whether subjects perceived outcomes as 
depending on their own behaviour and attributes or not. Abramson et 
al (1978) specify the usage of internality in their paper as 
fundamentally concerning the person's comparison of themselves with 
their peers or "relevant" others. They are concerned with peoples' 
attributions concerning their failure to overcome a problem. This 
failure is attributed to Internal causes if the person believes that 
others would have been able to overcome the problems, but to external 
causes if they believe that others would not have done any better than 
themselves. Finally a form of internality which has not been much 
discussed formally in an attribution framework is in the sense of 
comparison with Internal norms or standards. This usage is similar to 
that of Abramson et al but with Internal standards substituted for the 
person's peers. Internal causes, in this sense, are those which
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involve the person's failure to meet their own standards. This usage 
of internality has however been used informally by a number of 
cognitive theorists eg Ellis (1962). They have suggested that one of 
the cognitive distortions or irrational assumptions in depression 
involves excessively high or impossibly high standards and 
expectations by the depressed person of themselves.
These usages while distinguishable may overlap considerably. Indeed 
Abramson et al (1978) have argued that their way of defining 
internality is actually similar to Heider's and that Heider does 
actually rely on social comparison as a major determinant of 
internality. Nonetheless the various definitions clearly have 
implications for how internality is measured.
The usage of internality also differs in its temporal forms. Thus, 
for example, both Heider aind Abramson et al are mainly concerned with 
the intemality of the causes of failures (and successes) auid 
therefore focus on the past. Rotter however is more concerned with 
how much outcomes are dependent on a person's behaviour or 
characteristics and therefore has more of a present and future focus. 
It would seem, in principle, possible to apply euiy usage of 
internality both to past and to present and future causes.
Finally it is important to clarify what the object of the internal 
attribution is. All the usages discussed above concern the cause of 
outcomes of behaviour. None concern the causes of life events which 
"happen to" the person or emotional states. Indeed Heider clearly 
differentiates between such events, which he labels "heteronomous 
events", from those arising from the person, "autonomous events". The 
meaning of internality may be rather different if the focus is a cause 
of an event rather than ein outcome. The situation is however further 
complicated because people can view the same outcome as either an 
Imposed event or an outcome of actions. For example Illness may be 
attributed to something the person did or even to their personality 
(eg type A personality emd coronary disease), or may be viewed simply 
as a something which happens to the person.
To summarise, at least four different usages of Internality and two 
temporal foci have been identified. These refer to factors within the 
person versus factors outside the person, locus of control, comparison
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with peers and comparison with internal standards. These can concern 
either past or present amd future outcomes.
2 The Relationship Between Internality and Depression
As has been noted above, the reformulated learned helplessness theory 
proposes that internal attributions concerning the person's failure to
overcome a problem, to modify an expected outcome, will be related to
the lowering of self esteem. Internality, it will be recalled, is 
used in the sense of comparison with peers. There is however little 
relevant evidence available in the literature. Few studies have 
attempted to measure self-esteem as well as depression. Zautra et al
(1985) in a study of students found that self esteem was significantly 
correlated with all the attributional subscales of the ASQ. Criticisms 
of the internality subscale for negative items have however already 
been made. Rothwell and Miller (1983), in their comparison of
recently redundant men with men in secure employment, found that in
the redundant group, but not the control group, internality for 
negative outcomes (as measured by ASQ) was correlated with both 
depression as measured by the BDI and low self esteem.
There have therefore been no studies in psychiatric populations in 
which the relationship between measures of the internality of the 
perceived cause of the subject's failure to overcome real life 
problems, and measures of depression and loss of self esteem has been 
examined. Such studies are needed to test more adequately this aspect 
of the reformulated learned helplessness theory.
3 The Depressive Paradox
The concept of internality is also important to an understanding of 
the "depressive paradox" proposed by Abramson and Sackeim (1977). The 
paradox, they suggest, is that depressives appear both to bl^ une 
themselves and perceive themselves as helpless at the seune time. How, 
they ask, cem depressives blame themselves for outcomes over which 
they perceive themselves to have no control? Abramson and Sackeim 
reviewed evidence for the existence of this paradox 8tnd proposed a 
number of solutions. Four of these five solutions were that there is 
no paradox because the self blame and helplessness concern different 
groups of depressives or different outcomes, or because either the
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proposition that depressives are self blaming, or that they perceive 
themselves as being helpless, is false. Peterson (1979) attempted to 
study this paradox in a mildly depressed student population. He found 
some evidence to support the proposition that there is indeed a 
paradox. Depression severity, as measured by the BDI, correlated with 
ratings of both helplessness and guilt for a number of hypothetical 
roles including "myself as a loser", "myself when I'm sad", and 
"myself as a student". It may however be questioned to what extent 
ratings of felt helplessness or guilt in hypothetical situations (or 
roles) are valid measures of perceived helplessness (in the sense of 
controllability) and self blame.
The existence of this paradox is not well established. However the 
clinical literature cited by Abramson and Sackeim does suggest that it 
might well exist. A number of possible explanations of this paradox 
have been offered. Peterson, Schwartz and Sellgman (1981) have 
suggested that attributions to characterological causes may lead 
subjects to feel both guilty and helpless. Characterological causes 
are a kind of internal cause and are distinguished from behavioural 
causes. The former refers to relatively stable attributes of the 
person such as their personality or abilities while the latter refer 
to the person's actions. Their suggestion, therefore, is that if a 
person attributes a failure to a lack of personal qualities or 
abllltes, they may both blame themselves as the cause lies within 
them, and feel helpless as there is nothing they can do about it. In 
contrast attributions to the person's actions may still lead to self 
blame but not to helplessness. In a study of depression and 
attributions (using a version of the ASQ) in a student population, 
Peterson et al did indeed find higher levels of rated helplessness and 
guilt for events whose causes were classified independently as 
characterological compared with both behavioural and external causes. 
Once again this study relied on ratings of felt helplessness and 
guilt.
A second expleuiatlon of the paradox, similar to that of Peterson et 
al, is that depressives believe that there was something that other 
people could and would have done to overcome the problem but which 
they didn't because of a characterological falling. In other words 
they may perceive themselves as being personally not universally 
helpless, and blame themselves for their personal fallings. Such an
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explanation la in accord with Abramson et al's proposals regarding the 
role of intemality in the sense of comparison with others. In both 
cases it may however be questioned why people should blame themselves 
for their own personal characteristics over which they have apparently 
no control.
A third explanation is that while depressives may both perceive 
themselves as being helpless and blame themselves, they may in fact 
believe that there was something that they could have done in the past 
but didn't because, for example, they did riot think of doing it. The 
depressives may therefore believe that the outcome was controllable by 
them but is not any longer. They may then quite "logically" both 
blame themselves for failing to take the actions they could have taken 
and perceive themselves as currently helpless. It may be suggested 
that this argument runs counter to the findings of Peterson et al that 
chau'acterological causes were highly positively correlated with 
severity of depression while behavioural causes were moderately 
negatively correlated with depression. The finding in Chapter 3 
that depressives give more characterological than behavioural causes 
msiy also be cited. It is not entirely clear however that behavioural 
and characterological causes are completely distinct and Independent. 
For example a person may give as the cause of their failure to prevent 
the breetkup of their marriage, the fact that they frequently shouted 
and were irritable with their spouse. If etsked why they behaved in 
this way they might reply that they are a short tempered person. 
Whether such a cause is regarded as behaviour or character may depend 
on the level of explanation given by the person.
In summary Abramson and Sachelm (1977) proposed that there is a 
depressive peuradox that depressives both perceive themselves as being 
helpless and blame themselves at the same time. A number of 
resolutions euid explanations of this paradox have been considered. Two 
main possible explanations are offered. One is that in the case of 
personal helplessness a depressive may feel both helpless and be self 
blaming because they perceive the cause of their helplessness to lie 
within themselves, within their character or abilities. A second is 
that depressives perceive the past locus of control as being internal 
but perceive themselves as currently helpless. In this explcmation 
the depressed person believes that they could have done something to 
avoid the negative outcome but did not, but also that they are
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currently unable to do emything to change the outcome. They perceive 
themselves as currently helpless but in the past as being able to 
control the outcome. This second explanation is in many respects the 
opposite explanation to the former one.
QUESTIONS ADDRESSED IN THIS STUDY
In this study the following questions were addressed concerning the 
nature of the internality dimension smd its relationship to depression.
1 What is the relationship between the different usages of the term
internality? In particular to what extent are the four senses
identified above differentiable and to what extent do they covary.
2 To what extent is the internality of the cause of a person's failure 
to overcome current concerns and symptoms specifically associated with 
the self esteem deficit of depression?
3 Do depressed patients both blame themselves for their problems 2tnd
perceive themselves as having been in the past and being in the future
helpless?
These questions were initially addressed using a cross-sectional design 
as outlined in the introduction to this study, but a longitudinal study 
similar in design to that carried out by Firth and Brewin (1982) was also 
carried out and is reported in Chapter 6 below.
COMPARISON WITH THE PREVIOUS STUDY AND OTHERS REPORTED IN THE LITERATURE
As noted earlier few other studies have attempted to examine the 
relationship between internality and the self esteem deficit in 
depression. Those that have are limited in value because of both 
limitations in their measurement of Internality, the use of hypothetical 
situations and non-clinical populations and a failure to measure the 
self-esteem deficit Independently from other components of depression.
This study sought to overcome some of these limitations by using the 
following: a clinical population; real life current concerns; a number of 
measures of internality including one specifically concerning comparison 
with others; focussing the intemallty questions on the person's failure
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to overcome their current concern rather thsm the cause of the current 
concern itself and finally using factors derived from the BDI which allow 
the independent measurement of the self esteem deficit (negative attitude 
to self) from the other symptoms of depression.
METHOD
Measures Taken
Each subject completed the following interview and measures in the 
following order:
1 Symptoms and Current Concerns Interview (SCCI)
2 The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
3 Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire: Intensity (ASQI)
4 Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire: Frequency (ASQF)
5 Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire: Duration (ASQD)
6 Causal Beliefs and Expectancies Questionnaire (CBEQ)
All but 1 and 6 have been discussed in detail in Chapter 4 
Subjects
The subjects were 46 psychiatric out-patients referred to a clinical 
psychologist (the author) by consultant psychiatrists or GPs. Referral 
was for some kind of behavioural psychotherapy for a presenting problem 
of anxiety symptoms, depression, inability to cope or phobic euixlety. All 
subjects were aged between 18 and 65. They were excluded from the study 
if it was not clear that their symptoms were distinctly different from 
their "normal state" (this difference might have been quantitative but 
must have been clear, ie patients were excluded if it appeared that their 
presenting problem was of an anxious personality). Subjects were also 
excluded if they had a past or current diagnosis of a psychotic disorder, 
including manic-depressloni' mental impairment or low intelligence; an 
antisocial personality disorder, alcoholism, drug abuse or a history of 
anti-social or acting-out behaviour (eg criminal offences, repeated self 
Injury) or an organic disorder. None had taken part in the earlier study 
reported above.
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1 Symptoms and Current Concerns Interview (SCCI)
This interview was derived from the Current Concerns Interview used in
the study reported in Chapter 3 but bearing the following points in
mind:
i) to maximise the number of subjects who could be Included in the 
study, a relatively brief interview phase was considered 
desirable. This would enable subjects to be Included who were 
depressed and might be unable or unwilling to complete a two hour 
interview.
ii) It emerged from the first study that the elicitation phase 
usually elicited many more than six current concerns but many 
were relatively minor. This reinforced the view that a briefer 
phase would be acceptable.
iii) Pilot work suggested that subjects, with very little prompting, 
are able to give their main current concerns, sufficient to 
provide between three and six in most cases.
iv) The interview was also modified to ensure that symptoms and life 
problems were clearly differentiated. Questions were also 
Included concerning both failures to adjust to life changes and 
failure to modify expected future problems, neither of which were 
explicitly included in the original interview. These were both 
considered potentially very important sources of current 
concerns.
The interview schedule is Included in appendix (J) and consists of a 
brief series of questions concerning the patient'« main symptoms, main 
current life concerns, failures in adjustment and expected future 
problems. The current life concerns (excluding symptoms) were clarified 
on cards and ranked in order of Importance. The three top ranking 
current concerns were utilised with the CBEQ's.
v) Causal Beliefs and Expectations Questionnaire (Appendix K, L)
The questionnaire consisted of two parts, the first dealing with 
causal explanations concerning the life problems and the second
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dealing with causal expectations concerning future change in the 
life problems.
Part One: Causal Expleuiations (CBEQ(P))
The questionnaire consisted of six questions designed to measure the
internality of the subjectta causal beliefs about their failure to
overcome the problem and past controllability over the problem.
i) Internality in the sense of the cause lying within the self was 
examined by question 2 which was rated on a five point scale ranging 
from "entirely myself" (scored 1) and "entirely circumstances or 
other people" (scored 5).
ii) Internality in the sense of universality was examined in question 3. 
The question referred to how much the subject believed other people 
would have reduced the problems and was rated on a five point scale 
from "totally" (scored 5) to "not at all" (scored 1). From the 
patient's rating of this question was subtracted their rating from 
question 1 ("How much has this problem decreased") to give a measure 
of how other people would, in their belief, have done in comparison 
with themselves. (A constant of five is added to the score obtained 
to avoid negative values.)
iii) Internality in the sense of comparison with internal standards was 
examined question 5. The internality score was derived using a 
simileu' method to that used for universality, described above. The 
subject rated how much they should have reduced the problem on a 
five point scale ranging from totally (5) to not at all (1). The 
rating of this question was then subtracted from their rating in 
question one to give a measure of how much the problem has been 
reduced in comparison with their expectations of themselves.
Iv) Locus of control or controllability was examined in question 6 which 
concerned to what extent the subject believed that past change in 
the life problem had been under their control. The question took 
two forms depending on whether there had been any change in the 
problems. Answers were on a five point rating scale ranging from 
"not at all" (1) to "totally" (5).
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Part Two: Causal Expectations (CBEQ(F))
This part of the questionnaire consisted of seven questions concerning 
the internallty of expectations of future change. In addition two items 
were included concerning generalised expectancies of future change 
(questions 1 and 7 )•
i) Internality in the sense of the cause lying within the self was 
exeunlned in question 2. The question concerned how much the 
solution to the subject's problems was believed to lie within 
themselves rather than the environment. It was rated on a five 
point scale identical to that in question 2 of the CBEQ(P).
ii) Internality in the sense of universality was examined in question 3 
concerning how much the subject believed other people would be able 
to reduce the problems. It was rated on a five point scale (as in 
question 3 of the CBEQ(P) amd yielded a measure of expectancies of 
other people. How the subject compared himself/herself with others 
was measured by subtracting from this rating the answer given to 
question 6 concerning how much the subject expected he/she will 
reduce the problem.
iii) Internality in the sense of comparison with internal standards was 
exaunined by question 5 concerning how much the subject believed they 
should be able to reduce the problem. The internality score was 
obtained in a similar way to universality described above. The 
rating of how much the subject believed they ought to be able to 
chauige the problem was subtracted to how much they expected they 
would change the problem (question 6) to give a measure of how much 
their expectations of what they would achieve fall short of their 
own norms or stauidards.
iv) Locus of control or controllability was exaunined by question 6, 
concerning how much the subject expected their actions to bring 
about chamge.
Procedure
All subjects were interviewed auid completed the questionnaires either at 
the end of their first or second session with the clinical psychologist.
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They took approximately 45 minutes to complete and were given in the 
following order:
1 Symptoms and Current Concerns Interview (SCCI)
2 The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
3 Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire: Intensity (ASQI)
4 Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire: Frequency (ASQF)
5 Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire: Duration (ASQD)
6 Causal Beliefs and Expectancies Questionnaires (CBEQ) - for each of 
the main symptoms and three highest ranking current concerns a CBEQ(P) 
and CBEQ(F) were completed.
RESULTS
Subject Characteristics
The characteristics of all subjects, and subjects divided by median BDI 
score, are given in table 5i. There were no significant differences 
between more depressed and less depressed subjects in sex distribution, 
age, marital status, social class or median duration of psychiatric 
problem. Overall subjects were mainly married, with the modal social 
class, class III (skilled manual and non-manual workers), me2ui age 35, 
with a sex ratio close to two females to one male and median duration of 
psychiatric problem approximately one and a half years. There was a 
significant difference in employment status (x*=4.39, p 0.05) with fewer 
of the depressed subjects in full-time employment.
The distribution of BDI total scores is given in table 5ii. Nearly all 
subjects had a score of at least ten, the cut off frequently used in 
helplessness research in student populations. The population should 
therefore be regarded as ranging from mildly depressed to moderately to 
severely depressed. A substantial number of subjects, 18, scored over 
20, the cut off suggested by Beck to Indicate severe levels of 
depression. (Beck and Beamesdefer, 1974).
Interrelationships of the Internality Scales
Scores were computed for each subscale for each subject by averaging the 
subject's ratings over the main symptoms and three main current concerns. 
Where fewer than three current concerns were elicited the average of the
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Sex: u l e 7 9 16
feule 16 14 30
Age: mean 33.77 (N-22) 37.13 (N-23) 35.49 (N-45)
8d 8.91 9.39 9.07
Marital Status:
single 4 3 7
urried 18 18 36
divorced 1 1 2
widowed 0 1 1
Social Class:
I & II 7 4 11
III 10 15 25
IV 5 3 8
V 1 1 2
Employment Status:
full-time 10 17 27
part-time 5 1 6




Problem mean 3.03yrs 2.39yrs 2.70yrs
median 1.6 yrs 1.5 yrs 1.55 yrs
SD 3.59yrs 2.04yrs 2.87yrs
range 0.33-14.Oyrs 0.25—9.Oyrs 0•25—14•Oyx^
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ratings obtained was utilised. (Occurlng In eight subjects.)
(i) Internal Consistency of the Scales;
The internal consistency of the scales was computed using the formula for 
Cronbach's^^ . The values obtained are given in Tables 51ii and 5iv. The 
values ranged from 0.40 to 0.72 and are somewhat lower than the values 
reported in the earlier study with six current concerns. Once again the 
controllability scales yielded the lowest values of 0.40 and 0.48 for 
past and future controllability respectively. All other values lay 
between 0.50 £tnd 0.72 and are comparable to those obtained for the ASQ. 
This suggests that, apart from controllability, the scales do reflect to 
some extent consistent individual differences although these differences 
could be either state dependent or more enduring, stable ch2U'acterlstics.
(ii) Interrelationships Between the Internality Scales Relating to Past 
Causes
Table 5iii shows the intercorrelations, given by Pearson's product-moment 
correlation between the three internality scales, the controllablity 
scale and the two items concerning past expectations of others euid self. 
As can be seen the scales did intercorrelate but with mainly modestly 
sized correlation coefficents only a small number being significant. 
Internality correlated modestly but significantly with universality but 
not controllability or failure to meet one's own standards. Universality 
correlated moderately with failure to meet one^s own standards but not 
with controllability. These correlations suggest that although the three 
usages of internality are to some extent inter-related, they are not used 
in an identical f^lshlon, particularly in the case of internality 
(within-outside self) and the other two forms of internality.
(iii) Inter-relationship Between the Internality Scales Relating to 
Future Change
Table 5iv gives the results for expected causes of future change. The 
correlations tended to be of greater magnitude than for past change 
suggesting less clear differentiation between the scales. Internality 
(within-outside self) did not correlate significantly with the two 
internality subscales or controllability. However universality did 
correlate substantially with both controllability (negatively) and
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"comparison with one's own expectations". This latter form of internality 
also correlated substantially and negatively with controllability. It 
may be however that these correlations are to some extent em artifact of 
how the scales are constructed since universality was computed from the 
difference between expectations of others and controllability and 
"comparison with one's own expectations" from expectations of self and 
controllability. This explanation is weakened by the fact that 
expectations of self, expectations of others 2uid controllability are also 
intercorrelated (correlations of 0.20, 0.57, 0.40) although derived from 
separate items. It does therefore appear to be the case that subjects 
who compare themselves unfavourably with others also tend to compare 
themselves unfavourably with their own norms or standards and expect to 
have less control over future change.
(iv) Inter-relationships Between Past and Future Versions of Scales
Table 5v gives the intercorrelations between equivalent scales for past 
and future change. All correlations were positive and significant, those 
for internality (within-outside self), expectations of others and 
expectations of self were all greater than 0.70 indicating that subjects 
gave closely related ratings for past and future chamge on these scales. 
This suggests that these aspects of causal explanations are not specific 
to a particular temporal focus.
The Relationship Between Symptoms aind Internality
The relationships between the internality scales for past change and the 
main symptom factors, as indicated by the product-moment correlation, are 
given in table 5vi. As predicted by the reformulated learned 
helplessness theory there were small but statistically signiflceuit 
correlations between BDI factor two (negative attitude to self) and 
universality. No other BDI factor or the ASQI factor one (anxiety 
symptoms) correlated significantly with any of the internality subscales 
indicating that this relationship is specific to the BDI factor two. This 
conclusion is further strengthened by the absence of a significant 
correlation between BDI total score and universality indicating that 
depression per se was not associated with universality, only low self 
esteem eis measured by BDI factor two, "negative attitude to self". In 
addition there were no statistically significant correlations between 
either Internality (wlthln-outside self) or Internality (failure to meet
-  130 -


one's ovm standards) and negative attitude to self. The relationship Is 
therefore specific to Internallty In the sense of universality. There 
was also a larger correlation between BDI factor two euid expectations of 
others Indicating that subjects who had a more negative attitude to 
themselves tended to have higher expectations of others (le rated others 
as more able to reduce the current concern the subject was facing). 
Finally there was a positive and statistically significant correlation 
between negative attitude to self u^ld controllability Indicating that 
subjects with a more negative attitude to themselves tended to be more 
Internal with regeurd to past control le rated current concerns as more 
controllable In the past. This will be discussed further below.
The correlation between the scales for the cause of future change and the 
symptom factors 2U"e given In Table 5vll. The pattern Is similar to that 
for past chetnge but In this case both universality and Internallty 
(wlthln-outslde self) were significantly correlated with BDI factor two 
only. There was a larger correlation between negative attitude to self 
and future expectations of others but no statistically significant 
correlation with controllability or generalised future expectations. 
Subjects who had a more negative attitude to themselves therefore tended 
to expect that they would be less able to change their concerns than 
other people, expected other people to be more able to change their 
current concerns (compared with subjects who had a less negative attitude 
to themselves) and rated change as depending more on themselves.
These results suggest that the relationship between negative attitude to 
self and universality may not be specific to past change but may extend 
to expected future change. The causal relationship between the three 
variables cemnot be determined from these results. As reported earlier 
universality with respect to past and future change are highly 
Intercorrelated and therefore any relationship between either past or 
future universality and another variables would tend to be reflected by 
an association between the variable and the other form of universality.
The Relationship Between Depressive Self Bleune and Helplessness
The relationship between depressive self blame and helplessness can be 
addressed by reference to the correlations between the BDI factor two 
(negative attitude to self) and the two controllability scales. It will 
be recalled that In Table 5vl there was a positive statistically
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significant correlation of 0.38 between negative attitude to self and 
past controllability. This indicates that in this subject population 
there was no depressive paradox in that subjects who had a stronger 
negative attitude to themselves £ind were more self blaming, also rated 
themselves as having more control over past change. There was no 
significant correlation between future controllability and negative 
attitude to self. However it may be argued that the more relev^mt item is 
future internality (within-outside self) since this refers to how much 
future change is expected to depend on changes in the self (which is the 
sense used by Rotter in his concept of locus of control) rather than how 
much change is expected to be brought about by one's actions (which is 
similar to Bandura's concept of self efficacy). There was in fact a 
small but statistically significant positive correlation between 
internality and BDI factor two suggesting once Eigain that a more negative 
attitude to self was associated with a more internal locus of control.
These findings therefore suggest that there may not be a depressive 
psu'adox. Subjects who were more self blaming tend to rate themselves as 
having had more control over current concerns in the past, not less as 
was predicted by Abramson and Sackeim (1977). They also tended to expect 
future chamge to depend on themselves more but this of course does not 
involve any paradox.
DISCUSSION
The Relationship Between the Different Forms of Internality
The results presented above indicate that the different forms of 
internality are differentiable 2md relate to symptomatology with 
different patterns of association. It is of particular note that 
internality in the form similar to that usually given in questionnaires 
such as the ASQ and other forms of attributions! questionnaires 
(within-outside the self) does not correlate substantially with 
universality emd does not correlate with the negative attitude to self 
factor of the BDI to the same extent though it does correlate with 
negative attitude to self when applied to expectations of future change 
(Table 5vii). This is despite the fact that the wording was closer to 
that required by the reformulated learned helplessness theory, referring 
to the cause of the subject’s failure to overcome the problem rather them 
the cause of the problem itself.
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The Relationship Between Self Esteem and Causal Explanations u^^ld 
Expect^ u^ >cles
As predicted by the reformulated learned helplessness theory, a 
statistically significant correlation was found between negative attitude 
to self which is taken here as a measure of self esteem as measured by 
the BOI factor two, and past universality. This was not simply because 
of an association between depression and universality as there were no 
statistically significant correlations between 2my of the other factors 
of the BDI and universality. Indeed no other correlation was greater 
than +0.07 for either universality or expectations of others. There was 
in addition no statistically significant association with anxiety 
symptoms as measured by both the ASQI and ASQD factor one. The 
association was also relatively specific to internality in the sense of 
universality since internality in both the sense of within self-outside 
self and failure to meet one's own st^mdards did not correlate 
signficantly with any of the BDI factors. The only exception to this was 
controllability since past controllability was significantly correlated 
with negative attitude to self. This is discussed further below. Some 
evidence was therefore found of a specific association between low self 
esteem, as measured by BDI factor two, and universality, such that lower 
self esteem and a more negative attitude to self was associated with more 
unfavourable comparisons between themselves and their peers regarding 
their failures to overcome current life problems.
A number of reservations concerning this conclusion can now be advanced. 
First the magnitude of the association found was modest with a Pearson 
product moment correlation of only approximately 0.30 between 
universality and negative attitude to self, accounting for less than 10% 
of total variance. Secondly the measure of negative attitude to self, 
the BDI factor two, is not a validated measure of self esteem loss 
although the pattern of factor loadings suggests that the factor is 
related to the cognitive component of depression and this Includes sense 
of failure, self bleune, suicidal ideation w d  guilt. While these items 
are likely to be related to self esteem loss they are not synonymous with 
it. The association between universality and negative attitude to self 
may therefore reflect some common characteristic such as self blame or 
Intrapunitlveness. This argument is slightly weakened by the failure to 
find slgnlflcemt associations between negative attitude to self and other 
forms of Intemality such as comparison with Internal stemdards.
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The most significant reservation, however, is that the finding of an 
association does not provide any evidence regarding direction of 
causality. The reformulated theory proposed that the self esteem loss of 
depression is caused by the internallty of attributions concerning the 
subject's failure to overcome life problems. The results obtained could 
however Just as easily be explained by the self esteem loss causing 
Internal (personal) attributions. Loss of self esteem, it could be 
argued, may lead the person to compare themselves and their performance 
unfavourably with their peers. Longitudinal studies are required to
address this question.
The Relationship Between Self Blame and Helplessness
The evidence obtained in this study suggests that there may not be a 
depressive paradox as suggested by Abramson and Sackeim (1977). Past 
controllability weis found to be positively associated with negative 
attitude to self, not negatively associated as predicted by the 
depressive paradox notion. The critical difference between this and 
other studies is that this study examined past perceptions of 
controllability, ie whether there was something the person could have 
done to overcome the problem or whether improvement was caused by the 
persons actions. Other studies exEunlned only current feelings of 
helplessness. Depressed subjects do therefore appear to be quite logical 
in both being self blaming and perceiving themselves as having control in 
the past.
CONCLUSION
This study provided evidence of a specific association between low self 
esteem, as measured by BDI factor two, and internality in the sense of 
the personal-universal distinction. This finding was not due to an 
association between depression Emd internallty and was relatively 
specific to this particular sense of Internality. This evidence does not 
however give any indication of the causal relationship between the two 
variables.
No evidence was found of a depressive paradox. On the contrary a 
positive association between past controllability and negative attitude 
to self was found. This result may reflect the form of the
controllability question which concerned the subject%bellef in the past
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CHAPTER 6
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNALITY AND SELF ESTEEM: A LONGITUDINAL 
STUDY
In the previous chapter some evidence was found to support the proposal 
by Abramson et al (1978) that self-esteem loss in depression may be 
caused by internal attributions concerning the cause of failure to 
overcome current life problems. This evidence took the form of 
correlations between measures of negative attitude to self and 
attributions obtained on the same occasions. It was therefore not 
possible to identify the direction of any causal relations between self 
esteem loss and attributions.
The study reported in this chapter is longitudinal in design and involved 
the administration of measures of symptomatology, including self-esteem 
loss, and causal beliefs on two occasions separated by four months. The 
sample was a subset of the subjects studied in Chapter 5 to whom the 
original measures were readministered. The aim of the study was to 
examine further the relationship between self esteem loss and internal 
attributions and expecteincies, in particuleu' the nature of any causal 
relationship between these two sets of variables.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-ESTEEM LOSS AND CAUSAL BELIEFS
The hypothesis of the reformulated learned helplessness theory concerning 
internal attributions and loss of self esteem and relevant evidence in 
the literature were reviewed in Chapter 5. By using a longitudinal 
design it was intended to provide a more stringent test of the 
hypothesis. The use of this design does however raise the issues of how 
the correlations obtained can be interpreted.
THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PATTERN OF CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SELF ESTEEM AND 
CAUSAL BELIEFS
i) The administration of the two sets of measures on two occasions 
generates six correlations as shown in figure 6i. These consist of 
a pair of auto-correlations (a and b), a pair of simultaneous
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correlations (c and d) and a pair of cross-lagged correlations (e 
and f). The auto-correlations reflect the consistency of the
variables over time emd are equivalent to test-retest correlations. 
The simultaneous correlations are cross-sectional measures of 
association at time one and time two and should be of similar 
magnitude if the relationship between the two variables is 
consistent across time and range in the values of the variables. 
The cross-leigged correlations are the correlations between causal 
beliefs at time one and symptoms at time two (and vise versa). If 
correlation e ^  correlation f this suggests that there is a causal 
relationship between causal beliefs and symptoms, the former being 
causally prior. The analysis of such a cross-1apoed set of 
correlations has been described in detail by Clegg, Jackson and Wall 
(1977) and Kenny (1975).
ii) The use of a cross-lagged correlation analysis does rest on a number 
of assumptions as noted above. These Include synchronicity, which 
in this case is met by measuring causal beliefs and depression 
together at the same point in time. The stationary assumption 
requires that the causal influences on the VEuriables are similar at 
each time of measurement. An indication of this is that the 
synchronous correlations are of similar magnitude. A further 
assumption is that the two auto-correlations do not differ 
significantly, that is that the two variables are equally stable. If 
these assumptions are met, a difference in cross-lagged correlations 
is suggestive of a causal relationship between the two variables. 
It cannot however Indicate how the relationship is mediated and it 
therefore would still remain a possibility that this is mediated by 
associations between the variables and a third, causal variable.
THE AIM OF THE STUDY
The aim of this study was to answer the following questions concerning
causal beliefs, symptoms and their inter-relationship.
1 Are the dimensions of causal beliefs, peurticularly internallty 
dimensions, exeunlned in the previous study consistent characteristics 
of the subjects over a four month test-retest interval?
2 Do the causal beliefs change in parallel with changes in 
symptomatology or are they relatively stable characteristics?
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3 Is there evidence from a cross-lagged correlation analysis that 
internality is causally related to change in self-esteem?
METHOD
Procedure
Subjects completed the following questionaires individually on two 
occasions separated by eui interval of approximately 16 weeks(+ 2 weeks):
1 The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
2 Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire: Intensity (ASQl)
3 Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire: Frequency (ASQF)
4 Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire: Duration (ASQD)
5 Causal Beliefs and Expectancies Questionnaire (CBEQ)
Subjects
The subjects were 26 of the 46 patients included in the first part of the 
study described in Chapter 5 who were willing and available to complete 
again the questionnaire measures which they had originally filled in as 
part of that study. Subject characteristics are included in the results 
below. Of the 20 subjects lost between initial and repeat assessment, 10 
had dropped out of treatment and lost contact with the author, 7 were not 
able to be seen again at the desired time interval from original 
assessment, 2 refused on the second occasion and one was unable to 
complete all the questionnaires due to her emotional state on the second 
occasion.
Between assessment occasions patients received behavioural psychotherapy 
from the author. This took the form of a relatively brief and
behaviourally orientated approach. Attributional models and reference to 
the causal belief questionnaires were avoided during therapy.
The same questionnaires utilising the same current concerns and life 
problems were administered on each occasion. The Symptoms and Current 
Concerns Interview was not repeated at time two. All measures are 
described in detail in Chapters 4 emd 5. The symptoms and current
concerns remained relevant for each subject as evidenced by their 
response to item 4 on the CBEQ concerning the importance of each concern. 
All concerns were rated at least moderately Important (future) on both 





Table 6i gives the characteristics of the subjects included in this 
study and compares them with those subjects who completed 
questionnaires at time one but not time two. The only significant 
difference between the groups was in mean age, the "drop-outs" being 
significantly younger than those included in this study.
2 Consistency of Causal Beliefs
Test-retest correlations for each dimension are given in table 6ii. 
The values varied from zero to 0.73. Higher values were found for 
internality (past and future), expectations of others (past and 
future) aind universality (future) suggesting that these dimensions 
were rated quite consistently over this time interval (all values of r 
^0.50) despite changes in life problems rated. The lowest 
correlations were for the "controllability", "expectations of self" 
and "failure to meet one's own expectations" dimensions. These also 
had lower internal consistency values than the internality and 
universality dimensions (see Chapter 5) raising questions about their 
reliability. The relatively low test-retest correlation for past 
universality may be at least in part related to a significant change 
in this dimension between testing occasions rather than the measure 
being of low reliability. No such change was found for internality 
(past or future) or future universality.
Table 6ii also gives means and st£tndard deviations for each dimension 
at the two testing occasions. Only three variables change 
significantly between the two occasions. Past universality and past 
failure to meet one's own expectations both changed significantly in 
the direction of greater externality while past controllability 
changed in the direction of greater control. This latter finding is 
perhaps not surprising in view of a significant decrease in ratings of 
the life problems severity (as measured by question one of the 
questionnaire) (average rating time one; 0.69; time two: 1.51; 
t(paired samples)«4.79, df=25, p < 0.001).
Table 6111 shows the parallel results for the symptom factors. As can
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Table 611 Cbupetiacn of Oausal Belleft Made at Mnie OttB and Time TWo
Mean (SD) 
at Tim C m
Mean (SD) 






aocrea at H  and 
T2 (r)
Past Ihtemality 
(self cause of fbHire) 2.72 (0.90) 2.61 (0.70) t>0.76 0.63***
Bast (jhiversallty 6.27 (1.00) 5.SB (0.96) t> 3.17** 0.36
Bast Badlure to meet 
omn Standards 6.9S (1.08) 6.13 (0.12) U  3.38** 0.16
Bast Ocrrtmllability 1.66 (0.86) 2.12 (0.84) t^.l3* 0.17
Bast Belief About 
Others 2.00 (l.Ql) 2.08 (0.86) W1.54 0.73***
Bast Expectatlcn of 
Self 2.69 (0.87) 2.67 (0.61) t>. 0.13 0.003
Future Internali ty 
(self cause of chenge) 2.57 (0.86) 2.43 (0.71) U  1.07 0.65***
Future Universality 5.23 (1.18) 5.18 (1.03) t^ 0.26 0.54**
Future Expected Failure 
To Meet Own 
Standards 5.59 (0.78) 5.42 (0.54) t— 1.11 0.29
Future Controllability 1.88 (0.89) 2.21 (0.84) t=-1.57 0.20
Future Expectations of 
Others 2.12 (0.96) 2.38 (0.95) t>-1.91 0.73***
Future E>qpectatlons of 
Self 2.45 (0.83) 2.66 (0.83) t— 0.98 0.14
Expectations of Future 
Change (ancunt) 2.5B (0.93) 2.58 (1.00) t=-0.02 0.60***
Qqpectations of Future 
Change (likelihood) 1.91 (0.70) 1.92 (0.81) t=-0.05 0.36
't-test for paired sanples, degrees of fteedcsm in brackets









be seen there was a highly signiflcwt decrease In mean BDI total 
score, significant decreases in BDI Factor 2, negative attitude to 
self and factor 4 and a marginal, non significant, decrease in the 
anxiety symptom factor (ASQI factor one). It therefore appears that 
symptoms of depression, particularly negative attitude to self, 
decreased between the two occasions.
These findings therefore provided inconclusive evidence regarding the 
stability of the causal belief ratings over time. The evidence 
suggested that pEist and future internality (self cause of failure) and 
past and future beliefs about others are relatively stable. However 
their modest reliabilities and the relatively small absolute changes 
in symptom scores meant that this conclusion must be a tentative one. 
The past and future controllability dimensions both had low 
test-retest correlations and low internal consistency (as reported in 
Chapter 5) suggesting that they may be both unstable and 
situation-dependent. Past universality, one of the most interesting 
dimensions in view of the findings reported in Chapter 5, yielded a 
low test-retest correlation and a significant change between testing 
occasions. This may however be due to the ways this item was 
constructed (ie as the difference between item one "how much has this 
problem decreased?" and item three "how much would other people have 
reduced this problem?"). The past belief about others item did not 
change between testing occasions and yielded a relatively high 
test-retest correlation of 0.73. The change in universality is 
therefore likely to be due entirely to the change in item one, 
decrease in problem and may not be a reliable change.
Cross-lafy^ed Correlation Analysis
Synchronous correlations between causal beliefs and BDI Factor 2, 
negative attitude to self, are presented in table 6iv. As would be 
expected Time One results are similar to those obtained in Chapter 5 with 
the original 46 subjects although because of the smaller sample size some 
failed to achieve statistical significance in this population. At Time 
Two the results are similcur for past universality (although Just falling 
to achieve statistical significance) but much smaller for controllability 
indicating that this relationship may not be stable across time.






differences between cross-lagged correlations were found for the 
internality dimension. The only slgnficant difference was for future 
expectations (likelihood) although this m2iy have been a chance finding 
given the number of correlations computed. There was therefore no 
evidence to suggest that causal beliefs are causally related to negative 
attitude to self.
DISCUSSION
1 The Consistency and Stability of Causal Beliefs Over Time
The evidence obtained in this study suggested that some dimensions are 
relatively stable over a four month time interval and a modest change 
in symptomatology. However the test-retest correlations obtained were 
in general modest or small. Higher values were obtained for past and 
future belief about others, past and future internality (self the 
cause of failure), future internality (personal-universal distinction) 
and expectations of future change (range 0.54 to 0.73), comparable to 
those obtained by Peterson et al, 1982, for the ASQ). Low values
(less thsm 0.50) were obtained for past internality
(personal-universal distinction), past and future failure to meet one's 
own standards and past and future controllability. There is little 
comparable data available in the literature for real life problems 
although Firth and Brewin (note 1) in their small scale longitudinal 
study found test-retest correlations of -0.12 for uncontrollability 
and 0.23 for internality (but 0.74 for stability and 0.87 for 
globality).
It is therefore difficult to draw any firm conclusions regarding the 
temporal stability of causal beliefs measured in this study. The 
evidence overall suggests that the Internality dimensions (self causes 
of failure and internality, personal-universal distinction) are rated 
moderately consistently across the time Interval and range of 
depression examined in this study for both causal attributions and 
expectations. By contrast controllability and internality (comparison 
with one's own standards) were not consistently rated. In the case of 
controllability ratings this meiy be due in part at least to a change 
in the life problems between testing occasions. The Internal 
consistency coefficient for both dimensions were also low suggesting 
that the dimensions are either rated unreliably or reflect situational
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differences more than individual differences.
2 The Relationship Between Causal Beliefs and Symptomatology
In Chapter 5 a specific association between Internality 
(personal-universal distinction) and negative attitude to self was 
found. In this study the association was found to be stable over time 
(le similar at both time one and time two testings). The cross-lagged 
correlation analysis did not provide any strong evidence that a causal 
relationship exists between these two variables although there was a 
slight trend in the predicted direction. This negative result might 
be attributable to the questionable reliability of the internality 
(personal-universal distinction) measure. However inspection of the 
cross-lagged correlations for the more reliable past "belief about 
other" measure provided no evidence of a causal relationship 
(correlation between past belief about others/Tl and BDI Factor 2/T2: 
0.40, p^0.05; correlation between BDI Factor 2/Tl and past belief 
about others /T2 : 0.38, p=0.056).
There was therefore no evidence of a causal relationship between 
internality and self esteem. The failure to find evidence of a causal 
relationship may reflect the time interval chosen between testing 
occasions and the relatively modest change in symptomatology between 
testing occasions. Other studies (eg Firth and Brewin, 1982; Golin et 
al, 1981) chose 4 to 6 week intervals between testing occasions. 
However only Firth 2ind Brewin (1982) used real life events and 
symptoms and they found evidence of a causal relationship for 
stability and controllability but not internality.
CONCLUSION
This longitudinal study suggested that internality (universal-personal 
distinction) is associated with low self esteem, as predicted by the 
reformulated leeu'ned helplessness theory. However no evidence was found 
of a causal relationship between these two variables. The results were 
compatible with the hypothesis that internality is a function of low self 
esteem (le state dependent) although no very firm conclusions could be 
drawn with regard to this.
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CHAPTER 7
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEPRESSION, PRESENTING SYMPTOM TYPE AND CAUSAL 
ATTRIBUTIONS AND EXPECTANCIES CONCERNING SYMPTOMS
The literature reviewed and studies reported above have focussed on the 
relationship between symptoms and causal beliefs concerning life 
problems. While studies have lent some support to aspects of the theory, 
both the results reported in the literature and the results reported 
eeu-lier have been generally disappointing, particularly with respect to 
attempts to demonstrate that attributions play a causal role in the 
aetiology and maintenance of depression. Brewin (1985) noted in the 
conclusion of his review that "future research needs to examine .. . the 
relative importance of attributions for events and attributions for 
depressive symptoms themselves". It may therefore be that part of this 
failure is due to focussing on the wrong kind of attribution and that 
attributions for symptoms may prove more importeuit. The possibility that 
attributions, and expectancies, concerning symptoms themselves play am 
important role, particularly in the maintenance of depression has been 
suggested by Teasdale (1985). He writes that "anybody who experienced 
the highly aversive symptoms and effects of depression, who saw these as 
evidence of personal inadequacy, and who felt quite hopeless that their 
situation would improve, either through their own efforts or otherwise, 
would experience depression about depression". While not phrased in 
explicitly attributlonal terms, this proposal suggests that internal, 
especially characterologlcal, attributions concerning the cause of 
depressive symptoms may play a role in the maintenance of depression. 
These ideas had also been put forward earlier by Beck as part of his 
broad cognitive theory of depression (eg Beck 1976) in which he suggests 
that the depressive interprets his symptoms in a negative way, concluding 
that he is defective and leading to a vicious circle maintaining emd 
intensifying his depression. These observation are supported by clinical 
experience which suggests that depressed patients frequently attribute 
their depression symptoms to their own failings and may fail to Identify 
them as either part of depression at all (eg loss of interest in work may 
be Interpreted as laziness) or meiy not be linked to life problems or 
losses ("I should be over that by now).
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Patients' causal beliefs 2md expectations concerning their symptoms have 
been considered In a different context by Caine, Wljeslnghe and Winter 
(1981). They examined a number of related themes Including staff and 
patient treatment expectancies, patients' complaints of psychological 
distress and how this relates to measures of psychological functioning. 
Of particular relevance here Is their proposal that the type of complaint 
presented by the patient Is related to the patlenf's treatment 
expectancies. Basically they differentiated those patients who present 
with relatively diffuse, mainly emotional and Interpersonal difficulties 
from those who present with more specific neurotic symptoms (eg phobic, 
obsessional, somatic symptoms etc). They propose that the former have a 
psychological treatment set and construe their problem In psychological 
terms while the latter have a medlcal/physlcal treatment set 6uid construe 
their problem In more medlcal/physlcal terms. They present other data to 
suggest that these different treatment sets are associated with broad 
aspects of personal functioning such as "openness to Inner experiences". 
This body of work Is of Interest In the context of patient's causal 
beliefs concerning symptoms because It has Involved a detailed and 
extensive exeunlnatlon of how patients present their symptoms and how this 
relates to their beliefs concerning their symptoms and treatment. The 
distinction between psychological and medlcal/physlcal construction and 
treatment expectancies In relation to symptoms Is of particular relevance 
to Beck's and Teasdale's proposals. Although Caine et al do not relate 
their distinction to diagnostic groups (Indeed they vigorously question 
the value of psychiatric diagnosis), their two groups of symptom 
presenters appear to differentiate those who present with more depressive 
symptoms (eg feeling Inadequate euid Inferior In relation to others, being 
over-critical of others, feeling depressed and pessimistic etc) and those 
with anxiety based symptoms (eg feeling tense, nervous, panic attacks, 
obsessive thinking, compulsions, phobias and somatic complaints. 
Including feeling faint and dizzy, sweating etc). Could It be that 
depressed patients construe their symptoms In more psychological terms, 
hold themselves, particularly their personal Inadequacies, more 
responsible for their symptoms and expect that change depends more on 
their own action rather than medical treatment. This latter suggestion 
•night appear to conflict with Teasdale's proposal but this Is not 
necessarily so. Depressed patients may believe future chemge In their 
symptoms depends more on themselves but have low self-efficacy 
expectancies. This may be an even more depressing set of expectancies 
than to believe future change depends on medical treatment and that there 
is little that the person himself can do to bring about change.
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To return to ein attributional analysis, it may be hypothesised from these 
discussions that depressed, compared with anxious patients, attribute the 
cause of their symptoms more to internal causes, particularly their own 
personal inadequacies, while anxious patients attribute the cause of 
their symptoms more to external causes, particularly a medical or 
physical problem. This may be associated with more internal expectancies 
for change in the depressed patients compared with the Etnxlous patients. 
This pattern of attributions and expectancies may, as suggested by 
Teasdale, have a maintaining suid/or intensifying effect in the case of 
depressive symptoms. It should be noted that internal smd external are 
used here in a particular sense, in the sense of personal versus 
impersonal forces. Medical causes lie physically but not psychologically 
within the person. This distinction remains close to that of Heider 
(1958) and indeed to the concept of universality since medical causes 
might reasonably regarded as "a difficult situation" which would tend to 
affect most people.
To summarise, Beclds Eind Teasdale's proposals regarding "depression about 
depression" euid Caine et al's work on personal styles in neuroses lead to 
a number of distinct but related hypotheses. Teasdale*s and Beck's work 
suggests that depression may be maintained aind exacerbated by the 
patients' attributions and expectations concerning his depressive 
symptoms. It follows from this that more severe and prolonged episodes 
of depression may be associated with attributing symptoms to internal 
characterological causes to a greater extent, and with low expectations 
of change in symptoms to a greater extent.
Caine et al's work leads to the proposal that patients whose presenting 
complaints are diffuse 2ind emotional, rather than specific and neurotic, 
will have a more psychological orientation to their symptoms. It may be 
hypothesised that this would lead patients to attribute the cause of 
their symptoms more to their actions, personal characteristics and life 
problems and less to physical-medical problems. They should also expect 
future change to depend more on changes in themselves and less on medical 
treatment.
■ A
-  154 -
AIM OF THE STUDY
The aim of this study was to examine a number of questions arising from 
the above discussion. These c w  be summarised as follows:
1 Is the severity of depressive symptoms related to causal beliefs and 
future expectations concerning their symptoms?
In particular is the severity of depressive symptoms related to 
attributing the cause of symptoms more to characterological causes?
Is depression severity also related to the extent to which the subject 
holds themselves responsible for their symptoms?
Finally is depression severity related to both future expectations of 
improvement in symptoms and future expectation of the subject's ability 
to bring about change in their symptoms by their actions?
2 Does the type of presenting symptoms (specific neurotic symptoms vs 
diffuse emotional symptoms) relate to causal beliefs about symptoms?
In particular do patients who present with diffuse emotional symptoms 
attribute the causes of their symptoms more to psychological (compared 
with medical) causes, to their own personality or behaviour and to 
life problems?
Do they hold themselves more responsible for both the causes of their 
symptoms and future change?
Do they expect future change to depend more on their own actions and 
less on medical treatments?
3 What is the relationship between type of presenting symptom and 
symp tomatology ?
In particular are diffuse emotional symptom presenters relatively more 




The subjects were 52 psychiatric out-patients and day-patients who were 
all either receiving behavioural psychotherapy from a clinical 
psychologist or attending a day clinic for the behavioural treatment of 
neurotic disorders. Inclusion and exclusion criterion were identical to
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those given in Chapter 5 except that the age range was reduced slightly 
to between 18 and 55. Subjects were however at varying stages of
treatment rather than all at the beginning of treatment as in the earlier 
study.
Materials and Procedure
The following measures were administered to each subject individually on 
a single occasion in the order given below. The measures took 
approximately 30-45 minutes to complete.
1 Attitude to Symptom Questionnaire (ASQ)
2 Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
3 Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire: Intensity (ASQI)
The BDI and ASQI have been described in earlier chapters. The other 
measure is described in detail below.
1 Attitude to Symptom Questionnaire (ASQ) (Appendix L)
This self-administered questionnaire consisted of thirteen items 
concerning subjects' beliefs and attitudes regarding their presenting 
symptoms. The questionnaire begins with two general items concerning 
the nature of the patient's main symptoms or emotional problems and 
how distressing they have been during the past two weeks.
Questions (3) to (13) concern vcu'lous aspects of the patient's beliefs 
about these symptoms or problems. Each is presented in the form of a 
five point rating scale (scored 0-4), each point being defined by a 
phrase. The items cover:
(3) the extent to which life problems are believed to be a cause of 
the symptoms;
(4) the extent to which the subject holds themselves responsible for 
their symptoms;
(5) the extent to which the subject's personality is believed to be 
a cause of the symptoms;
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(6) - the extent to which a physlcal/medical problem or a
psychological emotional problem Is believed to be the cause of 
the symptoms;
(7) the extent to which the subject's past actions are believed to 
be a cause of the symptoms;
(8) the extent to which, the subject believes that, compared with
other people, they have done something to improve their
symptoms;
(9) the extent to which the subject holds themselves responsible for 
improving their main symptom;
(10) the extent to which the subject believes that improvement in
their symptoms depends on physical medical treatment;
(11) the extent to which the subject believes that improvement in
their symptoms depends on their own actions;
(12) the extent to which the subject expects their symptoms to
improve in the foreseeable future;
(13) the extent to which the subject expects to improve their
symptoms by their actions.
Classification of Subjects into Presenting Type Categories
Subjects were categorised as diffuse, emotional presenters or specific 
neurotic presenters on the basis of their response to question one of the 
Attitude to Symptoms Questionnaire. Detailed criteria are given in 
appendix M, based on those given by Caine et al (1981). To establish the 
reliability of this categorisation, it was carried out independently by 
the author and two psychology graduates, all of whom used only the single 
item to make their Judgement. Inter-rater agreements were 79%, 81% and 
83% yielding Kappa's of 0.58, 0.62 and 0.66 respectively. (Cohen, 1960). 
These relatively modest values may reflect the limited data on which the 
categories were made as case note data was not utilised.
RESULTS
Subject Characteristics
Characteristics of the subjects are given in table 7i. These are similar 
to the subject populations reported in Chapter 5 with a preponderance of 
meu'ried and female subjects, mean age in the mid thirties and belonging 
to social class two and three. Only one quarter were in full time
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employment with approximately a quarter each in part-time employment, 
unemployed euid not seeking employment (eg housewife). Mean duration of 
psychiatric illness was 5 years but the distribution was positively 
skewed, the median value being 3 years.
The Relationship Between Type of Symptom Presenter emd Subject 
Characteristics
The relevant data is siimarlsed in table 7ii. No significant differences 
were found between the two presenter types in sex distribution 
(X*=1.13, Idf p>-0.1), age (t=0.08, p>0.1), marital status (collapsing 
single and widowed/divorced categories, 7C *=0.43, Idf p^O.l), employment 
status (X * =0«91 3df p'>01) social class (X*=0*31, 2df,p-^0.1, social 
class IV ^md V collapsed) or duration of psychiatric disorder 
(Mann-Whitney U Test, U=293.0, p>0.1).
Relationship Between Symptoms of Depression and Causal Beliefs Concerning 
Symptoms
Pearson's product-moment correlations between measures of symptomatology 
(factors derived from the BDI 8uid ASQI) emd causal beliefs are given in 
table 7111. The results are based on the total subject sample including 
both groups of presenter types.
Contrary to predictions derived from Beck's eind Teasdale's proposals, 
depression severity, as measured by BDI total scores, was not 
significantly correlated with attributions to internal characterological 
causes although it was correlated with ratings of personal responsibility 
for the cause. Attributions to behavioural causes were also not 
signlflcemtly correlated with depression severity although in this case 
the correlation only just fell short of statistical significance 
(p=0.065). However in support of Beck's and Teasdale's proposals, 
substeuitlal, highly statistically significant correlations, were obtained 
between depression severity emd both measures of expectations of future 
change.
Inspection of the correlations between causal beliefs and the individual 
symptom factors revealed an interesting pattern. BDI factor two, 
"negative attitude to self", correlated strongly with responsibility for 





psychological causes (r 0.48-0.50, p < 0.01). No other symptom factor 
correlated with any of these Items apart from factor one with one 
relatively small significant correlation suggesting that attributing the 
cause of symptoms to internal, psychological and, in particular, 
characterologlcal causes is relatively specifically associated with 
negative attitude to self or low self esteem.
In contrast, for the future expectancy ratings, significant correlations 
were found with BDI factors one and two and BDI total score, suggesting 
that low expectsmcles of change in synq;>toms are less closely related to 
any specific component of depression.
Relationship Between Type of Presenting Symptom and Causal Beliefs
Mean values for each scale for the two groups, specific neurotic smd 
diffuse emotional symptom presenters is presented in table 71v. As 
predicted from Caine et al's work emotional symptom presenters compared 
with neurotic symptom presenters attributed the cause of their symptoms 
slgnficantly more to their personality, to psychological as against 
medical problems, and non significantly to their own actions (p=0.052). 
They also held themselves more responsible for their symptoms but they 
did not attribute the cause of their symptoms more to life problems. The 
results were less clear for expectations concerning future change. 
Emotional symptoms presenters held themselves signficantly more 
responsible for future change and there was a slight non-significant 
trend (0.1>p^0.05) for emotional symptom presenters to expect future 
change to depend more on their own actions. No differences or trends 
were however found for expectations that future change depends on medical 
treatment or generalised expectancies regarding future change.
The Relationship Between Presenting Symptom Type and Elicited 
Symptomatology
The data for each of the symptom factor scores for the two presenting 
symptom types is presented in table 7v. There was a highly significant 
difference in depression severity, as measured by BDI total score. 
Inspection of the differences for the BDI factors suggest that this is 
not due entirely to any one component of depression but is most strongly 
related to factor two, negative attitude to self. No significant 







that the emotional symptom presenters report more depressive symptoms, 
particularly negative attitude to self, but not that the specific 
neurotic symptom presenters report more anxiety symptoms.
In this context the relationship between causal beliefs concerning 
symptoms and reported symptomatology is relevant. Table 7iii shows that 
most of the significant correlations between symptom factor scores and 
psychological attitudes to symptoms are with BDI factor two, negative 
attitude to self. Significant correlations were found with all relevant 
items except for attribution of symptoms to behavioural causes, and the 
correlation with attributions to life problems, which was marginally non 
significEuit (p=0.055). Only one significant correlation involved another 
BDI factor. This evidence therefore suggests that a psychological 
attitude towards symptoms is associated with a relatively negative 
attitude towards oneself but not consistently with other aspects of 
depression euid particularly not with anxiety symptoms.
DISCUSSION
The results of this study provided some support for both Teasdale's 
(1985) and Caine et al's (1981) proposals regarding the relationship 
between depression, presenting symptom type and causal beliefs concerning 
symptoms. Depression severity was found to be quite strongly correlated 
with pessimism regarding future improvement in symptoms and regarding the 
subject's own ability to change their symptoms through their actions 
(self-efficacy expectations). Negative attitude to self was found to be 
specifically correlated with attributions to characterologlcal and 
psychological causes for which they held themselves responsible. This 
finding paralleled in some respects that obtained in Chapter 5 where 
negative attitude to self was found to be associated with Internal, 
personal attributions concerning the cause of failure to overcome current 
concerns.
Diffuse emotional symptom presenters differed from specific neurotic 
symptom presenters on a number of aspects of their beliefs about their 
main presenting symptom. Emotional presenters attributed the cause more 
to psychological causes, peu?ticularly dispositional causes and to a 
lesser extent their own actions. They also held themselves more 
responsible for future change with a trend towards expecting future 
change to depend on their actions. They did not however differ from
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neurotic symptom presenters In expectations of future change or in the 
belief that future change depends on medical treatment. This latter 
negative finding is somewhat surprising in view of Caine et al's work and 
the highly significant group difference for psychological vs medical 
causal beliefs. It may be that other factors, such as previous 
experience of the effect of medical treatments, may be more Important 
factors in determining such expectancies than causal explanations 
concerning the symptoms.
The relationship between type of presenting symptom and depression, in 
this population, is a rather complex one. Thé two types of presenting 
symptom differ in terms of depression severity and in three of the four 
depression symptom factors derived from the BDI. However the pattern of 
results for the attribution and expectancy questionnaires suggest that 
the distinction is not simply between more and less depressed subjects. 
Depression severity correlated most substantially with expectation of 
change measures (overall expectation of future change and expectation of 
change through their actions) and attributing the cause of their symptoms 
to psychological (vs medical) causes. By contrast both type of 
presenting symptom and negative attitude to self (BDI factor two) were 
most closely associated with attributing symptoms to psychological causes 






The attrlbutlonal reformulation of the learned helplessness theory is 
essentially a theory of the aetiology of some clinical depressions (see 
Chapter I). However most studies reported in the literature have been 
concerned with a relatively peripheral and non essential aspect of the 
theory, the depression-prone attrlbutlonal style. The studies reported 
in Chapter 3, 5 and 6 have attempted to examine the core of the 
reformulated learned helplessness theory, the aetlologlcal hypothesis. 
The results of these studies can now be summarised before considering 
criticisms of the theory and the studies reported here.
A cross sectional study comparing the attributions and expectancies 
concerning current life concerns of depressed, anxious patients with 
those of non-depressed, anxious patients yielded some though limited 
support for the aetlological hypothesis. Subjects who gave predominantly 
internal or global attributions for the cause of their current concerns 
were significantly more likely to be depressed than the patient 
population as a whole. Therefore, e« predicted by the theory, there was 
a conditional relationship, revealed by Bayesian methods of analysis, 
between internal emd global attributions £tnd depression. However although 
there were trends in the expected direction, there were no significant 
differences between depressed and non-depressed patients in the 
internality or globality of their attributions. For stability the 
findings emphasised the need for appropriate clinical control groups. 
Both depressed and non-depressed patients gave predominantly stable 
attributions for the cause of their current concerns but there were no 
trends or signlflcemt group differences.
Less direct support for the aetiologlcal hypothesis came from the finding 
that both patient populations gave predominantly uncontrollable 
attributions for the cause of their current concerns but that depressed 
subjects did this to a significantly greater extent than non-depressed.
Finally some support was also obtained from examination of future 
expectancies. Depressed subjects gave significantly lower expectations
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of change (likelihood of change in the expected cause of future change) 
than did the non-depressed subjects. Further, subjects who gave 
predominantly low expectations of future change were significantly more 
likely to be categorised as depressed than the population as a whole. 
However results for the controllability of future change did not yield 
any significant differences although there were trends in the predicted 
direction.
Evidence of a specific relationship between Internal attributions and low 
self esteem, as predicted by the theory, was found in a further study of 
the association between attributions and depression. It was found that 
internal attributions concerning the cause of the subject's failure to 
overcome current concerns were associated with negative attitude to self 
as measured by the second factor of a factor analysis of the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI). This result was specific to internality in 
the sense of the universal-personal distinction and was specific to this 
particular factor of the BDI, no significant correlations being found 
between internality and other factors or BDI total score. Similar 
results were also obtained for the internality of expected future change.
A subsequent longitudinal study did not however provide any significant 
evidence of a causal relationship between internality and low self esteem 
(or negative attitude to self). The cross lagged correlations between 
Internality at time one and self esteem (as measured by BDI factor two) 
at time two were not significantly different from the correlations 
between self esteem at time one and internality at time two, although 
there was a slight trend in the predicted direction.
Overall some relatively modest evidence was obtained of associations 
between attributions euid depression. No evidence was found to suggest 
that this relationship is a causal one, at least between low self esteem 
and internal attributions for the cause of failure to overcome current 
concerns.
Having summarised the rather limited evidence obtained in support of the 
reformulated learned helplessness theory, it may be helpful to consider 
some of the problems which arise from these and other attempts to examine 
the theory. These can be broadly categorised into problems arising from 
the nature of the theory Itself, problems of subject selection and 
symptom measurement and problems with the measurement of attributions and 
expectancies.
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PROBLEMS IN TESTING THE REFORMULATED LEARNED HELPLESSNESS THEORY 
Problems Arising from the Nature of the Theory
The reformulated learned helplessness theory as proposed by Abramson et al 
(1978) is basically a theory of the aetiology of depression. Although 
many studies and reviews have focussed subsequently on other aspects of 
the theory (eg Peterson and Seligman, 1984, on vulnerability to 
depression and Brewin, 1985, on recovery from depression amongst other 
aspects), these are peripheral to the original theory and merited only a 
brief note in the original paper.
The aetlological or developmental theory is particularly difficult to 
test adequately, which may at least in part explain the limited atttempts 
to examine it directly. The theory concerns the relationship between 
attributions and expectancies eurising from attempts by a non-depressed 
person to modify an expected aversive outcome and subsequent aspects of 
depression (self esteem loss and the stability emd generality of 
motivational deficits). It is therefore important to measure 
attributions amd expectancies before the onset of depression and after 
the expected aversive outcome arises. Meaisuring both depression and 
cognitions simultaneously after a variable length of time from the onset 
of depression cannot differentiate the effect of attributions and 
expectancies on depression from the effect of depression on attributions 
(ie the symptom model to use Brewin's (1985) terminology). However it is 
in practice very difficult to measure attributions before the onset of 
depression. At best attributions following major life events (eg child 
birth, exam failure, unemployment) could be measured but in these cases 
subjects are likely to be already becoming depressed, making it difficult 
to disentangle fully cognitions and depression. Many clinical depressions 
do not clearly follow from a single life event but may be related to a 
number of stresses and ongoing difficulties such as marital problems or 
problems in coping at work. In addition a relatively mild depression may 
be made much worse by a major life stress further complicating the 
relationship between life events and depression (eg Brown and Harris, 
1978). In summary it is in practice difficult to carry out emy direct 
study of the relationship between attributions, expectcuicies and clinical 
depression in a clinical population in which cognitions are meuured
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prior to the onset of depression. It has been argued that this is a 
basic necessary condition if the aetiologlcal theory is to be directly 
examined and differentiated from other explanations such as that 
attributions are simply an aspect of the cognitive symptoms of 
depression.
Problems in Subject Selection and Symptom Measurement
A major problem in the study of clinical depression is the way clinical 
depression is conceptualised and measured. As has been discussed earlier 
in Chapter I, although a number of distinctions have been made within 
clinical depression (eg psychotic-neurotic, endogenous-reactive, 
primary-secondary) none is very helpful in tests of the reformulated 
learned helplessness theory. The endogenous-reactive distinction is the 
most promising but cannot as yet be made reliably and is often made on 
the basis of presenting symptomatology rather them aetiology. It is 
therefore difficult to select patient populations which are likely to 
include many reactive depressions rather than those of a biological 
origin.
Two main strategies have been used in studies of clinical populations. 
Most studies have used groups selected on the basis of psychiatric 
diagnosis, such as DSMIII or Spltzer's Research Diagnostic Criteria. 
However using such an approach, the diagnosis of major depressive
disorder or unipolar depression may Include many subjects who have a 
biological depression. It is certainly not obvious that diagnostic
criteria are of particulsu? relevance to the reformulated theory. As 
reviewed earlier studies which have compared subgroups of depression have 
found no significant differences (see page 44).
The second main strategy is to use a continuous measure of depression 
such as the Beck Depression Inventory, either to identify a depressed
group using a cut off score, or to give a continuous measure of
depression severity. This strategy was adapted in the studies reported 
in Chapter 4, 5 ani 6. It may be argued that many of the subjects may 
not fulfill diagnostic criteria and that such measures are inappropriate. 
However this assumes that diagnostic criteria aur'e more valid than
continuous measures. This is far from clear in the study of
psychological models of depression which tend to assume that depression 
is a continuously varying state. Indeed the use of non-cllnlcal
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analogues such as mild non-cllnical depression In students only makes 
sense as a strategy If a continuous model of depression Is assumed.
A dlsadvemtage with both diagnostic criteria and continuous measures of 
depression Is that they treat depression as a single entity, tending to 
Ignore the components of depression which are of considerable Importance 
In the theory. Factor analytic studies of the BDI, Including that 
reported In Chapter 4, suggest that It Is made up of a number of 
differentiable components, broadly cognitive, motivational (or 
performance deficits) and somatic. It has been argued above that It may 
be Important to use scores reflecting these components rather than simply 
total score above an order to test aspects of the theory, particularly 
the relationship between self esteem and Intemallty.
A final problem In subject selection concerns the Issue of appropriate 
control groups. Many studies Involving clinical populations have used 
either normal or non-psychlatrlc or psychotic control groups. It has 
been suggested here that anxlous/non-depressed patients provide a more 
stringent control group than these and better allow the examination of 
how specific the theory Is to depression. A possible Illustration of 
this Is In Chapter 3 where both depressed and anxious groups gave 
predomlnauitly stable attributions concerning the cause of current 
concerns, a finding which might have appeared to support the reformulated 
theory If a "normal" or schizophrenic control group had been used.
Problems with the Measurement of Attributions and Expectancies
r
The main focus of Interest In the research described above has been 
causal attributions and expectations concerning current concerns and 
symptoms. The measurement of these variables does however raise a number 
of conceptual and practical problems Including the theoretical status of 
cognitions, their accessibility, the validity of measures and the 
appropriate forms of the attributions and expectations.
The theoretical status of attributions and expectancies, as was noted In 
Chapter I, Is not alweiys made clear. Attribution theorists often adopt a 
phenomenological stance, treating attributions as directly related to a 
person's experience. Attributions and expectations can however also be 
regarded as aspects of cognitive processing or as hypothetical 
constructs. In the former case attributions are hypothesised to exist
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but may not be accessible or "conscious" (eg Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). 
In the latter case attributions have a purely theoretical status and 
serve to link sets of inputs and outputs by which they are defined. 
Verbal statements of attributions are in this sense Just one of a number 
of outcome operations (eg Peterson and Seligman, 1984).
The use of attributions and expectations in the reformulated learned 
helplessness theory is not not always clear but seems usually to be one 
of these latter two senses. This then raises issues regarding the 
validity of verbal or written statements of attributions in response to 
specific questions as measures of actual cognitive processes or 
hypothetical intervening variables. Such verbal and written behaviours 
may be determined by other Influences such as social reinforcement 
contingencies. Many cognitive processes may not be accessible to 
consciousness and hence to verbal behaviour euid therefore meiy not be 
readily measurable by such methods. The issue of accessibility of 
cognitive processing can also be extended to the life events or current 
concerns themselves. People may not necessarily have access to knowledge 
of, or wish to disclose, current concerns, particularly if of a very 
personal or self esteem threatening nature. It may therefore be
difficult to assess both the current concerns themselves and attributions 
and expectations concerning them, due to problems in accessibility (and 
perhaps defensiveness), a reluctance to disclose accessible information 
and the impact of social reinforcement contingencies.
The relationship between causal attributions and expectancies is a 
further general issue raised by this thesis. The relationship varied 
considerably between particular dimensions in the studies reported above. 
It appeared stronger for internality dimensions but less so for control. 
This issue certainly needs examining in more detail as expectations are 
an Important aspect of many cognitive theories of depression Including 
those of Abramson et al (1978), Teasdale (1985) and Indeed Caine et al's 
(1981) theory of emotional disorders. It was noticeable that results for 
expectations obtained here were often less consistent, with few 
statistically significant results compared with those for causal 
attributions. Taken with the almost complete absence of studies of 
expectations in the literature arising from the reformulated theory, this 
suggests there may be particular methodological problems associated with 
attempting to measure expectations.
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Finally the focus of causal beliefs remains an Important issue, one which 
is often ignored or muddled in the literature. In particular the 
distinction between causal beliefs concerning the cause of events or 
problems and concerning the cause of failure to overcome or deal with 
events or problems may yet prove very Important. Another Important issue 
is the relative Importance of causal beliefs concerning events, current 
concerns and the symptoms themselves. It may be that these four all play 
roles in particular depression, and that future work will need to 
differentiate these types and critical mechanisms of maintenance.
In conclusion the aetlologlcal model of the reformulated learned 
helplessness theory is difficult to test directly and adequately. No 
studies reported in the literature come near to meeting criteria for an 
adequate test. The studies reported in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 are an 
improvement on most of those in the literature and utilised clinical 
populations, adequate controls and more relevant measures of attributions 
and expectancies. A major limitation was that depressive symptoms were 
measured at the same time as attributions and a considerable length of 
time after the depression commenced.
Causal Beliefs About Depression and the Maintenance of Depression
The relationship between attributions and expectancies concerning the 
symptoms of depression, and depressive symptomatology Itself, were 
studied in Chapter 7. Given the difficulties in testing aetiological 
theories discussed above and the problems of meeisurement of attributions 
concerning life problems, it may prove more fruitful to examine the 
maintenance of depression euid the role of causal beliefs concerning 
depression in this maintenance. This was examined from two quite 
different points of view: Teasdale's (1985) ideas about "depression about 
depression" as a maintaining factor in depression and Caine et al's 
(1981) proposals regarding the relationship between presenting symptom 
type and attitude to symptoms.
The study reported in Chapter 7 provided some evidence to support both 
proposals. Emotional, diffuse symptom presenters compared with specific 
neurotic symptom presenters attributed the cause of their symptoms more 
to psychological causes and their own personality and held themselves 
more responsible for their symptoms. They also held themselves more 
responsible for future change although they did not expect future change
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to depend more on their own actions or less on medical treatment. 
Depression severity, as measured by BDI total score, was significantly 
positively correlated with attributions to psychological causes and rated 
responsibility for the cause of symptoms and negatively correlated with 
expectations of future change. However inspection of correlations with 
the individual factorial components of the BDI suggested that causal 
attributions and rated responsibility were mainly asociated with factor 
two, negative attitude to self, while future expectations were associated 
with both factors one (loss of interest and energy) and two. (This 
finding again emphasises the importance of examining components of the 
BDI in addition to total scores when interpreting correlations between 
the BDI total score and other variables). It was also noted that the 
magnitude of correlations in this study were generally considerably 
higher than in the earlier studies of current concerns.
The findings therefore provided some evidence of an association between 
depressive symptoms, causal beliefs and expectations concerning symptoms 
and type of symptom presented. Diffuse emotional symptom presenters were 
more depressed, had a more negative attitude to themselves, and 
attributed the cause of their symptoms more to psychological causes. 
Depression severity was more closely associated with pessimism about 
future change, both change in symptoms and in the patients' ability to 
bring about future change (ie self efficacy). This was however a 
cross-sectional study and therefore must be interpreted with caution. 
This is particularly so as causal beliefs were obtained concerning 
symptoms and it is therefore not clear whether the associations obtained 
reflect differences in the focus of the causal beliefs, differences in 
the state of the subject or more enduring differences in the subjects. 
Thus one explanation might be that depressive symptoms generally tend to 
be attributed to psychological causes compared with non depressive 
(mainly anxious) symptoms. A second explanation is that, as Teasdale 
(1985) suggests, it is the depressed state of the subject which affects 
their causal beliefs. A third explanation is that people who tend to get 
depressed tend to attribute their symptoms more to psychological causes, 
a view in line with Caine et al's work. In addition a cross-section 
study cannot directly examine the role of cognitions in maintenance. 
Longitudinal studies will be needed to examine this.
The study reported in Chapter 7 therefore provided initial but promising 
evidence that causal beliefs about depression and how patients present
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their symptoms may be a more fruitful area of study than causal beliefs 
concerning life events or current concerns. It may also prove more 
practlally possible to examine theories about maintenance and response to 
treatment than aetiological and vulnerability theories since they do not 
require subjects to be tested before the onset of their psychiatric 
disorder.
To conclude, cognitive theories of depression have stimulated much 
research and the development of cognitive treatment methods over the past 
two decades. These theories have provided and continue to offer a 
stimulus to examining the nature of emotional disorders from a cognitive 
point of view. It has to date proved somewhat easier to obtain evidence 
of the therapeutic effectiveness of cognitive theories (although the 
mechanism by which such theories are effective remain much less certain) 
than evidence that cognitions play a causal role in the development and 
maintenance of depression. Future studies may need to attempt to 
demonstrate the specific role of cognitive processes in the disorders 
perhaps by treatment or other intervention studies.
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I should like you to tell me about problems in your life that concern you 
at the moment, or have concerned you during the past month. By problems 
I mean anything about yourself and your life that you are unhappy about, 
dissatisfied with or would like to ch^ulge.
To help you to do this I would like to ask you about different aspects of 
your life .... your health, social life, family life and so on. In each 
case I 2un particularly interested in whether you are dissatisfied with 
that part of your life in any way.
I aun not only interested in aspects of your life that may be causing you 
symptoms but rather any part of your life that you are not happy with, 
even if it has nothing to do with your psychiatric problems.
(The interviewer will go through each section as detailed below. It is 
not necessary to repeat on each occasion the question "During the past 
month have you been dissatisfied or concerned about" unless the 
interviewee gives some indication of not understanding that this is the 
question. It is importât to avoid, as far as possible, frequent 
repetition of the word "dissatisfaction" which may itself have a 
depressing effect.)
During the past month have you been dissatisfied with or concerned about 
any of the following
A Health;
By health I 6un Including illnesses, operations, accidents, chronic 
health problems, handicaps, disabilities, fitness worries - eg 
through smoking, drink or weight problems, and health worries 
(Including worries about dying or having serious Illness).
(Where it is unclear enquire if the person is concerned about emy 
health problems.)
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B Social and Leisure Life;
1 Visits to your home, (or lack of them) by ft'lends or guests
2 Visits to friends
3 Your social life (eg going out to clubs, pubs, etc)
4 Yoxir recreational activities (hobbles, sport, films, etc)
5 Holidays (or holiday plans)
6 Day trips and outings
C Hone Environment;
1 Your house (kind - terraced, etc, size, condition, etc)
2 Your neighbourhood
3 The area where you live
4 Living In the Potteries
D Home Management;
1 How your home Is run and looked after (Including cooking, washing, 
cleaning and shopping, etc)
2 How decisions are made about buying Icu'ge Items for the home 
E Work;
1 If you are not working at present - your lack of work
2 If you are working, or have a Job to go back to - your Job and the 
work you do (Including pay, conditions, kind of work, bosses, 
workmates, hours and your work performance)
3 Your future prospects with regard to work
F Finances:
Your financial situation (Including where the money comes from and 
whether It Is suffflclent to live on, etc)
How the finances are managed In your home (eg how the money Is 
divided, who pays bills, etc)
(Froa case notes establish whether parents are alive; whether patient 
married and whether patient has any children.)
I would like to ask you about the people who are important to you in 
your life. Are there any people besides your parents, spouse and 
children who are Important to you? What about your brothers and 
sisters if any? or in-laws? other relatives? close friends? Please 
mention pe^le if you are apart from them, even if they are dead, if 
they are still important to you.
Which of these people live with you?
1 I an interested if you are dissatisfied or have been dissatisfied 
during the past month with any aspect of your relationship with 
each of these people -
By this I include how you get on with them, how much you see them, 
how secure you feel about your relationship with them and anything 
else about them that affects you (such as how well disciplined your 
children are, or how miserable your parents are, etc).
(The interviewer should take each person in turn but need not repeat 
above question unless it seems likely that the person has forgotten or 
misunderstood some part of it. Where the patient has not got anybody 
in a particular relationship with him they should be questioned whether 
they have any dissatisfaction about this - mother, father , brothers, 
sisters, spouse, children, close friends.)
2 Sexual Relationships;
Any aspect of the sexual side of your life (including your partner 
or partners, the satisfaction you get from your sex life and any 
other sexual outlets).
H Relationships with Friends
Your relationship with your friends, or lack of them (including number 
of friends, how much you see of them, and how you get on with them).
6 Key Relationships;
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Are you dissatisfied In any way with how you get on with, or deal with:
1 Acquaintances (people you know well enough to say hello to)?
2 Neighbours?
3 Shop Assistants and Shop Nanagers?
4 Bus Conductors?
5 People «fho cone to your hone, such as- neter readers, nllknen, 
saleenen, window cleaners, rent collectors, etc?
6 Govemnent Officers, (eg at Job Centres, Social Security, etc)?
7 People In the Health Service (eg nurses, doctors, social workers, 
dentists, psychologist, etc)?
8 Teachers In schools?
J Yourself:
1 Your physical iq>pearance, face, hair, weight, shape, etc?
2 Undesirable habits eg snoklng, drinking, drug taking or nail 
biting?
3 Things you feel compelled to do even If don't want to, eg washing, 
cleaning, repetitive checking, etc?
4 Anything that you do but regret later, eg getting Into fights, 
losing your temper, breaking things, sulking, being Insulting or 
over-critical, stealing and other criminal activities, sexual 
activities?
5 Thoughts or fantasies which you dislike In any way, such as 
worrying thoughts, unpleasant thoughts, or sexual and aggressive 
fantasies?
6 Situations, things or people that you avoid If at all possible?
7 Any abilities or skills which at present you do not possess but 
which you would like to eg driving, cooking, work skills, artistic 
skills, etc?
8 Situations Involving people, or ways of dealing with people which 
you have difficulty with?
It General;
Finally Is there anything about yourself or your life, which I have not
covered which you are dissatisfied with at present?
I Relationship« with Acquaintances and Strangers, e tc
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CLARIFICATION OF CURRENT CONCERNS
Where any possible dissatisfaction or concern is elicitted during the first 
part of the interview further questions should be asked to clarify then. 
These should
1 Establish in as nuch detail as possible exactly what is the present 
situation and what is the desired situation.
(This should be expressed, as far as possible, in precise, ccxicrete^ 
terms, without explanatory references, eg beinjg out of work - working 
in a full time Job of any kind: not being able to drive - passing my 
driving test. It should exclude reference to the cause of 
dissatisfaction, eg "Have lost my confidence to get a Job.)
2 In particular clarify whether what is desired is simply to do something 
or go somewhere w  to do so and feel certain emotions or be able to act 
in certain ways - eg to go shopping or go shopping feeling relaxed and 
Interested, or to go to work and not feel panicky.
3 In particular clarify whether this dissatisfaction is with the 
situation or with the patient's reaction to it, eg having chest pains 
or worrying about having chest pains.




eg Present: I am not working
Desired: I am working full time in any Job
Present: There is a lot of tension between myself and my husband 
Desired: There is little tension between myself and my husband
The card should then be placed in front of the Interviewee, who should then 
be asked:
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i) "Are you happy with how I have worded these current concerns? Do 
they express them clearly 2tnd accurately?"
ii) "Are any of these current concerns linked (in your view)? For 
example, if any of them was overcome, would others be overcome as 
well?
(Any pairings or groupings introduced by the interviewee should be 
discussed with him/her. If the current concerns are perceived as 
causally related in a direct way (eg A-B) then only the superordinate 
concern should be retained. Current concerns with the same perceived 
cause should be retained.)
4 Ranking;
If number of cards ^  12:
All 12 cards are placed in front of ' I ' , who is asked "Now would you 
please place cards in front of you in order of their importance to 
you, ie, place the most important at the top, the next most important 
below that, etc".
If number of cards ^  12:
A discarding procedure is used:-
The cards are divided into packs of 12 or less (le if 12-24 - 2 
packs, if 24-35 - 3 packs, etc) and 'I* is asked to choose the least 
Important dissatisfactions, such that a total of 12 cards will remain 
(ie if two packs of 10 cards I is asked to chose the four least 
Important from each pack, if three packs of 9 the five least 
Important, etc).
5 Duration:
The interviewee is asked:
"How long have you been dissatisfied about each of these situations 
shown on the ccurds."
This is done for each of the top 12 ranking cards.
Current concerns of less than one months duration are excluded from 
the Causal Beliefs Interview.
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Appendix B
CURRENT CONCERNS INTERVIEW .......  Interviewees Copy
I should like you to tell me about problems in your life that concern you 
at the moment, or have concerned you during the past month. By problems 
I mean wything about yourself and your life that you are unhappy about, 
dissatisfied with or would like to change. To help you to do this I 
would like to ask you about different aspects of your life .... your 
health, social life, family life and so on. In each case I am 
particularly interested in whether you are dissatisfied with that part of 
your life in any way. I am not only interested in aspects of your life 
that may be causing you symptoms but rather any part of your life that 
you are not happy with, even if it has nothing to do with your 
psychiatric problems.
During the past month have you been dissatisfied with or concerned about 
any of the following:-
A Health;
By health I am including illnesses, operations, accidents, chronic 
health problems, handicaps, disabilities, fitness worries - eg 
through smoking, drink or weight problems, and health worries 
(Including worries about dying or having serious Illness).
B Social and Leisure Life;
1 Visits to your home, (or lack of them) by friends or guests
2 Visits to friends
3 Your social life (eg going out to clubs, pubs, etc)
4 Your recreational activities (hobbies, sport, films, etc)
5 Holidays (or holiday plans)
6 Day trips and outings
C Home Environment;
1 Your house (kind - terraced, etc, size, condition, etc)
2 Your neighbourhood
3 The area where you live
4 Living in the Potteries
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D Home Manfuieinent :
How your home is run and looked after (including cooking, washing, 
cleaning and shopping, etc)
How decisions are made about buying large items for the home
E Work;
1 If you are not working at present - your lack of work
2 If you are working, or have a Job to go badk to - your Job and the 
work you do (including pay, conditions, kind of work, bosses, 
workmates, hours and your work performance)
3 Your future prospects with regard to work
F Finances ;
1 Your financial situation (including where the money comes from and 
whether it is suffficient to live on, etc)
2 How the flnamces are managed in your home (eg how the money is 
divided, who pays bills, etc)
G Key Relationships:
I am interested if you are dessatlsfled or have been dissatisfied 
diiring the past month with any aspect of your relationship with each of 
these people -
By this I Include how you get on with them, how much you see them, how 
secure you feel about your relationship with them and anything else 
about them that affects you (such eis how well disciplined your children 









Any other people who are Important to you
- l‘J4 -
Any aspect of the sexual side of your life (Including your partner 
or partners, the satisfaction you get from your sex life and any 
other sexual outlets).
H Relationships with Friends
Your relationship with your friends, or lack of them (including number 
of friends, how much you see of them, and how you get on with them).
I Relationships with Acquaintances auid Strangers, etc
Are you dissatisfied in any way with how you get on with, or deal with:
1 Acquaintances (people you know well enough to say hello to)?
2 Neighbours?
3 Shop Assistants atnd Shop Managers?
4 Bus Conductors?
5 People who come to your home, such as meter readers, milkmen, 
salesmen, window cleaners, rent collectors, etc
6 Government Officers, (eg at Job Centres, Social Security, etc)?
7 People in the Health Service (eg nurses, doctors, social workers, 
dentists, psychologist, etc)?
8 Teachers in schools?
J Yourself:
2 Sexual Relationships;
Your physical appearamce, face, hair, weight, shape, etc 
Undesirable habits eg smoking, drinking, drug taking or nail biting 
Things you feel compelled to do even if don't want to, eg washing, 
cleaning, repetitive checking, etc?
Anything that you do but regret later, eg getting into fights, 
losing your temper, breaking things, sulking, being insulting or 
over-critical, stealing and other criminal activities, sexual
activities?
Thoughts or fantasies which you dislike in any way, such as
worrying thoughts, unpleasant thoughts, or sexual and aggressive 
fantasies?
Situations, things or people that you avoid if at all possible?
Any abilities or skills which at present you do not possess but 
which you would like to eg driving, cooking, work skills, artistic
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APPENDIX C
n A IlS A l. B B I .T B F S  TN TERV TgW
Each of the first six highest ranking current concerns identified by the 
current concerns interview is taken in turn.
General Introduction
"In this part of the interview I am interested in what, in your view, is 
the cause of each of the durrant- eoncems. There are no right or wrong 
answers as I am only Interested in how you see the cause."
For each current concern
The card is placed in front of the subject who is asked:
1 PRESENT "What in your view is the main cause(s) of this?"
The subjects spontaneous reply is noted.
The following question are then asked about the main cause given:
a) Internality
Is the cause of this something about you as a person (something you 
did, your abilities or personality, etc), something about your 
impersonal self (your body and physical make-up), about other people 
or about your environment or circumstances?
self personal (1); other pe<q>le (2); impersonal world (3); impersonal 
self (4)
b) Internality (Personal-Universal)
Would anybody else in your circumstances have been likely to have 
ended up with this dissatisfaction, or is the cause something 
particular about you or what you did?
personal (1); universal (o)
The next question applies only where question a) is rated (1) or (2)
c) Characterological-Behavioural
Is the cause something you did or did not do, or because you did not 
try enough, or because of something about your personality, attitude 
or abilities?
characterological (1); b^iavloural (2); not applicable (o)
d) Stability - (likelihood)
How likely is it that the cause will change in the future - 
impossible or certain not to, unlikely, quite likely, very likely or 
certain?
iapossible (o); almost certain not to (1); unlikely (2); quite likely
(3): very likely ( 4 ) ;  certain (5)
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e) Stability - (time scale)
If It la at all likely to change, will the change be In days (0-13), 
weeks (2-7), months (2-23) or years (2 or more)?
days (5); weeks(4); Monttis (3); years (2); almost certain not to (1); 
iaposslble, certain not to (o)
f) Globallty
How many (U'eaa of your life (family, social, health, work etc) has 
this cause directly aiffected - only one, area, a few areas, some 
(about half), most or all areas?
all areas (1); most areas (2); some (about half) (3); few (4); one 
only (5)
g) Control
To what extent. If any, la this cause under your control at the present 
time - completely, considerably, moderately, a little or not at all?
not at all (1); little (2); noderate (3); considerable (4); complete 
(5)
h) Personal Responsibility
To what extent. If any do you hold yourself responsible for this cause 
- totally, considerably, moderately, a little or not at all?
totally (1); considerably (2); moderately (3); a little (4), not at all 
(5)
1) Others Responsibility
To what extent do you hold others responsible for this cause - totally, 
considerably, moderately, a little or not at all?
not at all (1); a little (2); moderately (3); considerably (4); totally 
(5)
Where subjects are unable to give a codable response on any Item this Is 
scored (9).
2. FUTURE
If the situation (on the card) changed in the future In the direction 
you desire, what in your view Is most likely to be the cause?
The subjects spontcmeous reply Is noted.
The following questions are then asked about the main cause given 
above:
a)^  Internallty
Is this cause a change in you as a person or in what you do, a change 
in other people, a change in your circumstances or in your physical 
self?
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self personal (1); other people (2); ispersonsl world (3); ispersonal 
self (4)
b) Source of Change
Would this change arise from basically a change In your circumstances, 
or from a change in something about you?
tram self (1); f k ^  circumstances (o)
The next question applies only where a) is rated (1) or (2)
c) Behavioural - Characterological
Would this cause be a change in what you do, a change in how much you 
try or a change in your personality, attitudes or ability?
characterological (1); behavioural (2); not applicable (o)
d) Expectation - likelihood
How likely is it that this cause will occur in the future - impossible 
or certain not to, almost certain not to, unlikely, quite likely, very 
likely, certain?
impossible or certain not to (o); almost certain not to (1); unlikely 
(2): quite likely (3); very llkley (4); certain (5)
e) Expectation - time scale
If this cause is at all likely to occur, will it be most likely to 
occur within days (1-13), weeks (2-7), months (2-23) or years?
impossible or certain not to (o); almost certain not to (1); years (2); 
months (3); weeks (4); days (5)
f) Globality
How many areas of your life (family, social, work, etc) would this 
cause directly affect - only one area, a few areas, some (about half), 
most or all areas?
all areas (1); most areas (2); some (about half) areas (3); few areas
(4) ; one area (5)
g) Controllability
To what extent, if any, is the future occurrence of this cause under 
your control at the present time - completely, considerably, moderately 
a little or not at all
not at all (1); little (2); moderately (3); considerable (4); complete
(5)
h) Personal Responsibility
To what extent, if any, do you hold yourself responsible for whether 
this cause occurs in the future - totally, considerably, moderately, a 






** l8 your physical health good?
(Does your body fXmctlon normally?)
•• Do you feel you are physically ill in any way?
(What is that like? How serious is it?)
RATE SUBJECT'S OWN SUBJECTIVE EVALUATION OF PRESENT PHYSICAL HEALTH 
(irrespective of whether physical disease is present)
0 > Feels physically very fit
1 » Feels no particular physical complaint but does not say positively
feels fit
2 K Feels unwell but not seriously incapacitated
3 = Feels seriously incapacitated by physical illness
** What does your doctor say is wrong?
(Have you had a physical illness recently; colds, influenze, etc?)
RATE PRESENCE OF PHYSICAL ILLNESS OR HANDICAP, taking results of recent 
investigations and physical state examinations into account
0 K No physical Illness or handicap present
1 > Nlld but significant physical illness or handicap (eg influenza or
limp)
2 m More serious physical illness or handicap present but not
incapacitating or threatening to life (eg deafness or duodenal ulcer)
3 - Physical illness or handicap present which is incapacitating or
threatening to life (eg blindness or carcinoma)
Specify illness, disabilities and duration:
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RATE PSYCHOSOMATIC SYMPTOMS 
Special projects only
** Have you worried a lot during the past month?
(What do you worry about?)
PROBE: (Money, housing, children, health, work, marriage, relatives, 
friends, neighbours, other)
(How much do you worry? Are you a worrier?)
If indication of worry, use further probes:
** What is it like when you worry?
(What sort of state of mind do you get into?)
(Do unpleasant thoughts constantly go round emd round in your mind?) 
(Can you stop them by turning your attention to something else?)
RATE WORRYING: A round of painful thoughts which cannot be stopped and is 
out of proportion to the subject worried about.
1 s Symptom definitely present during the past month, but of moderate
clinical intensity, or intense less than 50% of the time
2 = Symptom clinically intense more than 50% of the month
** Have you had headaches, or other aches and pains, during the past 
month? (What kind?)
RATE ONLY TENSION PAINS eg 'band round head', 'pressure', 'tightness in 
scalp', 'ache in back of neck', etc not migraine
1 = Symptom definitely present during past month, but of moderate
clinical intensity, or Intense less than 50% of the time
2 » Symptom clinically intense more than 50% of past month
** Have you been getting exhausted and worn out during the day or 
evening, even when you haven't been working very hard?
RATE TIREDNESS OR EXHAUSTION: Do not include tiredness due to flu, etc >9
1 ■ Only moderate form of symptom (tiredness) present; or Intense form 
(exhaustion) less than 50% of the time
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2 = Intense form of symptom (exhaustion) present more than 50% of the 
past month
** Have you had difficulty in relcucing during the past month?
(Do your muscles feel tensed up?)
RATE MUSCULAR TENSION: Do not include a subjective feeling of nervous 
tension, which is rated later
1 = Symptom definitely present during past montht but of moderate
clinical Intensity, or intense less than 50% of the time
2 = Symptom clinically intense more than 50% of past month
** Have you been so fidgety eind restless that you could not sit still? 
RATE RESTLESSNESS
(Do you have to keep pacing up and down?)
1 = Only moderate form of symptom (fidgety, restless) present; or intense
form (pacing can't sit down) less than 50% of the time
2 = Intense form of symptom (pacing etc) present more than 50% of past
month
** Do you tend to worry over your physical health?
RATE HYPOCHONDRIASIS: Overconcern with possibility of death, disease or 
malfunction. Re-rate at end of interview if subject constantly reverts 
to hypochondriacal preoccupation. Consider ratings of symptoms (1) and 
(3).
1 = Symptom present during past month, but not (2)
2 = Subject constantly reverts to hypochondriacal preoccupations during
Interview
** Do you often feel on edge or keyed up or mentally tense or strained? 
(Do you generally suffer with your nerves?)
(Do you suffer from nervous exhaustion?)
RATE SUBJECTIVE FEELING OF 'NERVOUS TENSION': There is no need for
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autonomic accompsuiiments for this symptom to be rated present.
1 = Symptom definitely present during past month, but of moderate
intensity, or Intense less than 50 * of the time
2 s Intense form of symptom present more than 50% of the past month
** Do you find that a lot of noise upsets you?
(Do noises sometimes seem to penetrate, or go through your head?)
RATE HYPERSENSITIVITY TO NOISE
1 = Moderate degree during month
2 = Severe degree during month
AUTONOMIC ANXIETY
In this section, rate only subjective einxiety with autonomic 
accompaniments, either free-floating or situational. Do not include 
worrying or nervous tension. Do not include anxiety due to eg 
persecutory delusions, except in the special item (no 13).




Difficulty getting breath Sweating
Dizziness Trembling)
** Have there been times lately when you have been very anxious or 
frightened?
(What was this like?)
(Did your heeæt beat fast?) Ask for other autonomic symptoms 
(How often in the past month?)
RATE FREE-FLOATING AUTONOMIC ANXIETY: Exclude if due to desusions. 
Exclude if purely situational.
, 1 « Symptom definitely present, with autonomic accompamlment, during past 
month, but of moderate clinical intensity, or Intense less than 50X 
of the time
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2 = Symptom clinically Intense more than 50* of the time
** Have you had the feeling that something terrible might happen?
(That some disaster might occur but you are not sure what? Like 
illness or death or ruination?)
(Have you been anxious about getting up in the morning because you are 
afraid to face the day?)
(What did it feel like?)
RATE ANXIOUS FOREBODING WITH AUTONOMIC ACCOMPANIMENTS
1 s Symptom definitely present, with autonomic accompaniment, during past
month, but of moderate clinical intensity, or intense less that 50* 
of the time
2 = Symptom clinically intense more than 50* of the time
RATE AUTONOMIC ANXIETY DUE TO DELUSIONS, etc and if necessary defer to 
end of interview
0 = No anxiety due to delusions or hallucinations
1 = Subject complains of anxiety but no evidence of anxiety on
examination
2 = Clearly anxious or frightened because of delusions or hallucinations
CUT OFF IF NO EVIDENCE OF ANXIETY OR IF ANXIETY DUE ONLY TO DELUSIONS 
SECTION 4
Have you had times when you felt shaky, or your heart pounded, or you 
felt sweaty, and you simply had to do something about it?
(What was it like?)
(What was happening at the time?)
(How often during the past month?)
RATE PANIC ATTACKS WITH AUTONOMIC SYMPTOMS: A panic attack is an 
intolerable anxiety leading to some action to end it, eg leaving a bus, 
phoning husband at work, going in to see a neighbour, etc
j1 » One to four panic attacks during month 
2 =■ Panic attacks five times or more
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Do you tend to get emxlous in certain situations, such as travelling, or 
being alone, or being In a lift or tube train?
(What situations? How often during the past month?)
CHECK LIST: can be presented on separate card and each Item rated 
separately. If needed.
Crowds (shop, street, theatre, cinema, church)
Going out alone; being at home alone
Enclosed spaces (hairdresser, phone booth, tunnel)
Open spaces, bridges 
Travelling (buses, cars, trains)
RATE SITUATIONAL AUTONOMIC ANXIETY
1 = Has not been In such situations during the past month but aware that
anxiety would have been present If the situation had occurred
2 = Situation has occurred during the past month and patient did feel
anxious because of It
What about meeting people, eg going Into a crowded room, making 
conversation?
CHECK LIST: Present card If necessary:
Speaking to an audience
Eating, drinking or writing In front of other people 
Parties
RATE AUTONOMIC ANXIETY ON MEETING PEOPLE
1 = Has not been In such situations during the past month but aware that
anxiety would have been present If the situation had occurred
2 = Situation has occurred during the past month and patient did feel
anxious because of It
Do you have any special fears, like some people are scared of feathers or 
cats or spiders or birds?
CHECK LIST: Present card If necessary:
Heights, thunderstorms, darkness, animals, or Insects of any kind 
Dentists, Injections, blood. Injury
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RATE ONLY SPECIFIC PHOBIAS, NOT GENERAL SITUATIONAL ANXIETY
1 = Has not been in such situations during the past month but aware that
anxiety would have been present if the situation had occurred
2 = Situation has occurred during the past month and patient did feel
anxious because of it
Do you avoid any of these situations (specify as appropriate) because you 
know you will get anxious?
(How much does it affect your life?)
RATE AVOIDANCE OF ANXIETY-PROVOKING SITUATIONS
1 = Subject tends to avoid such situations whenever possible
2 = Marked generalisation of avoidance has occurred during past month eg
subject has not dared to leave the house or has gone out only if 
accompanied
Describe anxiety symptoms and list phobias 
THINKING, CONCENTRATION, ETC
** Can you think clearly or is there any interference with your thoughts?
** Do your thoughts tend to be muddled or slow?
(Can you make up your mind about simple things quite easily?) (Make 
decisions about everyday matters?)
RATE SUBJECTIVELY INEFFICIENT THINKING (if due to intrusion of alien 
thoughts, rate 9)
1 = Symptom definitely present during the past month, but of moderate
clinical intensity, or intense less than 50% of the time
2 = Symptom clinically Intense more than SOX of the past month
** What has your concentration been like recently?
(Can you read an article in the paper or watch a TV programme right 
through?)
(Do your thoughts drift off so that you don't take things in)
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RATE POOR CONCENTRATION
1 = Only moderate form of symptom present during the past month (eg can
read a short article, can concentrate If tries hard); or Intense less 
than 509Ì of the time
2 = Symptom clinically Intense {caivnot attempt to read or concentrate)
more than 5096 of the past month
** Do you tend to brood on things?
(So much that you even neglect your work?)
RATE NEGLECT DUE TO BROODING
1 = Symptom has caused moderate Impairment to work or social
relationships
2 = Marked Impairment
** What about your Interests, have they changed at all?
(Have you lost Interest In work, or hobbles, or recreations?)
(Have you let your appearance go?)
RATE LOSS OF INTEREST continuing during the past month
1 = Symptom definitely present during the past month, but of moderate
clinical severity or severe loss less than 5096 of the time
2 = Symptom clinically severe more than 5096 of the past month
DEPRESSED MOOD
** Do you keep reasonably cheerful or have you been very depressed or low 
spirited recently?
Have you cried at all?
(When did you last really enjoy doing anything?)
RATE DEPRESSED MOOD NB When rating clinical severity of depression 
remember that deeply depressed people may not necessarily cry.
1 ■ Only moderately depressed during past month, or deep depression for 
less than 5096 of the time and tending to vary in intensity
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2 s Deeply depressed for more than 50% of the past month, and tending to 
be unvarying in intensity
** How do you see the future?
(Has life seemed quite hopeless?)
(Can you see any future?)
(Have you given up or does there still seem some reason for trying?) 
RATE HOPELESSNESS on subject's own view at present
1 = Hopelessness of moderate intensity but still have some degree of hope
for the future (irrespective of time during month)
2 = Intense form of symptom (Patient has given up hope altogether)
USE JUDGEMENT ABOUT WORDING
** Have you felt that life wasn't worth living?
(Did you ever feel like ending it all?)
(What did you think you might do?)
(Did you actually try?)
RATE SUICIDAL PLANS OR ACTS
1 = Deliberately considered suicide (not just a fleeting though) but made
no attempt
2 = Suicidal attempt but subject's life never likely to be in serious
danger, except unintentionally
3 = Suicidal attempt apparently designed to end in death (ie accidental
discovery or inefficient means)
NB Exeunlner should judge clinically whether there was Intent to end life 
or not. If in doubt, assume not.
Is the depression worse at any particular time of day?
RATE MORNING DEPRESSION (particular on waking)
0 - No depression
1 m Not specially marked in mornings
2 a Specially marked in mornings
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SELF AND OTHERS
** Have you wanted to stay away from other people?
(Why?)
(Have you been suspicious of their intentions? Of actual harm?)
RATE SOCIAL WITHDRAWAL
1 = Only passive from of symptom ie subject does not seek company but
does not refuse it if offered; or, if active withdrawal, less than 
50% of the month
2 = Actively avoids company (refuses it if offered). Actively withdraws
in this way for more than 50% of the month
** What is your opinion of yourself compared to other people?
(Do you feel better, or not as good, or about the same as most?)
(Do you feel inferior or even worthless?)
RATE SELF-DEPRECIATION
1 = Some inferiority, not amounting to feeling of worthlessness. If
subject consideres self to be worthless, this intense form of the 
symptom is present less than 50% of the time
2 = Subject consideres self to be completely worthless. Symptom present
more that 50% of the month
** How confident do you feel in yourself.
(For example, in talking to others, or in managing your relations with 
other people?)
RATE LACK OF SELF-CONFIDENCE WITH OTHER PEOPLE. Consider only competence 
in social relationships, not competence at mechanical work, et
1 a Moderate lack of self-confidence, or intense lack less than 50% of
the month
2 « Intense lack of self-confidence more than 50% of the month
** Are you self-conscious in public?
(Do you get the feeling that other people are taking notice of you in
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the street or a bus or a restaurant?)
(Do they ever seem to laugh at you or talk about you critically?)
(Do you consider people really are looking at you, or is it perhaps 
the way you feel about it?)
RATE SIMPLE IDEAS OF REFERENCE (NOT DELUSIONS)
1 = Marked self-consciousness only (irrespective of time during month)
2 = Feels that people are criticising or laughing at self but can be
reassured
IF NO EVIDENCE OF GUILT, CUT OFF SECTION 7
(IF EVIDENCE OF MISINTERPRETATIONS, DELUSIONS OF REFERENCE OR PERSECUTION 
SECTIONS 15B, 15C.)
IF EVIDENCE OF GUILT:
Do you have the feeling that you are being blamed for something, or even 
accused? What about?
RATE GUILTY IDEAS OF REFERENCE. Do not include Justifiable blame or 
accusation. Exclude delusions of guilt.
1 = Subject feels blamed but not accused (irrespective of time during
month)
2 = Subject feels accused of some sin or misdemeanour. Not delusional.
Do you tend to blame yourself at all?
(If people are critical, do you think you deserve it?)
RATE PATHOLOGICAL GUILT ONLY
1 = Subject feels over-guilty about some peccadillo (irrespective of time
during month)
2 » Subject feels to blame for everything that has gone wrong even when




(Like gas taps, dcx>rs, switches, etc)
(Do you have to touch or count things many times or repeat the same 
action over and over again?)
(What heqppens when you try to stop?)
RATE OBSESSIONAL CHECKING AND REPEATING
1 = Symptom of moderate intensity or, if severe, present less than 50% of
the time
2 = Symptom present in severe degree, more tha 50% of the past month
** Do you spend a lot of time on personal cleanliness, like washing over 
and over even though you know you are clean? What about tidiness?
(Do you get worried by contamination with germs?)
(Do you have other rituals?)
(What happens when you try to stop?)
RATE OBSESSIONAL CLEANLINESS AND SIMILAR RITUALS
1 = Symptom of moderate intensity or, if severe, present less than 50% of
the time
2 = Symptom present in severe degree, more than 50% of past month
** Do you find it difficult to make decisions even about trivial things? 
(Do you constantly have to question the meaning of the universe?)
(Do you get awful thoughts coming into your mind even when you try to 
keep them out?)
(What happens when you try to stop?)
RATE OBSESSIONAL IDEAS AND RUMINATION
1 = Symptom of moderate intensity or, if severe, present less than 50% of
the time
2 > Symptom present in severe degree, more them 50% of the past mor th 
DEREALISATION AND DEPERSONALISATION
** Have you had the feeling recently that things around you were unreal? 
(As though everything was an Imitation of reality, like a stage set, 
with people acting Instead of being themselves?)
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(What is it like? How do you explain it?)
RATE DEREALISATION
1 = Moderately intense form of symptom definitely occurred during the
past month, euid persisted for hours at a time. Things appear 
artificial, people appear lifeless and seem to act rather th^ tn being 
themselves
2 = Intense form of symptom occurred during the past month and persisted
for hours at a time, eg whole world appears like a gigantic stage 
set, with imitation instead of real objects and puppets Instead of 
people. (If delusional, do not rate here but symptom 90)
** Have you yourself felt unreal, that you were not a person, not in the 
living world?
(Or that you were outside yourself, looking at yourself from outside?) 
(Or that you look unreal in the mirror?)
(Or that some peu't of your body did not belong to you?)
(How do you explain it?)
RATE DEPERSONALISATION
1 = Moderately intense form of the symptom definitely occurred during the
past month and persisted for hours at a time. Subject feels himself 
unreal, a sham, a shadow
2 = Intense form of symptom definitely occurred during the past month eind
persisted for hours at a time. Subject feels he is dead, not a 
person, living in a parallel existence, a hollow shell, even that he 




individual scores for each 
current concern
average score on dimension
score categorised eg as high, low
one subject
















group defined in terms of frequency 
in each category high 2. subjects; low 2 subjects
The criterion used for each dimension are inevitably somewhat arbitrary 
but were decided with reference to the verbal labels attached to each 
individual current concern rating. The criterion are given as follows, 
with the equivalent verbal labels given in brackets.
Internality:
Internal: range 0.51-1.0 (internal rating 1.0)
External: range 0.0 -0.50 (external rating 0)
Universality:
Personal: range 0.51-1.0 (personal rating 1.0)
Universal: range 0.0-0.50 (universal rating 0)
Globality:
Global: range 1-2.49 (affecting all (4) or most areas(3) of life)
Not Global: range 2.50-5.0 (affecting some (3), few (4) or one area (1)
of life)
Stability (likelihood):
Stable: range 0-2.49 (Impossible (o), almost certain not to (1) or
unlikely to change(2))
Not stable: range 2.50-5.0 (quite (3), very (4), likely or certain (5)
to change)
Stability (time-scale):
Stable: range 0-2.49 (impossible (o), almost certain not to (1),
years (5) to change)




Uncontrollable: range 1-2.49 (not at all (o), little (1) under control)
Not controllable: range 2.5-5.0 (moderate (3), considerable (4), or
complete (5) control)
Personal Responsibility:
High: range 1-2.49 (totally (1), considerably (2) responsible)
Not high: range 2.5-5.0 (moderate (3), little (4) or no (5) personal
responsibility)
Other responsibility: as for personal responsibility.
It may be noted that these categories with the exception of the two 
internal dimensions (internality a»nd universality are not defined by the 
labels usually used to define the ends of the dimension (eg 
global-specific, stable-unstable). This was because the categories were 
constructed specifically with the study questions in mind and, to avoid 
the need for more than two categories per dimension, the pole not of 
interest was merged with the middle region of each dimension. Thus for 
example globality was categorised as global-affecting all or most areas 
of life, the non global category including affecting some, few or one 
area of life. The label of "specific" would not seem appropriate to a 
category including an average rating labelled for individual items as 
"affecting some areas of life".
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Appendix F BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY
Here are bo m  s-taiMMuts regarding the my  people feel or think. The 
itateMnte are grouped in 21 eeotione froa A  to U. One etatoMnt Baet 
be ohoeen froa eaoh eeotion. Ton are requested to put a oirole round 
the nuaber of the stateaent whioh best describes how you have been during 
the past fortnight.
I do not feel sad.
I feel blue or sad.
I aa blue or sad all the tlae and X oan't snap out of it. 
I aa so sad or unhappy that it is very painful.
I aa so sad or unhappy that I oan't stand it.
F I aa not partioularly pessiaistio or disoouraged about the future. 
I feel disoouraged about the future.
I feel I have nothing to look forward to.
I feel that I won't ever get over s^r troubles.
I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve.
I do not feel like a failure.
I feel I have failed more than the average person.
I feel I have accomplished very little that is worthwhile or that 
means anything.
As I look baok on my life all I can see is a lot of failures.
I feel I am a oomplete failure as a person (peu*ent, husband, wife),
I am not partioularly dissatisfied.
I feel bored most of the time.
I don't enjoy things the way I used to.
I don't get satisfaction out of anything any more.
I am dissatisfied with everything.
I don't feel partioularly guilty.
I feel bad or unworthy a good part of the time.
I feel quite guilty.
I feel bad or unworthy practically all the time now.
1 feel as though 1 am very bad or worthlecs.
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X don't f M l  I Mi boinc pmiahod.
I hav« a feallae that aoMthln« lad Mgr happen to m, 
X foal X an bain« puniahad or will ba puniahad.
X faal X daaarta to bo puniahod.
X want io ba ponishad»
X don't foal diaappointad in aoraolf.
X aa diaappointad in mraelf.
X don't like ^JrBalf.
X an diagnated with ngraelf.
X hate Boraelf.
H X don't feel 1 an angr woraa than angrbodgr elaa.
X aa very oritioal of nyaelf for weakneaaaa or niatakaa. 
X blaae ayself for eveiything that goea wrong.
X feel I have nany bad faolta.
X don't have any thoughts of harming ngnelf.
X have thoughts of harming nyself but I would not oarrgr them out.
X feel I would be better off dead.
X have definite plans about oonmitting suioide.
I feel Bcr fasdly would be better off if 1 were dead.
I would kill nyself if I oould.
I don't ory any more than usual.
I ory more now than I used to.
X oxy all the time now. I oan't stop it.
X xtsed to be able to oiy but now I oan't ory at all even thou^
I want to.
I am not more irritated now than I ever an.
I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to.
I feel irritated all the time.
I don't pet irritated kt nil r.t the things that used to irritate me.
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1 h a w  not lost Interest In other people
I an lees interested in other people now than I used to he.
I h a w  lost Bost of agr interest in other people and h a w  
little feeling for thea.
I h a w  lost all igr interest in other people and don't oars 
about thea at all.
I Bake deoislons about as well as ewr.
I aa lees sure of SQrself now and try to put off waking deolsions. 
I oan't Bake deolsions any aore without help.
I oan't Bake any deolsions at all any aore.
I don't feel I look any worse than I used to.
I aa worried that I am looking old or unattraotiw.
I feel that there are permanent changes in sy appearanoe and they 
Bake ae look unattraotiw.
I feel that I am ugly or repuleiw looking.
I oan Moik about aa well as befdre.
It takes extra effort to get started at doing something.
I don't work as well as I used to.
I h a w  to push nyself very hard to do anything.
I oan't do any work at all.
I oan sleep as well as usual.
1 wake up more tired in the morning than I used to.
I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get 
back to sleep.
I wake up early every day and oan't get more than 3 hours sleep.
I don't get any more tired than usual.
I get tired more easily than I used to. 
I get tired from doing anything.
I get too tired to do anything.
l(]r appetit« is no worse than usual*
Hjr appetite is not as good as it used to he* 
1^ appetite is aioh worse now*
I have no appetite at all angr aore*
I haven't lost nuoh weight, if any, lately*
I have lost nore than 3 pounds*
I have lost more than 10 pounds*
I have lost a»re than 13 pounds*
I an no nore oonoemed about ay health than usual*
I an oonoemed about aohes and pains or upset stonaoh or 
oonstipation or other unpleasant feelings in sy body*
I an so oonoemed with how I feel or what I feel that it is hard 
to think of nuoh else*
I an oonpletely absorbed in what I feel.
I have not notioed any reoent change in my interest in sex. 
Z am less interested in sex than I used to be*
I am much less interested in sex now*
1 have lost interest in sex completely*
t:  : :  :t it





SYMPTOMS AND CURRENT CONCERNS INTERVIEW
1 Main Symptom:
Interviewer: "Could you please tell me what la the main emotional 
problem or symptom which you are seeking help for?"
"How long have you been troubled by this problem or 
symptom?"
(The subjects spontaneous reply is recorded and fed back to them to check 
that the wording is acceptable and accurate. )
2 Current Concerns :
Interviewer: 1 "Would you please tell me about the main problems or 
concerns which you are currently facing in your life 
such as regcæding:
- your physical health
- your work
- your relationships especially within your family
- your social life
- your financies
or anything else which concerns you currently?"
(All spontaneous replies are recorded.)
2 "Have there been changes in your life or upsetting 
events which you feel you have not come to terms with 
or got over yet?"
(All spontaneous replies are recorded.)
f
3 "Are there any problems which you expect to come up 
against in the future and have not either come to 
terms with or found a way of preventing?"
(All spontaneous replies are recorded.)
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NB In this section only /external" problems or concerns in the person's 
life were included, not concerns about the person themselves except 
for physical illness. Thus symptoms, feelings and personal qualities 
could be excluded.
Each of the concerns identified above is written as a single statement on
a card, taking care to clarify what is the precise concern. Where the
concern is with the absence of a desirable state of affairs, the 
statement should be in the form of a negative eg "not having a part-time 
Job".
The interviewee is then asked to rank the cards in order of current
importance to them. For each of the top three rcmklng concerns the
duration of the concern is elicited. Concerns of less than a months 
duration were excluded and replaced.
For each of the top three ranking current concerns and main symptoms two 




This questionnaire concerns your views about what has happened regarding 
the problem stated below. There are no right or wrong answers. I am 
only interested in what you think. Please tick the answer which is 
closest to what you think.
Problem:
1 How much has this problem decreased?
not at all little moderately considerably totally
2 Have you not overcome this problem because of something about you (eg 
your capabilities, personality, lack of effort, mood, actions), or 
because of your circumstances, or because of other people?
entirely mostly partly myself mostly entirely
myself myself partly circumstances clrcumsteuices crcumstances
or other people or other or other
people people
3 How much would other people*, in your situation, have reduced this 
problem?
totally considerably moderately little not at all
4 In the past how Important has it been for this problem to cease?
not at all a little moderately considerably very considerably
important Important importwt Important Important
5 How much should you have reduced this problem?





This questionnaire concerns your views about what will happen regarding 
the problems stated below. There eu'e no right or wrong answers. I am 
only interested in what you think. Please tick the answer which is 
closest to what you think.
Problem;
1 How much do you expect this problem to decrease?
totally considerably moderately little not at all
2 How much will the solution to this problem depend on something about 
you (eg your capabilities, personality, mood, actions) rather than 
circumstances or other people?
entirely mostly partly myself mostly entirely
circumstances circumstances partly circumstances myself myself
or other or other people or other people
people
3 How much would other people*, in your situation, be able to reduce 
this problem?
not at all little moderately considerably totally
4 How importsuit is it that this problem ceases? I
very considerably moderately a little not at all
considerably important important important important
important
5 How much should you be able to reduce this problem?




ATTITUDE TO SYMPTOM QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire concerns your beliefs and attitudes concerning the 
main symptoms and feelings which you are seeking help with.
1 Vftiat are the main symptoms, feelings or emotional problems which you 
are seeking help with?
For each of the following questions please tick the answer that is 
closest to what you think. All the questions concern the main symptoms 
you have identified above.
2 During the past two weeks how distressing has the main symptoms or 
feelings been?
not at all distressing 




3 Are the main symptoms or feelings caused by the problems you are 
facing in your life or by what has happened to you (eg financial 
problems, marital, family, work, etc)?
entirely caused by problems I have faced or am facing 
mostly caused by problems I have faced or am facing 
partly caused by problems I have faced or am facing 
a little caused by problems I have faced or am facing 
not at all caused by problems I have faced or am facing
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4 To what extent do you feel that you are reaponalble for the main 
aymptoma or feelings?
entirely responsible for these symptoms and feelings 
mostly responsible for these symptoms and feelings 
partly responsible for these symptoms and feelings 
a little responsible for these symptoms and feelings 
not at all responsible for these synv)toms and feelings
5 To what extent aire the main symptoms and feelings caused by your 
personality and emotional make-up?
not at all caused by my personality or emotional make-up 
a little caused by my personality or emotional make-up 
partly caused by my personality or emotional make-up 
mostly caused by my personality or emotional make-up
6 Are the main symptoms or feelings caused by a physical medical problem 
or by a psychological or emotional problem?
entirely by a psychological or emotional problem 
mostly by a psychological or emotional problem
partly by a psychological or emotional problem, partly a physical 
medical problem
mostly by a physical medical problem 
entirely by a physical medical problem
7 To what extent is the main symptoms or feelings caused by what you 
have done in the past?
entirely caused by what I have done 
mostly caused by what I have done 
partly caused by what I have done 
a little caused by what I have done 
not at all caused by what I have done
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8 Compared with other people, how much do you think you have done to 
improve the main symptoms or feelings?
much more than other people 
a little more than other people 
as much as other people 
a little leas than other people 
much less than other people
9 To what extent do you feel that you are responsible for bringing 
about whatever changes are needed to improve your main symptoms or 
feelings?
not at all responsible for these changes 
a little responsible for these changes 
partly responsible for these changes 
mostly responsible for these changes 
entirely responsible for these changes
10 To what extent do you believe that the improvement of your main 
symptoms or feelings depend on some kind of physical medical 
treatment (eg drugs, ECT)?
entirely depends on a physical medical treatment 
mostly depends on a physical medical treatment 
partly depends on a physical medical treatment 
a little depends on a physical medical treatment 
not at all depends on a physical medical treatment
11 To what extent do you believe that the improvement of your symptoms 
or feelings depend on what you do?
does not depend at all on what I do 
depends a little on what I do 
partly depends on what I do 
mostly depends on what I do
-  234
12 How much do you think (not hope) that your main aymptom or feeling 
will improve in the foraeeable future?
likely to improve conq>letely 
likely to improve conaiderably 
likely to improve moderately 
likely to improve a little 
not likely to improve at all
13 How much do you think you will be able to improve your main aymptoms or 
feelings by something you can do?
I will not be able to do anything to improve my main symptom or feeling 
I will do something to improve my main synq>tom or feelings a little
I will do something to improve my main symptom or feelings moderately
I will do something to improve my main symptom or feelings considerably
I will do something to improve my main symptom or feelings completely
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